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A B S T R A C T

The participation of Spain in the Seven Years'
War resulted in the humiliating defeat of its armed
forces in America, and the French cession of Louisiana
brought Spain face to face with the expanding English
colonies of North America along an extended and defense
less frontier.

Fearing future English aggression against

his American empire, Carlos III reorganized his colonial
defenses.
The burden of maintaining Spain's growing armed
forces in North America weighed heavily on New Spain,
the richest of the viceroyalties.

Although the public

revenues of the kingdom more than doubled in the years
1763 - 1 7 7 9 / tlie increase in the subsidies (situados) paid

by Mexico City to the colonies financially dependent upon
it tripled.

Guatemala, Cuba, Louisiana, Santo Domingo,

and Puerto Rico were scenes of increased military and
naval activity, and since none of these colonies was

v
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self-sufficient, the growth of their defense establishments
was reflected in heavier disbursements by New Spain.
The Spanish government regarded another war between
. England and Spain as inevitable, and after hostilities
between England and her North American colonies began in
1775/ Spain, urged on by trance, moved slowly toward sup
port of the rebels and to war with England.

Limited and

covert aid to the Americans began in 1776 through the port
of New Orleans, and the port officials of Spanish America
were secretly instructed to admit American privateers.
Spain's declaration of war against England in 1779
coincided with the death of Antonio Marla Bucareli, Vice
roy of New Spain.

His successor, Martin de Mayorga,

unexpectedly faced the task of meeting the unprecedented
demands made upon the viceroyalty for money, gunpowder,
and food.

The discharge of his responsibility was made

more difficult by almost constant quarrels with Josi de
Gilvez, Minister of the Indies, and with officials in Cuba.
The principal objectives of the Spanish forces in
America were to expel the English from the Mississippi
River, to conquer Florida, and to destroy the English logcutting establishments on the Bay of Honduras. After
vi
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Bernardo de G&lvez, the Governor of Louisiana, had captured
the British posts on the Mississippi River and had taken
Mobile and Pensacola, plans were made to recover Jamaica
and to take the Bahamas.

All of these objectives were not

realized, for Jamaica was not invaded, and the Spanish
operation against the Baymen had only limited and tempo
rary success.

All the Spanish operations were financed

and supplied from New Spain, as was the expedition of the
French admiral de Grasse from the West Indies to Chesapeake
Bay in 1781 . In this service of supply Havana functioned
as the base for Spanish naval power and as a distribution
center for money and supplies.
During the period of hostilities, the value of New
Spain's disbursements to Spain, to other Spanish colonies,
and to allies of Spain, was equivalent to one-half of all
the revenue collected by the viceregal.establishment.
Although the viceroyalty was hard-pressed to meet the
obligation

imposed on it, the transportation of money,

food, and supplies from Mexico to Cuba and to other points
proved to be as difficult as their collection.

Poor

communication and a serious shipping shortage impeded the

vii
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movement of cargoes and caused the loss of perishable
material.
This dissertation, written largely from unpub
lished material in the Archivo General de la Nacidn in
Mexico City and the Archivo Hist6 rico Nacional in Madrid,
Spain, traces the nature and extent of New Spain's contri
bution to the prosecution of the American war. The conclu
sions reached are that, despite poor communications, the
shipping shortage and dissension among officials in Madrid,
Havana, Guatemala, and Mexico City, New Spain was virtually
the sole support of Spanish arms in America, and that during
the war the viceroyalty made a contribution to the mother
country and her allies unmatched in the history of colonial
Spanish America.

viii
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C H A P T E R

SPAIN PLANS REVENGE:

I

FROM THE PEACE OF

PARIS IN 1763 TO BELLIGERENCY IN 1779

On February 10, 1763, the Treaty of Paris ended
the war between Great Britain, Portugal, France, and
Spain.

By its terms Spain lost the island of Minorca and

the two Floridas, although she regained Havana and Manila,
'both of which had been lost to the British in 1 7 6 2 .
France had ceded Louisiana to Spain on compensation for
the loss of the Floridas , 1 but the effect on Spain of her
participation in the Seven Years 1 War could not be

•'•England had apparently hoped to gain control of
access to the Mississippi through possession of West Flor
ida, but her negotiators at the peace conference were
ignorant of the details of the physical geography of the
Gulf Coast of North America. The Duke of Choiseul, anx
ious to retain control of the river mouth for France *s
ally, had convinced the English that Lake Pontchartrain
was the most desirable entry to the river, and by so doing
had retained the Island of Orleans for Spain. Wilson Lyon,
Louisiana in French Diplomacy (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 193*0, PP* 23-24.
1
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measured solely in terms of colonial territory gained or
lost.

The armed forces of Carlos III in the Indies had

suffered a humiliating defeat, all the more humiliating
since it had been unexpected.

As late as July 22, 1 7 6 2 ,

the King had written to his confidant in Naples, Bernardo
Tanucci, that "the English will have their heads broken in
the Indies . "2

Yet at the time he wrote Havana was under

attack, its naval squadron had been sunk or scuttled in
the harbor, and its land defenses had been invested by an
English army.
Spain's mistake had been to go to war before she
was prepared, for her ministers had been deceived by the
misrepresentations of her commanders in the Indies.

The

soldiers of the Havana garrison had been ill-trained and
badly equipped, their officers had been incompetent, and
corrupt colonial officials had stolen supplies. Warships
had been unready for service for the same reasons, and

2Quoted in Ces&reo Fern&ndez Buro, Armada Espafiola
desde la uni 6 n de Castilla % de Araq 6 n . 9 Vols. (Madrid:
Tipografico "Sucesores de Rivadeneyra," Impresores de la
Real Casa, 190i-1915),. Vol., 7» P- ^6 [hereafter referred
to as Fern&dez Duro, Armadal .
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3
their commanders had even deprived the crews of their
proper rations . 3

During the years that the Marquis of

Ensenada had been in power (17^3“175^)/ he had constructed
a fleet strong enough to alarm British observers, but its
strength had been wasted, and the administrative reforms
which he had decreed had either been nullified or had
never been implemented . 4
The Viceroyalty of New Spain had never been
invaded, and the army of 8 ,5 0 0 regulars and militiamen
which Viceroy Cruillas had hastily formed had not been
tested in battle . 5

Although its armies had not seen

3Manuel Danvila y Collado, Reinado de Carlos III,
6 Vols. (Madrid: El Progreso Editorial, 1892-1 8 9 6 },
Vol. 2, p. 216 [hereafter referred to as Danvila, Carlos
III.
4PernAndlgz Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 108.
5Lyle N. McAlister, "The Reorganization of the
Army of New Spain, I763 -I7 6 6 ," The Hispanic American His
torical Review. Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February 1953)/ P. 7Cruillas had found that arms and equipment for the militia
almost non-existent. On December 3/ 1761/ he wrote Madrid
that he needed 2 0 ,0 0 0 muskets to arm his troops. Cn
August 30, 1762, the Minister of the Indies answered him
by reassuring him that the guns 'Will be sent." By the
date of Arriaga's reply Havana had already fallen and
peace talks were underway. Arriaga to Cruillas, AGNM,
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4
action, the war had cost the northern viceroyalty 3/390/471
pesos, one million of which had been totally wasted.

That

sum had been sent to Havana just before the English attack,
and had fallen into the hands of the invaders. 6
Since the payment of the first situado to Cuba in
1529/ New Spain had increasingly assumed the role of finan
cier for that island . 7

The function of Havana as a port of

deposit and transshipment and as a rendezvous point for
fleets bound to and from the Indies had necessitated
fortifications and garrisons to man them.

The shipyard at

RC, Vol. 82, August 30, 1762, expediente 6 6 , fol. 34
[hereafter referred to as McAlister, "Reorganization of
the Army"] .
6 "Defensa del Reyno: sobre gastos que se hicieron
con motivo de la Guerra declarada a los Yngleses en el afio
1762," AGNM, Historia, Vol. 44, Pol. 5 . This is an account
which was rendered to Viceroy Revillagigedo on May 3/ 1793;
it forms part of a history of the Real Hacienda which the
viceroy had ordered to be written, and which was eventually
published as: Fabian de Fonseca and Carlos de Urrutxa,
Historia general de real hacienda escrita cor orden del
Virev. Conde de Revillaqiqedo. 6 Vols. (Mexico: Imprenta
de Vicente Garcfia Torres , 1845-1853) •
7Julio LeRiverend Brusone, "Relaciones entre Neuva
Espafla y Cuba (1508-1820), " Revista de Historia de America.
Nums. 3 7 -3 8 (Enero-Diciembre de 1954), pp. 58, 88
[hereafter referred to as "Espana y Cuba"].
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5
Havana had built forty-five warships between 1724 and
I7 6 l,s and a naval squadron was based permanently on the
port.

All of these activities required subsidies which

New Spain had to furnish; and in 1763/ the year of defeat,
the financial distress of Cuba was acute.
Extraordinary efforts had to be made to repair the
damages of the siege.

The fortifications had been breached

at several points, and the English had practically
destroyed the shipyard after the surrender.

Enemy offficers

had told Lorenzo de Montalvo, the Comisario de Marina,
that they intended to leave the yard in such a state that no
vessles could be constructed in it for the next six years . 9

sAlejandro de Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre la
Isla de Cuba (La Habana: Fublicaciones del Archivo
Nacional de Cuba, L., i9 6 0 ), pp. 114-113 [hereafter
referred to as Humboldt, Cuba]
9 "Despacho del Comisario de Marina D. Lorenzo de
Montalvo al Ministro de Indias, Bailio Fr. D. Juli&n de
Arriaga, sobre evacuacion de la Plaza de la Habana por los
ingleses," printed in extenso in Fernandez Duro, Armada,
Vol. 7/ P. 114. Montalvo stated chat the English had
stolen everything that they could carry, and that machinery
and buildings had been wrecked or burned. This was con
trary to the terms of peace, which provided that all port
facilities should be delivered to Spain in the same condi
tion in which they had been found at the time of
capitulation.
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6

Cuba needed immediate relief for its land and sea
forces, which lacked food, clothing, and supplies of every
sort.

New Spain was called upon to furnish 3/209,362

pesos for the subsistence of the armed forces of the
island between July and December, 1763 / 10 and Julian de
Arriaga, Minister of the Indies, urged Viceroy Cruillas to
aid in the rehabilitation of the island with all available
funds . 11

Cruillas responded promptly, but not with enough

1 0 "I763 Havana restituda en 12 de Julio," AGNM,
Historia, Vol. 425/ fols. 79~S3*

11Arriaga to Cruillas, June 18, 1763, AGNM,. RC.
Vol. 83, expediente 80, no pagination. New Spain regu
larly sent subsidies to Havana to meet the expenses of its
naval squadron and its soldiery, and made similar payments
to other points. Besdies these regular disbursements,
there were frequent extraordinary bills to be paid from
Mexico, for while on campaign the squadron purchased food
and supplies where and when it was necessary. After a
cruise by the Havana warships claims for payment came in
to Mexico City, by way of Spain, from all ports at which
the ships had called, and the process of debt collection
was extremely slow. One case may be cited as an example
of the procedure involved. In 1762 the Governor of Spanish
Santo Domingo had furnished the Havana ships with a quan
tity of cordage and pitch. Santo Domingo then informed
Madrid of the quantity and value of the supplies. From the
Ministry of the Indies an expendiente eventually came to
Mexico City, instructing the viceroy to reimburse the Caias
of Santo Domingo for the amount owed, 3,343 pesos. The
processing of this debt had required a year and one-half.
Arriga to Cruillas, June 27, 1763- Ibid., expediente 8 6 ,
no pagination. The warships of Spain frequently sailed
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7
money to satisfy the Governor of Havana, the Count of
Ricla.12
While Cuba was rebuilding, hundreds of Spanish
colonists from East and West Florida were arriving in
Havana, for the principal settlements of that Province had
been surrendered to the English.

The fort of San Marcos,

the strong point of St. AugUstine, had beaten off three
English sieges since its completion in ± 6 8 7 ; but it had
now fallen bloodlessly into enemy hands.13

From Pensacola

with insufficient food and gear because of the widespread
dishonesty of the purveyors, who stole from the goods
delivered to the ships or who connived with royal offi
cials to purchase, at the expense of the crown, non
existent supplies. A detailed account of the nature of
these frauds can be found in Jorge Juan and Antonio de
Ulloa, Noticias Secretas de America (Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Mar 0c6ano, 1953)» PP* 65 -7 0 . Similarly, ships
of the British Navy frequently found themselves short of
food and essential supplies because of thefts by their
victuallers and dockyard officials. Robert G. Albion,
Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal
Navy. 1652-1862 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1926), pp. 47ff.
12Conde de Ricla to Cruillas, November 24, 1763/
AGNM, Historia. Vol. 425, fols. 51"56. The governor
thanked Cruillas for an emergency remission of 900,000
pesos, but said that it was not enough, and that the
English had seized 2,440,000 pesos during their occupation.
13The total population of Spanish Florida in 1763
was 3 »0 9 6 , a figure which included women, children, slaves,
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in West Florida 634 Spaniards sailed for Veracruz on
September 3» 1763/ carrying with them 108 Yamasee Indians
who were Catholic . 14

The West Florida refugees, borne in

a flotilla of small craft, arrived unannounced at Vera
cruz in early November? and Viceroy Cruillas helped them
to settle in New Spain . 15
At this point in his career Viceroy Cruillas must
have felt that he had discharged his duties as Captain
General well.

On August 21, 1763/ Ricardo Wall, Secretary

of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote him a congratulatory
letter which conveyed the thanks of the King and his

and soldiers. It is not clear that all of these withdrew
from Floi'ida when the provinces passed under the British
flag, but the overwhelming majority did so. Verne E.
Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565 to 1763
(Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1941),pp. 6 7 , 1 2 8 .
14Clinton N. Howard, The British Development of
West Florida (Berkeley: University of California Press,
19^7), P. 11.
15Arriaga to Cruillas, July 12, 1763/ AGNM, RC,
Vol. 84, expediente 273/ no pagination.
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complete approbation of the Viceroy's service during the
late war . 16

Less than a month later the Minister of the

Indies, Arriaga, added his personal approval, mentioning
Cruillas 1 organization of militia units, his wise selec
tion of officers, and his frequent trips of inspection to
army units and coastal fortifications. 17
The Viceroy had no way of knowing that in Madrid a
secret committee of imperial defense, composed of
Carlos Ill's principal ministers, had been convened to
consider the lessons learned in 1762 and that changes in
the colonial defense system were planned.

The King feared

future English aggression against his American colonies, 18
and the Duke of Choiseul, exploiting his fears, advised
Carlos to speed the rebuilding of "our navy [sic] and
colonies, in order that within a few years we may be able

16Ricardp Wall to Cruillas, August 21, 1763/ ibid.,
Vol. 8 3 , expediente 1 3 6 , no pagination.
17Arriaga to Cruillas, September 15, 1763/ ibid.,
expediente 142, no pagination.
laDanvila.. Carlos III, Vol. 2, p. 110.
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to wipe out our disgrace . " 19

Cruillas received the first

notice of the activities of the defense junta in a letter
from Arriaga,

dated September 27, 1763, which stated

briefly that the King had called a meeting of experts
(unnamed) to consider the problems of colcnial defense.
The yiceroy would be informed of the decisions of that
body "when it was convenient . " 20
Early in 1764 the junta devised a general plan.
For the time being warships would be buiit in Spain,
because the thorough destruction of the Havana facilities
made definite construction schedules in that port impos
sible . 21

There was, however, one badly needed maritime

reform which could be made by using existing vessels:

the

19Allen Christelow, "French Interest in the
Spanish Empire during the Ministry of the Due de Choiseul,
1759“177i/" The Hispanic American Historical Review,
Vol. XVI, No. 4 (November 1941), p. 5232°Arriaga to Cruillas, September 27, 1763, AGNM,
RC, Vol. 83, expediente 1 6 7 , no pagination.
21 Fern4ndez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, P* 118. No
ships were constructed at Havana until 176 5 , when three
were launched.
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11
institution of a regular mail service between the
Peninsula and the Indies. 22
The King's junta considered the fortifications of
the principal ports of America the first line of defense
and as a more important deterrrent than seapower. When
Viceroy Cruillas reported that English warships from
Pensacola were intruding in the coastal waters of New
Spain and had even carried out a leisurely reconnaisance
of the harbor of Veracruz, he recommended that a coast
guard be formed to watch English ship movements in the
Gulf of Mexico . 23

Having received no satisfaction from

22The center of the maritime post was to be
La Corufia. On the first day of each month a packetboat
was to leave with correspondence for the Indies. The mail
would be left at Havana where it would be picked up and
carried to the principal ports of the Spanish colonies in
the northern hemisphere. A separate vessel was to leave
La Corufia on the same dates for Rio de la Plata. The pro
visional regulations of the correo maritime were outlined
for Cruillas in the fall of 1764. Arriaga to Cruillas,
October 18, 1764, AGNM, RC, Vol. 85# expediente $1, no
pagination.
23Cruillas had first written to Spain asking for
the protection of New Spain's coastal waters on Novem
ber 28, 1764. Arriaga's response to this letter had been
noncommital. Arriaga to Cruillas, February 9» ^765,
ibid.. Vol. 86, expediente 5 3 , fol. 6 9 .
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his first request, Cruillas wrote again to Arriaga and
asked that a frigate be maintained in constant readiness
at Veracruz to challenge intruders who appeared offshore.
In his response to the Viceroy's second letter Arriaga
explained why such action was both impractical and
unnecessary.

The minister argued in a long didactic

statement that to maintain a large warship in a state of
constant readiness to put to sea was impossible.

Small

launches were more useful? they could sail from the port
and determine the identity of a strange craft.

If the

approaching vessel proved to be hostile, the launches
could warn the fort, whose cannon "were the true impedi
ment to attack . " 24

Arriaga's reply reflected the deci

sion of the King's junta to depend primarily upon repaired
and strengthened coastal forts, but the junta had also
decided that complete reliance upon fixed defenses was
dangerous.

Colonial armies would have to be created:

the ad hoc militia units which Cruillas had mustered in

24Arriaga to Cruillas, April 11, 1765# ibid.,
expediente 1 1 0 , fols. 224-225-
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13
seventeen sixty-two,:but regiments.raised and permanently
Stationed in America.25
The fiio (fixed) regiments in the colonies would
be built around cadres of veteran European troops, as
would the militia regiments.

As in the past, a few Penin

sular regiments of regulars would rotate in overseas
service.

The new system was first tried in Cuba, where

Mariscal de Campo Alejandro O'Reilly reorganized the
troops and militia of the island in 1763 and 1764.

The

results pleased the Governor and Captain General of the
island, who came to have a high regard for the Cuban
militia.26

2SMcAlister,

"The Reorganization of the Army,"

p. 8.
26The Governor and Captain General was Antonio
Marla Bucareli, who was to become Viceroy of New Spain in
1771- Bernard E. Bobb, The Vicereqency of Antonio Marri'3
Bucareli in New Spain. 1771-1779 (Austin: The University
of Texas Press, 1962 ), p. 88 [hereafter referred to as
Bobb, Bucareli]. O'Reilly also inspected the fortifica
tions of San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1 7 6 5 * and after a
consultation with the Chief Engineer, Tomds O ’Daly,
recommended that the garrison be increased and works
repaired. Nicolds Cabriliana, "Las fortificaciones militares en Puerto Rico," Revista de Indias. Vol. XXVII,
Nus. 107-108 (Enero-Junio, 1967 ), pp. 172-173• O'Reilly's
recommendations caused the King to send two battalions of
infantry and an artillery company to the island and to
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The task of reorganizing the armed forces of
New Spain was entrusted to Lieutenant General Juan de
Villalba y Argulo, who arrived at Veracruz on November 1,
1764, accompanied by four Mariscales de Campo. the Regi
ment of America, and veteran cadres for the militia and
fiio regiments to be formed.

Villalba had hardly reached

the capital when he and Viceroy Cruillas began a quarrel
which was to last almost two years.

According to Cruillas,

Villalba was arrogant, disrespectful, and many of his arbi
trary decrees encroached on the privileges of the
Viceroy . 27
Meanwhile, New Spain had acquired another depen
dent:

the Province of Louisiana.

A royal order of

May 21, 1765/ named Antonio de Ulloa governor of the new
colony and fixed its annual situado at 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 pesos . 28

order New Spain to send 100,000 pesos annually to Puerto
Rico for the repair and improvement of the fortifications.
Arriaga to Cruillas, September 20, 1765# AGNM, RC.
Vol. 27/ expediente 222, fols. 115-H5 v .
27 McAlister,
p p . 16- 1 7 .

"The Reorganization of the Army,"

2aArriaga to Cruillas, May 21, 1765# AGNM, RC.
Vol. 8 6 , expediente 155/ fols. 331“331v *
first
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The Governor, who arrived in March, 1 7 6 6 , found Louisiana
helpless to resist any thrust from British West Florida.
With less than 100 Spanish soldiers at his command, Ulloa
was unable to do more than to disperse token garrisons to
several posts along the Mississippi River . 29
Viceroy Cruillas' situation became more difficult
with the arrival in July, 1 7 6 5 , of Jose de G&lvez, who
came bearing the titles of Visitador General and Intendente
del Eiercito. There was no legal precedent for such a
title, for the intendant system had not been established
in New Spain.

Since Lieutenant General Villalba had been

named Commandante General de las Armas de Nueva Espaffa.
there were simultaneously in the kingdom two officials

situado was inadequate, for Spain had undertaken to redeem
more than two million livres in paper money which was then
in Circulation in Louisiana. The Mexican silver promptly
disappeared from circulation into private hoards, Vicente
Rodriguez Casado, Primer os affos de dominaci6 n espaflola en
la Luisiana (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas, 19^2), p. 116. In May 1767/ the king ordered
the situado increased to 250,000 pesos. Arriaga: to Cruil
las , May 19» 1 7 6 7 , AGNM, RC, Vol. 90, expediente 133,
fols. 227 - 2 2 8 .
29John W. Caughey, Bernardo de G&lvez in Louisi
ana. 1776-1783 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
193^)/ PP* 12-13 [hereafter referred to as Caughey,
Gcilvez] .
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from Spain whose powers encroached on those of the Viceroy
as Captain General, an office in which viceroys "often
acted with more freedom and initiative than in any other
capacity . " 30
Cruillas had heen solely responsible for the
defense of New Spain during the war emergency of 1 7 6 2 ; he
had raisied, equipped, and commanded an army of more than
8,000 men which he had been able to create from units
which had previously existed only on paper.

Yet in 1765

he found himself engaged in a jurisdictional struggle with
two other high-ranking officials who had assumed direct
command of the troops in his viceroyalty and who were
responsible only to the crown.

Only the intervention of

the King could resolve the quarrel, and Carlos III acted
by recalling both Villalba and the Viceroy.31

On

August 23# 1766, Cruillas surrendered the symbolic baton

3°Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in
America (New York: Oxford University Press, ±9^7)>
p. 115.
3 1McAlister, "Reorganization of the Army,"
pp. 28-29. Before his departure Villalba submitted a
report which showed the strength of the army of New Spain
to be 2,3^1 regulars and 1 0 ,6 9 8 militiamen. Ibid., p. 28.
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of command at Otumiba to his successor, the Marquis de
Croix, who came to America with strict orders to cooperate
fully with Visitador General Gcilvez ,32
One of the first acts of the new Viceroy was to
inspect the new army whose organization had caused the
recall of his predecessor and Lieutenant General villalba.
Despite Villalba's final report that the organized militia
numbered more

than

10,000, de Croix found that the mili

tia units hardly existed in actuality (Foco mas que sobre
el p a pel), a condition which the Viceroy attempted to
correct by frequent musters and inspections . 33
De Croix found that New Spain 's financial commit
ments to the defense of the Windard Isles had not been
honored during the last two years of Cruillas' vice
regency.

In the period ±761 - 1 7 6 6 , the latter had sent

1,^05 convicts and vagabonds from New Spain to work on the

32 McAlister, “Reorganization of the Army," p. 30.

33Instrucci6n del Virrev Marqu6s de Croix que
deia a_ au sucesor Antonio Maria Bucareli: prologo y
notas de Norman F. Martin, S.J.
(Mexico: Editorial JUS,
i9 6 0 ), p. 112, Num. 139 [hereafter referred to as DeCroix,
Instruccidnl .
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fortifications and in the shipyard of Havana , 34 but
payments of situados had lagged.

In 1J66 the situado of

Havana had been set at 500,000 pesos, to be divided as
follows?

3 0 0 ,0 0 0 for the fortifications and shipyard;

100,000 for other projects in Cuba, and 100,000 for
Puerto Rico . 35
But in December, 1765, Havana had complained to
the Minister of the Indies that no money at all had been
received from Mexico City during the past year, and that
work in the shipyard and on the construction of fortifica
tions had ceased . 36

On September 30, 1?66, Arriaga wrote

a strongly-worded letter to the Viceroy.

The Intendente

de Marina of Havana had informed him that no situados had
been sent to Cuba for a year and one-half, and that all

34Cruillas to Arriaga, August 11, 1 7 6 6 , AGNM, CV,
Vol. 9» expediente 987/ fol. 409* Cruillas stated in this
letter that he could have sent more forzados. Although he
had offered many more, officers of the ships sent to take
them to Havana had rejected many, because they were not
strong enough for the work.
35Arriaga to Cruillas, March 25# 17&6, AGNM, RC,
Vol. 8 8 , expediente 40, fol. 82.
36Arriaga to Cruillas, March 25» 1766, ibid.,
expediente 39/ fol. 8l.
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shipbuilding and repair had been halted.

The King had

ordered Arriaga to repeat to the Viceroy that construction
must proceed,

"for the Armada is the most crucial nerve of

the Monarchy, and in case of shortages it is to be prefer
red to other less important enterprises. " 37
The Intendentes de Tierra % Mar were instructed to
list the deudas que se justifiquen (legitimate debts) of
their respective ramos and to forward the statement to the
viceroy for payment, in order that the credit of the crown
should remain unimpaired.

Beginning in January, 1 7 6 8 , the

37Arriaga to de Croix, September 3 0 , 1766, ibid..
Vol. 89/ expediente 190, fol. 6 5 . The author of the com
plaints to Spain about the stoppage of work in the ship
yard was Lorenzo de Montalvo, who is referred to in
correspondence both as Comisario and Intendente. This
able officer, who had spent his whole working life in
naval administration, had come to Havana in 1756 bearing
a title previously unknown in America: Intendente de
Marina % Director de _la Real Fabrica de Navios. The date
of his appointment antedates by six years the establish
ment of an Intendencia de Guerra y Hacienda in Cuba.
1
Luis Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias (Sevilla:
Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1959),
pp. 18- 1 9 . Haring had previously accepted 176 ^ as the
date of the first intendency in the American co IcniOo•
Haring, Spanish Empire in America, p. 13^-.
*
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situados were to be increased.

One million nine hundred

thousand pesos were to be divided in this manner:

7 0 0 ,0 0 0

for all expensfes of the marine, 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 for the fortifica
tions of Havana, 400,000 for the pay of the garrisons, and
500,000 for the purchase of Cuban tobacco for the royal
monopoly'.38
The increase in the money allocated to the marine
was needed for an accelerated program of naval construc
tion and was

so used.

Eighteen warships were launched at

the Havana shipyard during the five years of de Croix's
viceregency, a greater number than had been launched in
any comparable period of time . 39

Extraordinary requests

for funds for shipbuilding were frequent during the next
few years , 40 and de Croix wrote in his lnstrucci6 n to

30Arriaga to de Croix, February 2, 1768, ibid.,
Vol. 9 2 , expediente 47# fols. 85 -8 7 .
"Humboldt, Cuba, p. 116.
4°Between 1766 and 1770 ten royal c6 dulas directed
New Spain to pay the Intendente de Marina at Havana vary
ing amounts to meet emergency expenses hot covered by the
annual situatos.
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Bucareli that the demands of Havana had nullified an
increase of 3/200,000 pesos in the annual income of the
Real Hacienda during the period of his rule.41
In the summer of 1 7 6 9 , New Spain received a sub
stantial shipment of artillery and small arms from the
Peninsula,42 which enabled the viceroy to arm shore bat
teries erected to support the fort of San Juan de Ultia in
the defense of Veracruz, the port which the Viceroy called
"the key to the Kingdom."43

The fort of San Diego which

guarded Acapulco possessed more artillery and muskets
than it needed, but the Viceroy allowed the surplus;
weapons to remain on the west coast.

The road between

4lDe Croix, Instruccidn, p. 100, num. 114.
42Arriaga to de Croix, June 20, 1769/ AGNM, RC,
Vol. 9 ^/ expedientes 135 and 135 b i s , fols. 247~248v.
The shipment had left Cadiz on June 8, 1769/ in seven
merchant ships which also transported the Regiment of
Sevilla to garrison duty in Havana. The cargo for Vera
cruz included thirty-six pieces of artillery, ten mortars,
and 2,130 muskets, together with 3 8 /000 projectiles of
varying calibres.
*3De Croix, Instrucci6n. 115, num. 146.
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Acapulco and the capital was so wretched that their
transportation would have been too costly and difficult. 44
Fortunately for Spain, the reorganization of its
colonial defenses could be carried out in time of peace,
for Europe remained quiet during the rule of de Croix and
of his successor, Bucareli.

In 1770 the expulsion of a

British garrison from West Falkland Island by an expedi
tion from Buenos Aires brought tension, and an embargo was
placed on all transatlantic shipping from the ports of

44 Ibid.. p. 117, num. 152. Travel over the road
from Acapulco to the capital was mostly by mule-back, and
the passage of wheeled vehicles was virtually impossible
during the eighteenth century. In the first decade of the
nineteenth century a better highway was planned, but great
blocks of stone lay along the road for generations without
ever being placed in position. When Teodoro de Croix
traveled the road in 1767 to assume the post of castellan
at the Acapulco fort, he called the road "impracticable.''
William L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York:
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1939)» PP* 3 8 6 -3 8 7 [hereafter
referred to as Schurz, Manila Galleon] . Eighteenth cen
tury guns were inordinately heavy, by modern standards, in
relation to their power. A thirty-two pounder gun weighed
more than three tons. Many of the guns mounted at
Acapulco had come from Manila, since transportation from
Manila, which had an excellent foundry, was more
practicable than transportation from Veracruz.
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America, but the ban was lifted less than two months later
when the dispute was resolved.45
Yet. the government of Spain expected war with
England sooner or later.

Count Aranda, President of the

Council of Castile, in a dictamen addressed to the King on
September 13, 1770, expressed the belief that England
would attack as soon as she felt herself prepared, per
haps without a formal declaration of war.

Therefore,

Spain must plan to wage defensive war in America.
principal ports must be reinforced.

The

He felt no concern

for the safety of the Viceroyalty of Peru, because its
geographical isolation would protect it.46

Carlos III saw

the threat of English aggression in all parts of the world,
and in a personal letter to King Louis XV of France
recommended that his ally devote more time and attention
to his navy and less to his army.

The naval forces which

45Arriaga to de Croix, December 22, 1770, AGNM, RC,
Vol. 97/ expediente 155/ fols. 2 8 9 -2 9 0 and same to same,
February 4, 1771/ ibid.. Vol. 9 8 / fols. 67 - 67 V.
46"Dictamen dado por el Conde de Aranda, Presi
dents del Consejo, al rey Carlos III, en Madrid a 13 de
Septiembre de 1770," printed in Danvila, Carlos III.
Vol. 4, p. 129.
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England maintained in the East Indies, in the
Mediterranean, and in Jamaica, justified great vigilance
on the part of the Bourbon powers; and Carlos had ordered
that two Spanish squadrons be constantly kept in a state
of readiness to put to sea.47

Shortly afterwards he

declared to Louis:

In reference to armaments in the present time of
peace, my plan is formed, because all my ships are
always maintained in such a1 state that in three
months of time they can be armed and ready to go on
campaign.48

4 7 "Carta de Carlos III a Luis XV, Aranjuez, 27 de
Mayo de ljjl," printed in ibid., Vol. 4, p. 152.
48Carta de Carlos III a Luis XV, Aranjuez, 27 de
Mayo de 1771# " printed in ibid., Vol. 4, p. 154. The
Earl of Sandwich, who took office as First Lord of the
Admiralty in London in 1771# wrote to Lord North:
"Had we broke with Spain the other day [17703# 1 am con
vinced that we should have lost the Indies and possibly
Gibraltar, and suffered the capture of an immense fleet
of merchantmen, before we could have had a fleet in readi
ness so as to venture to dispatch any considerable force
from home: for when I came to the Admiralty we had not
above fifteen ships fit for sea, and I believe the French
and Spanish were then superior to us and more forward in
their preparations."
George Martelli, Jemmy Twitcher: A Life of the.Fourth
Earl of Sandwich, 1718-1792 (London: Jonathan Cape,.
1 9 6 2 ), p. 8 9 .
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A Spanish historian of the reign of Carlos III has
described the temper of Spain in the 1770's by stating
that "the resolution to fight England was already a fact.
The only things lacking were to arm and to seek an oppor
tune moment . " 49

In spite of the belligerence of Count

Aranda and the insistence by the King on the constant
readiness of his ships, the "opportune moment" was some
time in coming.

There was still peace in Europe and the

Indies when a change of viceroys occurred in New Spain.
On September 22, ± 7 7 Antonio Maria Bucareli,
Governor and Captain General of Cuba since ±7 6 6 , suc
ceeded the Marquis de Croix.

War did not appear to be

imminent, and Bucareli was instructed to increase the
income of the Real Hacienda and to practice economy.
Within ten days of his arrival in Mexico City he dis
charged three battalions of militia then serving in the
capital.

His preliminary inspection of several militia

units convinced him that they were of little value.

Since

his initial reduction of their numbers had received the

40 Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 412.
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approval of the King, he then dissolved two infantry
companies and a lancer squadron of Veracruz.

Because he

had formed a low opinion of the Mexican militia and had
been directed to economize whenever possible, Bucareli
formed no new militia units until 1775/ when the incipient
rebellion in the English colonies of North America caused
general uneasiness throughout the Spanish-American
empire.50
While practicing economy in the employment of
soldiery, the Viceroy favored substantial expenditures on
the fixed defenses of Veracruz.

Upon first seeing the

fort of San Juan de Ul6a at that port he had expressed
surprise at its small size, and he began at once to plan
its expansion and improvement.

He convened a junta of

engineers to discuss changes in the works and, finding
that the members of the junta were unable to agree among
themselves, forwarded all their opinions to Spain for
judgment at a higher level.

The decision of the home

government was to call in more experts.

In informing

soBob, Bucareli. pp. 89“90*
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Bucareli of this, Arriaga delivered a short homily on the
planning of fortifications.

The King had noted, the Min

ister of the Indies wrote, the frequency with which vice
roys, captains general, and governors of fortified places
proposed and planned fortifications for their respective
districts and their extravagant demands for artillery,
munitions, and all types of war materiel.

There was

always a wide diversity in these plans and requests, and
the proposals for improvement were always presented when
there was a change of administration in the Indies,
whether of viceroys, governors
or engineers.

artillery commandants,

Apparently, every new commander, no matter

what his rank, felt that his predecessor, had been negli
gent in providing for the defense of his district.

In

order to cut short the debate in the case of the fortifi
cations at Veracruz, the King had dispatched two engineers
from Spain to Mexico to decide the matter.51

After dis

cussion among the visiting engineers and those already in
New Spain, plans were formed and work was begun.

The

slArriaga to Bucareli, September 20, 1775/ AGNM,
RC, Vol. 106, expediente 226, fols. 432-433*
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reconstruction was completed in 1777 at a cost of
approximately 4,500,000 pesos*52
Throughout the viceregency of Bucareli the sub
sidies paid by New Spain to its financially dependent
colonies rose steadily.53

In Havana an accelerated pro

gram of shipbuilding which had begun in 1765 was still in
progress,54 and the annual cost of the improvements of the
fortifications of Puerto Rico rose to 225/000 pesos by
1 7 7 5 *55

To the old outposts of defense a new one had been

added within the past decade:

the Province of Louisiana.

The loss of Canada in the Seven Years' War and the cession

52Bobb, Bucareli. p. 148.
53The situados paid to the Windward isles and to
Louisiana and distributed through Havana were as follows
for the years 1772, 1774, and 1 7 7 8 : 3,146,332 pesos,
4,324,347 pesos, and 4,531,910 pesos. Ibid.. p. 226.
Bobb states that figures for the missing years are either
unclear or missing.
54Humboldt, Cuba, p. 117. Thirteen ships were
built at Havana during Bucareli's viceregency.
55Arriaga to Bucareli, November 6, 1775, AGNM,
RC, Vol. 106, expediente 271, fols. 491"491v.
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of Louisiana to Spain had brought Spain and England into
collision along a frontier that extended from the mouth of
the Mississippi River to the coast of the Pacific North
west.

The acquisition of Louisiana with its thin popula

tion and its poorly defended border made the fear of
further English aggression more acute and intensified
Spanish belief that war was inevitable.56
The first Spanish governor of Louisiana, Antonio
de Ulloa, found the Province helpless to resist any
attack from the English establishments in their new pos
session, West Florida.

An attempt to determine the opti

mum northern limit of Spanish control of North America
was begun in 1764, when the Marquis of Rubi, who accom
panied Lieutenant General Villalba to New Spain, was
charged with the inspection of the northern frontier of
the viceroyalty.

His lieutenant, a young engineer officer

named Nicol&s Lafora, spent two years traveling the line
of the isolated missions and presidios of the north.
report, submitted as an informe of twelve chapters,

56Haring, The Spanish Empire in America^
pp. 134-135.
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recommended the establishment of a chain of forts on or
near the Rio Grande River and the abandonment of fortified
points north of the river, with two exceptions.

San

Antonio de B6xar in Texas and Santa F6 in New Mexico were
to be left as salients projecting deep into hostile Indian
territory.

The presidios on the proposed line would, in

the Words of de Croix, "form a barrier which would serve
for defense, and they should be able to aid one another."57
Such an approach to frontier defense was impos
sible in the case of the newly-acquired territory of
Louisiana, whose eastern boundary, the Mississippi River,
faced an area rapidly being penetrated by English colo
nists.

The great distances involved, the lack of support

from Cuba, and the hostility of the French population
combined to frustrate the efforts of Ulloa to establish a

57De Croix, Instrucci6n, p. 128, num. 128.
Lafora's reports of the conditions of the frontier
presidios. their garrisons and their equipment were almost
uniformly unfavorable. His account is filled with
descriptions of unpaid, ill-equipped and ill-fed soldiers
and of mission priests who had made rio converts for
decades. Lawrence Kinnaird, The Frontiers of New Spain:
Nicolas Lafora's Description. 1766-1768 (Berkeley: The
Quivira Society, 1958), passim.
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series of forts on the river.

No real progress toward

strengthening the Province was made until after Ulloa was
ousted from New Orleans by a revolt of the colonists in
1768.

His successor, Lieutenant General Alejandro

O'Reilly, the organizer of the Cuban militia and the
friend of Bucareli, then Captain General of the island,
reduced Louisiana to obedience and organized a citizen
militia.

By 1770 this force numbered 1,040 men, who were

commanded by native French colonial officers and trained
by Spanish regulars.

The small force could not serve as a

bulwark against the English, but it could be "an obstacle
that would delay them, at least temporarily, in their
attempts to get at the mines of Mexico. . . ."se
When the conflict between England and her colonies
in North America began in 1775/ Spanish concern for the
safety of Louisiana and Spanish America in general grew.
In June of that year, Count Aranda, then Ambassador to
1

France, expressed his fears in a letter to the Marquis of

S8Caughey, Galvez, p. ^2. O ’Reilly
maintained seven fortified points on the Mississippi River
between the mouth of the river and the mouth of the
Missouri River.
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Grimaldi, the Spanish Minister of State.

If the North

Americans should win their independence, he predicted,
Louisiana would be the first object of their expansion.
Whether they became independent or not, the English colo
nies "must be viewed as a growing power for our
subjection."50
Grimaldi's reply to Aranda in August was equally
gloomy.

He feared that no possible program of coloniza

tion from Spain could increase the population of Louisiana
enough to meet the tide of British migration moving west
ward toward the Mississippi River.

The English would

always be able to raise armies which Spanish Louisiana
could not match.

To develop the province and to erect

strongly garrisoned forts would only cause the conquest
of Louisiana to be more of a challenge to the English.
short, he-concluded,

In

"the evil has no remedy."60

After fighting between British troops and
Massachusetts colonists had begun, Governor Luis de Unzaga

59Panvila. Carlos III. Vol. 4, p. 415.
6°Ibid.. p. 4l6.
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of Louisiana became alarmed.

He sent a vessel to

Philadelphia, ostensibly to buy flour, but actually to
discover how serious was the rift between England and her
colonies.

The reports which he received were not encour

aging, and he feared attack from both loyalists and
rebels.

Lacking troops and strong fortifications, he

wrote to Spain that he could only follow the advice given
in 1770:

if attacked, fight a delaying action and fall

back to Mexico.61
In September,1775 the:Marquis.:of Grimaldi wrote to
Count Aranda in Paris that war might break out at any
time between the Bourbon allies and England, and that
England could not possibly muster forces for the subjec
tion of the French and Spanish colonies before the autumn
of 1776.

The defenses of the Indies must be strengthened

and the colonial forces supplied with war m=tteriel at
once.

Precautions must be taken against a sudden assault

with or without a declaration of w a r .

He warned that

"prudence dictates that the two Courts take without delay

6l0aughey, Galvez, p. 5^•
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effective steps to defend their respective possessions,
as if war were already upon us."62
In New Spain Viceroy Bucareli turned his atten
tion to the militia, whose numbers had remained static
since 1772.

By 1776 the strength of the enrolled mili

tiamen was increased from 6,837 to 14,000, and the number
of regular troops stationed in the kingdom rose from 3/754
to 4,527.63

More soldiers were sent to reinforce the

Cuban garrisons? the Regiment of Spain, for instance,
being ordered to Havana in February, 1776.64

With the

troop transports were to come four frigates to cruise the
Windward Isles, the Antilles, the Mexican Gulf, and "ail
the other places enemy squadrons could sail to our
Dominions.,,ss

62Danvila, Carlos III. Vol. 4, p. 421.
63Bobb, Bucareli. pp. 101-102, 108.
°4Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, August 6, 1776,
Vol. 108, expediente 66, fol. 1 3 8 . The burden of the
regiment,!s annual payroll, 2 0 0 ,6 5 6 pesos, became an
additional expense to New Spain.
65Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, February 29, 1776,
ibid., Vol. 107, expediente 5 8 / fols. 100-lOOv. Aranda
reported the dispatch of the cruisers to Vergennes, the
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By the same mail packet which brought the above
orders, the new Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de Gctlvez,
sent Bucareli his appraisal of the deteriorating European
situation.

He forecast the involvement of Spain in the

struggle between England and her rebellious colonies.
Relations between Madrid and London were for the moment
cordial, but the American conflict was a growing threat
to the neutrality of all the nations of Europe.

The

Viceroy was directed to make a survey of the defenses of
New Spain, but he was also told not to manifest alarm nor
to indicate that an emergency might soon arise.66

French Foreign Minister, who was pleased by the move.
Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p.. 452.
66Jos4 de Gctlvez to Bucareli, February 28, 17?6,
ibid., expediente 50, fols. 87“88v. Julictn de Arriaga,
who had served as Minister of the Indies since the fall of
the Marquis of Ensenada in 1754, had died in January,
1776. An unsociable man, incapable of forming friend
ships, he had been humorless, efficient, and incorrupti
ble, but his undoubted talents as an administrator had
not been appreciated by Carlos III, who had always
regarded him with suspicion because of Arriaga's friend
ship with Jesuits. Fernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7/ p. 1 8 7 .
Bucareli, after a survey of New Spain's resources for war,
requested that artillery of all calibres be sent from
Spain. Gctlvez in his reply admitted that Spain could not
satisfy even its domestic needs for guns, and he wrote
that negotiations were underway to buy naval guns from
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A major threat to the neutrality of continental
Europe was the growing activity of American commerce
raiders, particularly in the English Channel, where they
so successfully harassed English shipping that marine
insurance rates rose to more than twenty percent by
1777 *67

Count Aranda, from Paris, expressed amazement at

the American successes at sea.

The maritime strength

which the colonists displayed was incredible to him, and
he speculated that a large percentage of the Americans
were seamen because of their extensive foreign commerce.
Although the British also took many prizes, their losses
exceeded their gains, because the prizes taken by the

Carron, Scotland (the well-known large-calibre pieces
known as "carronades" ). Bucareli was directed to plan
the establishment of a foundry for bronze cannon in New
Spain. Gcilvez to Bucareli, October 6, 1776, ibid.,
Vol. 109, expediente 21, fols. 36-37* For the next two
years surveys, plans, and reports on the projected foundry
were made, but it was never built. Bobb, Bucareli,
p p . Ill-112.
67Samuel P. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935),
pp. 5^-55*
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American vessels were more numerous and of greater
value.68
The success of the rebel privateers prompted Jos6
de Galvez to advise Bucareli, in a secret letter of
September 20, 1776, how the American ships should be
received in the ports of Spanish America.

In an official communication of September 19, the
Marquis of Grimaldi tells me the followings
"The
Ambassador of England hinted to me (assuring me above
all that he did this on his own initiative and without
orders from his Ministry) how pleasing to his Sover
eign would be the news that American ships had been
denied entrance into the ports of Spain, as had just
been ordered in Portugal, by considering them rebel
lious subjects of a friendly power.69,! was quick to

68Juan P. Yela Utrilla, Espafla ante la independencia de los Estados Unidos.. 2 Vols. in one (Lerida:
Graficas Academia Mariana, 1925), Vol. II, p. 11. In some
cases American cruisers caused near-starvation in the
British West Indies, which were almost completely dependent
upon North America and Europe for food. A decline in the
free Negro population of Jamaica has been attributed to
starvation during the war years„ The whites fared better,
as did their valuable chattels, the slaves. Piers Mackesy,
The War for America, 1775-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1964), p. 228 [hereafter referred to as
Mackesy, War for America] .
690n August 23, 1775# England had issued a Procla
mation of Rebellion which forbade all intercourse with the
rebellious colonies, and the seizure of rebel shipping
began. The proclamation could not be effectively enforced
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respond by declaring that it was my belief that very
few cargoes came from their colonies: that if they
did it was part of a continuing exchange of goods to
which Spain had always been accustomed, and that doubt
less they bore the English flag. But I added that I
would write to the Governors of the principal ports
to ask news. I did this really to warn the Governors
of the terms in which they ought to answer me in a
letter that can be shown, and in another in which they
privately expressed the plain truth: whose contents
the Ambassador need not hear.
The King has taken the foregoing matter under con
sideration: and reflecting that to close his ports to
the Americans would be to declare them enemies of
Spain, and they would take as prizes our ships in every
3ea, without leaving us any means of reprisal or even
of punishing this offense: the result is that the
Americans may be cordially admitted into the ports of
Spain, although they may present themselves under their
own flag, distinct from the British, and that if the
English Court should make complaints, that they may be
made to see that the King cannot expose the commerce
of his subjects to suck risks, since neither his
Britannic Majesty nor his Ministry would be obligated
to compensate for the damages which their rebellious
colonists would cause us.
For my part, I have made the matter known to the
Governors, under the greatest secrecy, about how to
receive and deal with with the ships of the English
colonies in the ports of Spain, instructing them that

because of the shortage of British warships, and the Amer
icans were quick to begin reprisals.
"The sea is now
over-spread with privateers on every part," the Earl of
Sandwich wrote to Lord Howe in 1778, "and the demands for
convoys and cruisers is so great that we know not how to
supply them." Mackesy, War for America, p. 173*
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if an American privateer with a prize, no matter what
its nationality, should enter, they must not impede
it, assuming that the prize should fly the same flag
as her captor, as is the general practice. In the
same manner an English privateer which might capture
an American prize would not be molested."
I make these dispositions known to Your Excellency
in order that they may serve as a guide in interpreting
orders dispatched to the ports of the Indies, although
there may be in the orders the general prohibition
agair.st foreigners, whether friends or enemies, and it
must be understood that the Americans under their own
flag or with any prize, must be received and dealt
with in cases or urgency and apparent need, with the
same hospitality as would be the English or the French:
I notify Your Excellency of the order of the King, so
that from this date you may direct that in the ports
of your jurisdiction it be observed in the cases speci
fied, and with the idea that the Royal Wish is that
when refuge is granted to the ships of the colonists
through hospitality, that the sale of goods not be
permitted, nor any trade, and only if they should make
repairs and buy what may be necessary, paying its
price in money, bills of exchange, or negro slaves.
And Your Excellency, having been informed of this,
will give me notice at the first opportunity.70

As if this letter might seem ambiguous to officials
in a position to admit American vessels, Jos6 de G&lvez
followed it a month later with more bluntly worded
instructions.

7°Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, September 20,: 1776,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 108, expediente 157. reservada 129/
fols. 3 2 0 -321 v.
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I advise you very confidentially of his Majesty's
order, that under the precautions listed in the letter
of September 20, his Royal Will be followed. Observe
it carefully within yout jurisdiction in cases that
may occur, with the advice that in regard to refuge
given to American corsairs, you can proceed without
any scruples.71

The first Spanish colony in America to face the
dilemma of giving covert aid to the American rebels while
remaining officially neutral was the Province of Louisi
ana.

In May, 1776, a Captain George Gibson and twenty-

five men disguised as traders appeared in New Orleans
from upriver bearing a letter from Major General Charles
Lee, second in command to General George Washington.

The

letter solicited Spanish aid for the American colonists,
warned of the dangers to the Spanish colonies if the
English won, and offered to take Pensacola for the Span
iards.

Governor Luis de Unzaga, elderly, infirm, and

hoping for retirement after forty-one years' service in
America, referred the propositions to Spain.72

To Jos6 de

71Jos6 de Ghlvez to Bucareli, October 23» 1776,
ibid., Vol. 109» expediente 51/ reservada 134, fols. 21-

22v.
72Caughey, Gctlvez, p. 55*
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G&lvez the time seemed propitious to aid the Americans,
although not as flagrantly as Prance was then doing.73
In a dictamen addressed to the Council of Castile, he
urged, “Let us establish indirect and secret intelligence
with the American colonies, inspiring them to vigorous
resistance, and hoping for the diversion of English
forces. 1,74
In the summer of 1776 Spain moved to strengthen
the defenses of Louisiana and to use New Orleans as a dis
tribution center for secret aid to the Americans.

A royal

order of September ±9 named young Colonel Bernardo de
Galvez interim Governor, and instructed him to increase

73A clause in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 had
forbidden France to receive the vessels of the enemies of
Great Britain in her ports, and this ban had been renewed
by the Treaty of Paris in 1 7 6 3 . Prom the beginning of
the American rebellion France's violation of this prohibi
tion had been so flagrant that Count Vergennes expected
war with England as early as 1777* Bemis, The Diplomacy
of the American.Revolution, p. 53.
74Quoted in Yela Ultrilla, Independencia, Vol. II,
p. 78.
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the militia strength, to make accurate charts of the
Mississippi, River, and to estabU-ab-i ntp.lligence agents
among the English settlements and the Indians.75. The sum
of 40,000 pesos was added to the situado of the Province
to be employed in "objectives useful to that colony, as a

75Caughey, Galvez, pp. 67-6 8 , Unzaga surrendered
his office in January, 1777- The new governor was greatly
disturbed by the defenceless state of New Orleans. The
city had no fortifications to protect it, and in Galvez'
opinion, there would not be enough time to build them
before hostilities began. There was not a boat at his
disposal, and he complained to his uncle, the Minister of
the Indies, as follows:
"In all the ports of Spain and America His Majesty main
tains launches for the Governor, Intendant, the Captain
of the Port, and the royal officials, and only in this
one is there no boat for me nor for employment in crown
duties. We must beg a launch from the very ship which we
are going to visit, or else embark in a canoe, which is as
dangerous as it is unbecoming for Ministers of the King."
"Carta de D. Bernardo de G&lvez, en que da cuenta de sus
preparativos para defendarse de los inqlesse.11 Docitmentos
historicos de la Florida _y Luisiana; siglos XVI al XVIII
(Madrid: Libreria General de Victoriano Suarez, 1912),
P. 315.
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barrier against the English in that part of the continent
and the Province of Texas, 1,76 and complete freedom of comrmerce was allowed between Louisiana and all the ports of
Mexico for the first time.77
Governor Unzaga was informed that the Governor of
Havana would receive by the monthly mail vessel from
La Corufta goods to be delivered to the Americans by way of
New Orleans.

In the meantime the rebels should be given

whatever surplus of Mexican gunpowder there might be, and
surplus firearms would be sent from Havana.78

Before'; the

end of 1776, an American party had departed upriver with
9,000 pounds of gunpowder, the first product of New Spain
to be giver as aid to the enemies of England in the war.78

76Jos& de G&lvez to Bucareli, November 25, 1776,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 109/ expediente 107/ fols. 95~95v.
77Jos& de G&lvez to Bucareli, November 25/ 1776,
ibid., expediente 1 0 6 , fol. 94.
78Yela Utrilla, Independencia. Vol. I, p. 108.
79The gunpowder arrives just in time to save Forts
Pitt and Wheeling from being taken by a British and Indian
force. More gunpowder was shipped from New Orleans at
the same time by Oliver Pollock, an Irish-American who
figured prominently in the clandestine transactions with
the Americans. Caughey, G&lvez. p. 8 7 .
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In January 1777/

monthly paqu^bot sailed from

La Coruna for Havana carrying medicine and cloth for uni
forms .

In February a second shipment was made by the

paquebot. and in Havana 300 muskets with bayonets and 100
quintales (10,000 pounds) of powder were added.80

By means

of a complicated but transparent subterfuge which did not
deceive the watchful English in West Florida, material for
the Americans was declared to be condemned royal stores
unfit for use by the Spanish troops.

Such material,

falsely labeled, was shipped to New Orleans to be "sold."81
By the end of Bernardo de Gdlvez' first year as
Governor, $70,000 worth of arms, clothing, and gunpowder
had been sent to the upper Ohio River after repeated
requests by George Morgan, the commander of Fort Pitt.82
Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the first ship
ment of stores from New Orleans, a merchant of Bilbao,
Spain, received 70,000 pesos from the crown to be spent

soYela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, p. 109.
8 1Ibid.. pp. 108-10982Caughey, GSlvez, pp. 91-92. The exact amount of
money and supplies given by Spain directly to the Americans
has not been determined. Spanish and American archival
records of the disbursements are incomplete. Bemis, The
Diplomacy of the American Revolution, pp. 91“92.
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in goods to be picked up by American ships.83

In

anticipation of increased traffic, Count Floridablanca,
now the principal minister of Carlos III, announced the
opening of a regular paquebot service between Havana and
New Orleans.84
Throughout 1777 Spain continued preparations for
war with England, although her approach toward belliger
ency was not as overt as that of France.

While the Span

ish government sought to reinforce colonial defenses, it
did not wish to provoke an English preventive attack by
abrupt and large-scale troop and ship movements.

Count

Floridablance recommended to Vergennes that France make
cautious movements of men and vessels to the West Indies.
He felt that neither of the Bourbon powers could know when
war would begin, but that it would be better for France to

83The merchant of Bilbao, Diego de Gardoqui, "was
our Beaumarchais in the matter of aiding the colonies, "
Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, pp. 242-243.
84Floridablance to Bucareli, May 28, 1777» AGNM,
RC, Vol. Ill, expediente 51/ fol. 107*
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emulate Spain and to move selected units overseas with
discreet intervals between sailings.85
Spain's schedule did not call for war in 1777 if
it could be avoided.

Although there were in Spanish ports

113 warships of all types completely armed, it would be

November before C4diz would have 20 ships of the line
ready for sea, and in the same month there would be 9
ships of the line in the West Indies available for the
protection of the Spanish colonies of North America.

The

government of Spain believed in 1777 that England had not
committed her full naval strength to the suppression of
the American revolt, and that she still held her heaviest
warships in reserve for possible action against France and
Spain.86

Yet in August, Spain felt Strong enough to

8SDanvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 4 9 6 . After
Count Aranda, Spanish Ambassador at Versailles, had
delivered this communication, Vergennes read it, and he
expressed bewilderment at a reference to the port "El Guarico." He asked Aranda if it were a French possession.
Aranda told Vergennes that "El Guarico" was another name
for Cap Francois, and he later wrote to Madrid that "the
French Ministry is lost in regard to American geography."
Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, p. 201.
86"Memoria hecha por el Gobierno de Espana para
presentarla a la Corte francesa, S. Lorenzo 17 de Octubre
de 1777/" printed in extenso in Yela Utrilla,
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reject an English protest concerning the admittance of
American corsairs into Spanish harhors.

The Spanish reply

was that the English complaint could not be considered at
a time when the Royal Navy was harassing the legitimate
commerce of Spain and other neutral nations.87
The involvement of New Spain and its dependent
provinces in the mother country's preparations for war
increased after the initial shipments of gunpowder from
New Orleans in 1776.

There was a constant shortage of

this explosive, so essential to war, to mining, and to the
quarrying of stone , Since the powder factory in Mexico
City was the sole source of supply for all the Spanish
colonies in the northern hemisphere, Jos6 de G&lvez
expressed concern about the ability of that establishment
to meet the demands of an emergency.

In July ±777/ when

the Minister of the Indies ordered Viceroy Bucareli to

Independencia, Vol. II, p. 152. Spain had overestimated
British naval strength, which was at the time insufficient
to maintain a blockade of the North American coast and to
arrest American traffic with the Continent and with neu
trals in the West Indies. Nine-tenths of the supplies
that reached the rebels came by sea. Mackesy, The War for
America, pp. 88 - 8 9 .
87Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 487-
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send 1,500 auintales of gunpowder to Havana, he directed
that the output of the Mexican factory be increased.

At

the time, Havana needed the ejqplosive because that port
had just sent 1.500 auintales to Cartagena de Indias,
whose magazines were empty.

Havana was the distribution

point for money and munitions to the other islands, to
Cartagena, to Caracas, and to Louisiana.

The shipment to

Cartagena was only one example of the continuing need.
Actually, 9,902 quintales would have been needed to fill
the magazines at Havana and to allow that port to meet the
requests of other points.

Therefore, instead of ordering

that any specific quantity be sent to Cuba in the near
future, Gcilvez directed that the Viceroy continue to send
"the greatest quantity that may be possible . " 88
1
In this period of transition from nominal neutral
ity to open belligerence, New Spain was also asked for aid
in the recruitment of manpower to defend Louisiana.

In

88 Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, July 22, 1777# AGNM,
RC, Vol. Ill, expediente 176, fols. 282-282v. The Viceroy
had anticipated Galvez' plan to increase the capacity of
the capital's powder mill before he received the letter
cited, and he had already begun expansion of the existing
facilities by May. Same to same, ibid.. expediente 252,
fol. 411.
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August 1777, Viceroy Bucareli was informed that an officer
from New Orleans would soon arrive in Mexico City to
recruit men for a second battalion of infantry to serve in
Louisiana, for the Province had only one battalion of reg
ular troops . 89

The recruiting party, consisting of a Sub-

Lieutenant Godeau, four sergeants, eight corporals, and
twelve enlisted men, was given 1 ,2 0 0 pesos for expenses
when they arrived in the capital , 90 but the prospect of
military service in Louisiana had attracted only thirty
recruits by July 1778.

At that time the Viceroy ordered

criminals who had been convicted of minor crimes to be
drafted into the new Louisiana battalion, an action that
was approved by Jos6 de Gcilvez. 9 x
G&lvez acted also to relieve the chronic shortage
of foodstuffs in Louisiana.

He directed Bucareli to order

89 Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, August15, 1777/
Xbicl *, pvhp
9 239 / fol •396 •

ibid.,

9 °Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, September 25/
vol. 1 1 5 / expediente 34, fol. 54.

1778,

91 Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, December 21, 1778/
ibid., expediente 154, fol. 3 8 7 * In July 1779, there were
106 Mexicans serving with Bernardo de Galvez in Louisiana.
Gaughey, Gcilvez , p. 139-

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
the port officials of Veracruz to fill without prior
approval from the capital all orders for provisions pre
sented to them by the officers of ships from Louisiana, 92
where Gcilvez continued to build an army . 93
The aid to the North American insurgents before
her entry into the war may be viewed as one aspect of
Spain's general policy of opposition to the British along
the Mississippi River, a "new application of the divide et
impera policy . 94

Yet aid to the new republic might defeat

the ultimate Spanish objective:
American empire.

the preservation of her

As an armed opponent of England, the

young nation was to be encouraged, but as the founder of a
new and vigorous political force that would menace Spanish
America, to be hindered.

Count Floridablanca, foreseeing

the dangers of an independent Anglo-America, recommended
the proper Spanish counter-measures in 1777-

ssJos6 de Galvez to Bucareli, October 29/ 1778/

AGNM, RC, Vol. 115/ expediente 91/ fol. 230.
93 Caughey, Galvez. p. 1 3 7 . From 1778 to I779 the
number of regular troops in Louisiana rose fromo437 to
7 6 9 ', from 1777 to 1779
number of militiamen-rose from
136 to 1 ,5 0 0 .
94 Ibid.. p. 1 0 1 .
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In the event of their independence, we should
intervene in the formation of' their constitution by a
kind of protection or guarantee, and then we should
work so that the power of the Americans and their
republic should remain so divided, and the 'indepen
dence of one province from another so contrary, that
we may not fear the establishment of a formidable
power in the future, near our America . 85

In spite of Spain's steady course toward war, her
government attempted to maintain the appearance of neutral
ity until February 6 , 1778, when France signed two treaties
with the United States, one of amity and commerce, the
other of conditional and defensive alliance.

The treaties"

had hardly been signed when Spain began to pressure the
British government to accept the mediation of the Spanish
monarch, a service far which he expected to be rewarded.
The Spanish ambassador, the Marquis of Almodovar, suggested
the cession of Minorca and Gibraltar, otherwise Carlos III
might be forced to honor his obligation to France by
entering the war.

But Viscount Weymouth, the English Sec

retary of State for Foreign Affairs, made it clear to

ssYela Utrilla, Independencia. Vol. I, p. 184.
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Almodovar in December 1778/ that England would offer Spain
nothing for her neutrality . 06
On March 22, 1779 / Jos6 de G&lvez ordered an
embargo on all shipping from the ports of New Spain, and
warned Viceroy Bucareli that neutrality would soon be
ended:

Refrain from mixing in the quarrels and war between
the French and the English, maintaining equal harmony
with both in every incident that may occur, so long
as Your Excellency should not have well-verified word
to the contrary, which will be communicated to you at
the proper time . 07

On April 3, 1779, Count Floridablanca sent a vir
tual ultimatum to England which demanded that she accept
Spanish mediation of the war on terms completely unaccept
able to the former.

Before the communication could have

been answered, Spain and France signed the Convention of
Aranjuez, which provided that Spain should enter the war

0eBemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
PP. 78-7907 Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, March 22, 1779/ AGNM,
RC, Vol. 116, expediente 148, fols. 254-254v, and same to
same, ibid.. expediente 2 0 7 / fols. 294-294v.
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if England refused the demands made by the Convention, one
of which was the restitution of Gibraltar. 98
The actual declaration of war against Great Britain
was written in Madrid on May 18, 1779 * ^ut New Spain had
received prior warning.

The orders prohibiting the depar

ture of vessels and giving the Viceroy notice that neutral
ity would soon be ended had been followed on May 12 by an
order which forbade all royal officials, no matter what
their ranks, to leave New Spain without permission . 90

The

declaration of war could hardly have come at a more inop
portune time.
April 9th.

Viceroy Bucareli had died suddenly on

The task of executing the first war measures

fell upon the Audiencia of Mexico,- until a new Viceroy
could be designated.

98The Convention, ratified at Versailles,
April 28th, provided for Spain’s entrance into the war,
"in case England should refuse Charles Ill’s final offer,
so studiously composed as to be unacceptable." Bemis,
The Diplomacy of th^ American Revolution, p. 80.
" j o s d de Gcilvez to Bucareli, May 12th, AGNM, RC,
Vol. 118, expediente 19, fol. 29-
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C H A P T E R

I I

SPAIN ENTERS THE WAR FOR AMERICA

Martin de Mayorga, the forty-seventh Viceroy of
New Spain, was born in Spain in the third decade of the
eighteenth century.

In 1773/ when appointed Captain Gen

eral and President of the Audiencia of Guatemala, he held
the rank of Mariscal de Campo and was a Cabellero of the
Order of AlcSntara . 1

He still occupied this post in

Guatemala when Viceroy Bucareli died on April 9 , 1779*
The Real Acuerdo 2 opened the C^dula de Providencia, or

^ i s service in Guatemala was arduous. Shortly
after his arrival, on July 23/ 1773/ a violent earthquake
destroyed the capital of Guatemala and devestated a wide
area. In his reports to Spain of this disaster and its
consequencies, he stated that he had a force of only
forty-eight dragoons to police the stricken region. Pil
lage, disease, and famine followed, and Guatemala, not a
rich province under the best of conditions, was slow to
recover. Manuel Garcia Pur6 n, Mexico yr sus Gobernantes
(Mexico: Libreria de Manuel Porrua, 1964f, p. 125.
2When an Audiencia sat as a council of state to
deliberate matters of political administration, its
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Mortaia, which Jos6 de Galvez, Minister of the Indies, had
sent from Spain shortly before Bucareli's death, and found
that the paper provided that the successor to the Viceroy
should be the President of Guatemala.
Matias de G&lvez, who had just been appointed by
the crown as President of Guatemala to succeed Mayorga,
was the elder brother of the Minister of the Indies and
the father’of Bernardo, Governor of Louisiana.

Jos6 de

Galvez had undoubtedly expected that Matias would assume
the presidency of Guatemala before it might be necessary
to implement the Mortaja which appointed a successor to
Bucareli.

The mail had made an unusually swift crossing

of the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mortaia had outdistanced
Matias. Thus Mayorga became Viceroy of New Spain by
chance; it was a position which he had neither desired
nor sought, and he was the object of Jos6 de Gcilvez'
resentment during his term of office.

He received only

sessions were known as Acuerdos, and its decisions as
Autos Acordados. While functioning as an Acuerdo, the
colonial Audiencia exercised powers somewhat analogous to
those of the Council of Castile in Spain. Haring, The
Spanish Empire in America, p. 124.
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half the salary of his predecessor, 3 and his correspondence
reveals that he was almost constantly at odds with the Min”
ister of the Indies, who never seemed to forgive him for
unintentionally blocking the ambition of the elder Gcilvez. 4
A courier dispatched by the interim governing body
of New Spain, -the Audiencia Gobierna. made a swift journey,
traversing the wretched roads from Mexico City to Guatemala
in seven days.

The Audiencia, well aware of the almost

impassable trails between the two capitals, ordered hasty
repairs made to the roads and bridges to facilitate the
passage of the new Viceroy and his entourage; 5 but Mayorga,

3Herbert I. Priestley, Jos6 de Gcilvez, VistorGeneral of New Spain (1765-1771) (Berkeley: University of
California Press, I9 I0 ) , p. 9* Bucareli's salary had been
40,000 pesos per year. Bob, Bucareli, p. 25.
^Manuel Rivera Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico,
Gal^ria de biografxa de retratos de los virreyes, imperadores, presidentes _y otros gobernantes que han tenido
Mexico, 2 Vols. (Mexico: Imprents de J. M. Aguilar Ortiz,
1872-1873)/ Vol. 1, p. 438.
5 Ibid., p. 439.
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who had started northward upon receiving the news, found
travel slow and difficult.

He did not arrive in Mexico

City until August 23rd, and one of his first letters to
Spain from the capital recounted the hardships of the trip.
When he learned in Puebla that Spain had declared war upon
England, he attempted to speed his progress, but with
little success . 6
After he had taken formal possession of his office,
Mayorga turned at once to the emergency created by the
state of war.

The declaration of hostilities, written in

Spain on May 18th, had been received in Mexico on
August 13 th , 7 and notice of the formal opening of

6The road between Veracruz and the capital, which
passed through Puebla, had apparently not been improved
since the viceregency of the Marquis de Croix,.although it
was the most important road in the kingdom. De Croix, in
his Instrucci6 n of 1771 to his successor, Bucareli, stated
that he had found the road in very bad condition, and that
he had levied a tax of one and one-half real on every
beast of burden traveling the road. He predicted that
after the road had been improved, all travelers would be
happy to pay the tax. De Croix, instruccidn, pp. 79”80,
num. 62. Mayorga's colorful description of the hardships
and dangers of his forced journey is found in Mayorga to
Jos£ de Galvez, August 27/ 1779/ AGNM, CV, Vol. 122, No. 6 ,
fols. lv-3 .
7 Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, May 18, 1779/ AGNM,
RC, Vol. 116, expediente 257, fols. 451-451v.
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hostilities had been followed by an order to cease all
communication and trade with the enemy . 8

The Audiencia

Gobierna had begun to initiate war measures before the
arrival of the new Viceroy.

After a courier had been sent

to meet Mayorga, a million pesos had been sent to Veracruz
with instructions to forward half of it to Havana, and to
divide the remainder between the governors of Louisiana
and Yucatcin.

Pood and gunpowder had also been sent to

Havana and Yucatan.

The port of San Bias had been alerted

to be ready to send money and supplies to the Philippine
Islands, for Manila was as yet unaware of Spain's entry
into the w a r . 9

Mayorga, after having reviewed the actions

8 Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, June 24, 1779# ibid..
expediente 2 9 6 , fols. 510 ~ 510 v.

9William L. Schurz has written that when word of
the war between Spain and England reached San Bias, a
pilot named Francisco Murelle carried the news to Manila
in a ship's yawl, a feat which Schurz cited as proof of
the ease of navigation from New Spain to the Philippines,
as contrasted to the difficult eastward voyage. The
Manila Galleon (New York: E . P . Dutton, 1939)» P • 247•
No mention of this extraordinary voyage was found in the
correspondence of Mayorga. On the contrary, the Viceroy
found it difficult to send a ship to Manila with news of
the war and emergency aid, a problem which is described
in this chapter.
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taken by the Audiencia Gobierna, praised them, particularly
the preliminary orders which had been given by the Reqente
Francisco Roma y Rosell, who had personally assumed the
interim duties of Captain General . 10
Mayorga inherited a military establishment whose
strength and effectiveness are debatable.

There were in

1779 a total of approximately 4,400 regular army troops in

New Spain, plus urban and provincial militia units num
bering approximately 7,000.

These figures do not include

1,997 men stationed at the presidios of the Interior Prov
inces under the command of the Commandant General, Teodoro
de Croix . 11

10Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, August 27, 1779 , AGNM,
CV, Vol. 122, No. 7 , fols. 3^-4, On this’ same date Mayorga
acknowledged the belated receipt of a c^dula dated Octor
ber 2 2 , 1 7 7 8 , urging strict economy in all defense mea
sures. The Viceroy made no comment on this impossible
order, and stated merely that he had ordered copies of it
forwarded tb all military posts.
13The figures of troop strength are called approxi
mations because there seems to be no agreement as to the
exact count of regular army and militia enrollment. The
biographer of Bucareli states that "their strength on
paper reflected little actuality." Bobb, Bucareli. p. 102.
The author who has made the most detailed study of the
armies of New Spain in this period arrives at a total
slightly higher than that given by Bobb, but she also
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The principal fortified point designed to prevent
seaborne invasion of the east coast of the realm was the
Castillo de San Juan de Ultia, which guarded the major port,
Veracruz.

Construction of the fort had begun in 1 8 6 3 , and

since that date it had been enlarged and altered several
times. The most recent reconstruction and addition had
been made under the direction of Viceroy Bucareli.

Four

and one-half million pesos had been spent on its rehabili
tation, and its engineers regarded the condition of the fort
as satisfactory. 12

There were minor fortifications on the

states that reports of the number of troops and militiamen
given out by individual units cannot be added to produce
the totals reported by Bucareli and Mayorga to the Min
ister of the Indies. Marla del Carmen Veldzquez, El
Estado de Guerra en Nueva Espana. 1760 -1808 (Mexico: El
Colegio de Mexico, 1950), p. 125. There is agreement that
the militia units were in deplorable shape and that it
was fortunate that they were not tested in battle against
an invader. McAlister, Fuero Militar. p. 55*
12Jos6 Antonio Calder6 n Quijano, Fortificaciones
en Nueva Espana (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Escuela de Estudios HispanoAmericanos, 1953)/ P* 148.
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coast of Tabasco and Yucatan, but most of the Spanish money
and care were devoted to the maintenance of the defense of
Veracruz.

All thought concerning the defense of the east

ern seaboard of New Spain was limited in scope, and plans
were based "on the stubborn insistence that the
English . . . must attack the Castle of San Juan de
Ultaa. " 13

In the event that an enemy penetrated the

defenses of Veracruz and advanced toward the capital, he
would encounter the new fort of San Carlos at Perote, on
the road to Mexico City . 14
The point most likely to be an objective of attack
from the Pacific Ocean was Acapulco, the American terminus
of Philippine-American navigation and the eastern port of
the Manila galleon.

Acapulco was guarded by the Castillo

of San Diego, which was undergoing reconstruction after

13Bobb, Bucareli, p. 120.
14Ibid., pp. 122-123- Bobb observed that a sense
of inferiority ran through the defense plans and that "one
must almost conclude that the only really effective
defense for the Mexican viceroyalty would have been for
Spain to remain at peace with England." Ibid., p. 121.
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having been damaged by an earthquake in 1776.

For some

reason the enemies of Spain felt this fort to be as strong
as the works of San Juan de Ultia or those of Cartagena de
Indias, and even if its reputation was undeserved, it had
in the past served effectively to keep invaders at a
distance . 15
The eastern sea approaches to New Spain were pro
tected by a naval squadron based on Havana, whose strength
in 1779 was five 70 -gun ships and three frigates . 16

Imme

diately after the news of the declaration of war reached
America this squadron, commanded by Lieutenant General
Juan Bautista Bonet, surprised and captured a convoy of
sixteen British merchantmen homeward bound from Jamaica . 17
Regardless of the activity of Bonet's small force, the
most potent sea defense of the Spanish possessions around
the Gulf of Mexico was the French navy in the West Indies.

15 Schurz, Manila Galleon, p. 373*

lsGerv.asio de Artiffano, La Arduitectura naval
espaftola en madera (Madrid: published by author, ±920) ,
p. 364.
l7Ferncindez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7/ P* 282.
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By 1779/

squadrons of d'Estaing, Vaudreuil, and

LaMotte-Picquet had taken the British islands of Dominica,
St. Vincent, and

Grenada, the last-named being the rich

est sugar island of the Lesser Antilles.

The British,

outnumbered and outmaneuvered, had temporarily lost control
of the West Indian waters . 18
The Spanish colonies in America were spared an
immediate attack because French naval superiority in the
West Indies was only one manifestation of British weak
ness in 1779•

As Piers Mackesy stated:

For three years England had kept far more men in
America than had beaten the French out of Canada, and
she had maintained them without the resources of her
American colonies. The decision to persevere com
mitted the country to three more years of exhausting
effort in America; and its immediate effect was that
no fresh resources could be deployed against the
Spaniards in the Caribbean . 19

lsMackesy, The War for America, pp. 2J3-2J4. The
passage cited also states, that French successes in the
islands and the threat of Spanish intervention caused six
battalions of British troops intended to reinforce
Sir Henry Clinton in North America to be retained for gar
rison duty in the British West Indies, thus indirectly
aiding the cause of American independence.
19Ibid., p. 2 6 6 .
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The scanty British forces in West Florida had
been ordered to seize New Orleans if war were declared,
but had been unable to do so.

For years both East and

West Florida had lived in fear of an attack by the Spanish,
since Spain's intention to retake the Floridas had never
been concealed.20

The fear was justified, for on

August 27, the same day that Mayorga assumed power in
Mexico City, Bernardo de G&lvez, Governor of Louisiana,
led an army of 1,427 men against his first English
objective, the fort at Manchac.21
There being no war emergency that demanded his
immediate attention, Mayorga turned his attention to mat
ters which had been neglected because of the death of his

2°Charles Loch Mowat, East Florida as a^ British
Province, 1763-1784 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1943)/ P. 107.
21Caughey, Getlvez, p. 1 5 3 . The foremost historian
of the British army has written that all British posts in
Florida and on the Mississippi River should have been
evacuated at once, "so burdensome were they from their
unhealthiness and their absolute dependence on supplies
from without." West Florida did not learn that war had
been declared until September. John W. Fortescue, A His
tory of the British Army, 13 Vols. in 20 (London:
MacMillan and Company, 1899”1930), Vol. Ill, pp. 307”308.
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predecessor.

He wrote numerous letters to Jos6 de Gcilvez,

most of them representative of the tedious hut indispens
able trivia that consumed the time of a Viceroy acting in
his capacity of Captain General.

The arrival of a cargo

of solid shot for the fort at Perote was acknowledged. 22
In obedience to a royal order of May 12th, Inspector
General Pasqual de Cisneros had circulated a warning that
royal officers of all ranks were forbidden to leave the
realm unless directed to do so by an order from Spain . 23
On May 30th a report on the progress of work on the
earthquake-shaken fort at Acapulco had arrived.

Mayorga

forwarded it to Spain with a note of praise for the
engineer in charge of the project, Engineer-Captain Ram6 n
Pan6 n . 24
On August 29, 1779/ while Mayorga was disposing
of the unfinished business that had accumulated during

22Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, August 27/ 1779/ AGNM,
CV, Vol. 122, No. 14, fols. 8v-9.
23Same to same, ibid., Vol. 122, No. 19, fols.
llv-12.
24Same to same, ibid.. Vol. 122, No. 28, 26v-27v.
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the regency of the Audiencia Gobierna, Jos6 de G&lvez.
dispatched from Spain a secret expediente outlining the
objectives of Spain in the war and the part that New Spain
was expected to play in their attainment:

After mature deliberation the King has determined
that the principal object of his forces in America
during the war against the English shall be to expel
them from the Gulf of Mexico and the banks of the
Mississippi where their establishments are so preju
dicial to our commerce and also to the security of
our richest possessions. The present situation in
Europe favors the success of this important under
taking, for Great Britain, weakened by its great
losses, pressed by superior forces in both hemispheres,
has been abandoned by other nations who have been
angered by her hateful predominance.’ And on the eve of
seeing herself assaulted within her own island by a
French army of more than forty thousand men, she finds
it impossible to resist our forces, directed with pru
dence and vigor. But since to wait for assistance
which could be sent from Spain will be to risk an
operation in which speed is so essential, and perchance
to lose amid delays the fortunate moment of execution,
His Majesty wishes that with no delay whatever an expe
dition be formed, composed of land and sea forces which
can be collected in those Dominions, and that Mobile
and Pensacola, which are the keys to the Gulf of Mex
ico, be attacked, detaching them sooner or later from
the Mississippi, which must be considered as the
guard-post of the vast empire of New Spain.
To accomplish this desired object, Your Excellency
will send all the troops possible, and the Governor of
Havana will do the same, acting in concert, and
deciding with the Commandant of Havana the point where
the forces must be united under the escort of the
squadron, which must support the land operations, and
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the number of men which each must contribute: it
being well understood that from four to five thousand
men must be mustered, among them three hundred dra
goons or those who appear suitable for the success of
the expedition, according to the plan dictated by the
Governor of Louisiana; for although the English have
in Pensacola no strong fortifications, only wooden
forts, it is to be expected that the garrison of thnt
post may be reinforced, they being well aware of its
importance and fearing our attacks.
The units which Your Excellency may send must b e ,
inasmuch as is possible, picked men, commanded by
officers of talent and vigor. The force will bring
two field guns and a full complement of stores and
munitions. Also there will go fifty artillerymen,
commanded by a Commandant who is completely satisfac
tory, and an engineer officer of the rank of Colonel
or Lieutenant Colonel, accompanied by two subalterns.
The embarkation of the troops, with abundant rations,
will take place in Veracruz, in the ships which may be
in that port, and Your Excellency will agree with the
Commandant of the squadron on this point, and on the
rendezvous where you must join the convoy leaving
Havana, and you will take all necessary steps for safe
transportation.
The King wishes that this expedition be commanded
by the Brigadier Don Bernardo de G&lvez, Proprietary
Governor of Louisiana, who prior to forming the plan
of the expedition, gained practical knowledge of those
areas, having established agents among the enemies.
He knows the diversions that must be made at the same
time by the troops of the United States of America:
he has gained the friendship of the Choctaws and other
Indian nations who would always take the part of the
English if the enterprise were headed by some other
chief unknown to them, and finally, his actions and a
happy combination of circumstances have accredited him
with the members of Congress and have spread respect
for his name among the English establishments near
Louisiana. The knowledge of how much enemy opinion is
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worth in war has guided His Majesty to the selection
of this Governor in preference to other officers with
more years of experience and who are doubtless more
suited for any other undertaking.
At the same time that the attack by sea and land
will be executed against Pensacola and Mobile, troops
of the United States of America in the number of three
thousand will besiege St. Augustine, and perhaps there
will be another diversion high upstream on the Mississ
ippi . This has been offered by Congress, using money
will must be given them to repay the costs of the
expedition. Let Your Excellency not delay in sending
all the troops which the Governors of Havana and
Louisiana may ask, as well as the rations
and supplies necessary for the success of an expedition
of so much importance, for the English, attacked from
all sides, are incapable of seizing even one house of
this Kingdom, and truly in no way can this be accom
plished more usefully than by dislodging the English
from the Mississippi and Florida, and making Louisiana
an impregnable barrier.
However, in order to provide for any contingency,
it had been arranged with the Governor of Havana that
in case the troops he can collect in Cuba and in that
Kingdom (without leaving either of the two indefensi
ble)’ should be insufficient to bring about the con
quest of Pensacole, he should ask the Governor of the
French part of Santo Domingo for the number of men he
should judge necessary to complete the expedition, for
the Court of Versailles has reiterated to the Comman
dants of their islands and the Chiefs of their squad
rons that cruise in those waters the order that they
wait upon and aid effectively with their land and sea
forces whatever undertakings our forces may form
against the establishments of Great Britain.
Let Your Excellency maintain the most profound
secrecy about this expedition, and of your effective
dispositions for the mustering, preparation and march
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of the troops to Veracruz, pretending that they have
some other object than the real one. Perhaps, for
example, an attack on Jamaica. The confidence which
the King has in your spirit and military talents does
not permit me to enter into trivial details, since in
accord with the Governors of Havana and Louisiana you
will send to the latter whatever aid in the way of
troops, money, supplies and rations may be necessary,
and make every effort which your love of King and
Country may inspire, in order that the splendor of
Spanish arms may be assured in an undertaking of the
greatest importance. May God keep Your Excellency
many years. San Yldefonso, August 29, 1779*
Jose de Galvez?5

At the same time that he sent the above letter to
Mexico, Jos6 de Galvez issued several lesser orders con
cerned with New Spain's war effort.

He approved the

emergency remissions of money, powder, and food made by
the Audiencia Gobierna; and he ordered that an additional
2,000 quintales of powder be sent to Havana, part for
that port and part to be transshipped to Cartagena de
Indias.

The situado of Louisiana was to be raised from

1 5 5 ,3 22 pesos to 3 1 5 ,0 0 0 pesos because of the war, and

25 Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga, August 2 9 , 1779,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 117, expediente 122, reservada,
fols. 225 - 227 v.
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Mayorga was

to aid Bernardo deG&lvez in creating a company

of dragoons if asked to do so . 26
The expedientes cited were not received in Mexico
City until February 1, 1780, after Governor G&lvez had
taken Manchac, Baton Rouge, and Natchez and was on his way
to Mobile.

The five-months delay between the issuance of

orders in Spain and their receipt in Mexico is only one
example of the slow transmission of intelligence between
the Peninsula and its American colonies.

In peacetime such

delays inhibited effective action both by the crown and by
colonial authorities.

In wartime, when communications were

inevitably disrupted, the delays could be disastrous to
planned military or naval actions.

Spanish ministries

issued directives in ignorance of the actual situation in
the Indies.

Colonial officerswaited months for orders

which they were often unable to execute because .

26 Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, August 26, 1779,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 117, expediente 107, 'fol. 210; same to
same, ibid., August 29, 1779, expediente 125, fol. 230;
same to same, ibid., August 30, 1779, expediente 127,
fol. 2 3 7 -
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circumstances had made the orders meaningless by the time
they arrived.27
In ignorance of the plans of Jos6 de Gcilvez and in
the absence of any known crisis in the Gulf theatre,
Mayorga was free to deal with an emergency on the Pacific
Coast.

The Philippine Islands had to be notified of the

declaration of war, and money had to be sent to Manila in
the event that the regular sailings between New Spain and
the islands were interrupted.
When on August 13 the Audiencia Gobierna received
the foyal order declaring war on Great Britain, it sent
200,000 pesos to the port of San Bias with instructions
that a vessel be sent to Manila as soon as possible
carrying 150,000 pesos.

The remaining 50,000 pesos were

27The correo marltimo which had been established
in 1764 and which departed La Coruha on the first of each
month was apparently immediately disrupted by the war, if
one can judge from the frequent and increasing complaints
about delayed mail delivery noted in Mayofga's correspon
dence. The armed forces of England in America operated
under similar handicaps. A letter from London dated Sep
tember 24, 1779# ordering three ships sent from New York
to the Leeward Islands, did not reach its destination
until May, 1 7 8 0 , and was not executed until a month later.
Mackesy, The War for America, p. 332.
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to be used to defray the expenses of the voyage.28

In

1779 there had been regular maritime traffic between New
Spain and the Philippines for 214 years, and in the light
of this long practice of transpacific navigation, it might
be assumed that an order to dispatch a ship to Manila
could be easily and promptly executed.

It proved impos

sible to comply with the directive of the Audiencia with
out protracted delay.

On the west coast of New Spain

there were few ships available for the royal service and
even fewer pilots trained in Pacific sailing.

There was

even a shortage of the basic tools of navigation.

28The port of San Bias was situated on the west
coast of Mexico twelve leagues south of the Rio Santiago
and seventy-five leagues from Guadalajara. There was a
small inner harbor and a large outer anchorage. Inland
there were forests of cedar and other timbers suitable for
shipbuilding. The base had been created after Jos6 de
Galvez' Sonora expedition of 1 767-1768 had shown the need
for a permanent naval post in Nueva Galicia. The new
Department of San Bias was independent? it derived its
authority directly from the viceroy, indirectly from the
crown, and it was considered a unit of the Real Armada.
Shipbuilding had begun in I7 6 7 . The two paquebotes El
Principe and San Carlos, which eventually went to Manila,
were constructed in San Bias and were two-masted vessels
of 139 tons burden, Michael E. Thurman, "The Establish
ment of the Department of San Bias and its initial Naval
Fleet, 1767-1770," The Hispanic American Historical Review.
Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (February,'1963 ) , pp. 67 - 6 9 , 71.
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When the new Viceroy took office he found that the
money and the official papers which were to accompany it29
were still in San Bias.

The Commandant of Marine at San

Bias, Bruno de Hezeta, planned to send the paquebot
El Principe to Manila, but no pilots were available, for
all of them had accompanied an exploring expedition to
Upper California.30

Furthermore, the Department of San

Bias had no charts of the Pacific Ocean, and there was no

29Among the papersto be sent to Manila was a let
ter from Jos& de G&lvez to the Governor, Jos& de Vasco y
Vargas. Galvez warned him that Manila must not be sur
prised again, as it had been in 1 7 6 2 . England's naval
forces in Oriental waters were superior to those of France,
and G&lvez regarded an attack on the Philippines entirely
possible. He also emphasised that the annual galleon must
not sail for Acapulco if the presence of British naval
units was suspected. Jos& de G&lvez to Jos& Vasco de
Vargas, May l8th, AGNM, RC, Vol. 116, expediente 2 5 6 ,
reservada No. 133/ fols. 449-450v.
30Viceroy de Croix andVisitador Jos& de G&lvez
had begun planning a series of exploring voyages to the
northwest in 1 7 6 7 * Exploration continued throughout the
viceregency of Bucareli, but after the voyage of 1779#
which was commanded by the famous pilot Juan Francisco
Bodega y Cuadra, orders were received to discontinue
exploration. Charles E. Chapmen, A History of Spanish
California: the Spanish Period (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1921) , p. 343.
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artillery to arm El Principe.

Some of the vessels based

on San Bias had guns which could be used to arm the Manila
ship, but these ships were dispersed all the way from
Guaymas, at the head of the Gulf of California, to the
Pacific coast of Upper and Lower California.

Hezeta sent

a small boat in search of the absent ships, and he made
plans to form an armed guard for El Principe;

a corporal

and twelve soldiers from the militia of Tepic.
Meanwhile, Mayorga instituted a vain search for
pilots in the capital.31

The Administrador General of the

Real Hacienda, Pedro Antonio de Cosio, urged that the
Viceroy order whatever pilots might be in Veracruz to
leave their ships and go to San Bias, whether the pilots
were willing to go or not.
take this coercive step.

Mayorga refused, however, to
It would be dangerous, he wrote

to Jos& de G&lvez, to entrust ships, money, and important
papers to pilots who had to be forced to make the voyage
and who were, moreover, ignorant of the Pacific Ocean.
Two pilots were eventually found, but two more were needed,

31Mayorga to .Jos& de G&lvez, September 26, 1779/
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 82, fols. 11-13.
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for the Viceroy had decided to send a second ship to
Manila with an additional 150,000 pesos and copies of all
important documents in case the first ship should fail to
arrive.
Antonio de Coslo found a five-volume maritime
atlas, while Mayorga located some charts of the Pacific
Ocean, two binnacle compasses, two surveyor's compasses,
and two half-hour watch glasses.

The pilots, glasses, and

charts were hastily ordered to San Bias, and the Viceroy
hopefully reported to Spain that if more pilots had been
located, the "ships already could be sailing . " 32

But the

last of the indispensable four pilots was not found until
the end of September, when one was discovered commanding a
schooner in the port of Guaymas.
Carlos sailed for Manila . 33

On October 10, the San

At last, on December 18, 1779/

the second paquebot, El Principe, departed.

The Governor

of Manila was instructed to use the vessels indefinitely
if he needed them.

Mayorga requested him to return them

32Same to same, Ibid., No. 8 l, fols. J-ll;
fols. 7-llj No. 8 3 , fol. 13v.
33Same to same, November 15, 1779/ ibid., No. 154,
fols. 22-24.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
to New Spain armed with full complements of artillery,
because Manila had a cannon foundry, and New Spain had
none.

The ships had sailed from San Bias only partially

armed, because few guns had been available by the time of
sailing.34

Almost six months elapsed between the day the

Audiencia Gobierna issued the first order and the day the
second vessel left San Bias.
During the period between the outbreak of war and
the beginning of heavy shipments of supplies to Havana,
Mayorga set in motion a project which increased the supply
of gunpowder.

Explosives had been manufactured in Mexico

since the time of Cortes, and by 1600 a factory had been
constructed at Chapultepec and leased to private oper
ators .

The production and sale of gunpowder was a crown

monopoly, although it was neither centralized nor closely
supervised, and by the time of the visitation of Jos£ de
G&lvez, explosives were being made in 112 other places.
In 1767 Gcilvez reorganized production, raising the standard
of quality and lowering the price.

Despite the lower

price, the new code worked so well that the Real Hacienda

34Same to same, December 15, 1779/ ibid., Vol. 125/
No. 1 8 3 , fols. 7~7V *
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realized a 200 percent profit on the operation, and gross
income from sales rose from 190,204 pesos in ±765 to
3 2 6 ,0 0 0 pesos in I7 8 8 . 35

Even in peacetime there were heavy demands upon
Mexican powder production.

The continuous construction of

fortifications in Cuba consumed explosives in demolition,
excavation and quarrying, while the Mexican mining indus
try regularly used large quantities. 36

It was certain

that wartime demands would strain the facilities of the
Chapuitepac factory, for New Spain was the sole source of
supply for Cuba and other islands, as well as for all
ships of the Real Armada in American waters. The Peninsula

3 SPriestley, Jos6 de Gcilvez, pp. 346-34-7- Because
of the wide distribution of saitpptre and sulphur beds in
Mexico there were many illicit powder factories. Humboldt
estimated that the royal factories produced only onequarter of the explosives used in Mexico. Humboldt,
Ensayo politico sobre la Nueva Espana, sexta edicion
castellana, 5 Vols. (Mexico: Editorial Pedro Robredo,
1941), Vol. 4, p. 17.
36 0ne mine, La Valenciana, in Guanajuato, used
from 1,400 to 1,500 auintales annually. Ibid., p. 17.
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produced its own powder, and after the Seven Years' War
attempts had been made to increase its output.

In 1766

Arriaga had asked Viceroy de Croix to send samples of
salitre (potassium nitrate) to Spain for testing, since
the mother country lacked this essential ingredient of
black powder . 37

He reminded the Viceroy that Mexican

production must be increased, since New Spain had to pro
vide explosives not only for its own mining industry but
also for "Havana and other dependent ports . " 38

As the

years passed, the Ministry of the Indies continued to
express concern about the ability of the Chapultepec
factory to meet wartime emergencies . 39

37Arriaga to de Croix, November ±5, 1 7 6 6 , AGNM,
RC, Vol. 8 9 # expediente 9 6 , fols. 25^-256.
38Same to same, December 23/ 1766, ibid.,
expediente 2 1 7 , fols. 2 5 ^-2 5 6 .
39 E.g., Arriaga to Bucareli, December 20, 1772,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 101, expediente 164, fol. 521; Jos6 de
G&lvez to Bucareli, July 8 , 1777, ibid., Vol. Ill,
expediente 135, fol. 215. These are not the only letters
urging increased powder output, but the urgency of their
tone must have impressed Mayorga, for he referred several
times to the two expedientes cited as justification for
the expenses of building a new plant.
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Just before the beginning of hostilities in 1779/
Jos£ de Gcilvez, in an admission of weakness rarely found
in his correspondence with the viceroys of New Spain,
wrote:

The King orders me to notify Your Excellency that you
must send 2,000 quintales of powder with all possible
speed to Havana, for this amount has been shipped
from that port to Cartagena de Indias, where there was
a serious lack of it, and Your Excellency must attempt
by all means to increase the production of the Royal
Powder Factory, for those of Spain can hardly supply
the needs of the Peninsula, and the overseas Dominions
need immense quantities for their defense, an objec
tive that demands the greatest care in the present
critical circumstances.40

When Mayorga received this letter, he acted with
speed.

During the viceregency of his predecessor,

Bucareli, plans had been drawn for a new factory and a
site selected:
Santa F d .

a barranca which ran from Tacubaya to

But Bucareli, who had been a thrifty adminis

trator, had decided to improve the existing plant, and
the new plant had never been built.

The Viceroy reviewed

the plans, and after consultation with Engineer—Captain

4°Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, May 15/ 1779/ AGNM,
RC, Vol. 116, expediente 243# fol. 424.
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Miguel Costanzo decreed on August 25, 1779, that the new
factory be built.

He did not call a junta of the Real

Hacienda to discuss the matter because, as he explained to
Jos6 de Galyez,

"of the delay'which that formality required."

Construction was to begin at once, and no offices or
living quarters would be built until the machinery was in
place.

A weekly progress report would be required.41

4 1Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, August 27, 1779,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 122, No. 11, fols. 5~6v. Scattered
throughout Mayorga’s correspondence are many references to
correspondence of previous years, and it is evident that
the Viceroy had thoroughly perused the letters sent and
received by his immediate predecessors. It may be that
his decision not to convene a junta to discuss the new
powder factory was prompted by advice once given to
Viceroy Cruillas by the old Minister of the Indies, Julidn
de Arriaga. On November 1^, 1 7 6 1 , when war with England
appeared imminent, the veteran administrator counseled
Cruillas:
1

"Take all measures necessary to defend the Kingdom, with
out submitting them to a Junta de Guerra, because such a
Junta is often composed of people who do not understand
what is going on" (vndibiduous aue no entienden aue es) .
Arriaga to Cruillas, November 14, I7 6 I, AGNM, RC,
Vol. 8l, expediente 166, no pagination.
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The Viceroy's next step was to appoint a commission
headed by a French engineer, Salvador de Dampier,42 to
procure and to refine potassium nitrate, in anticipation
of an increased consumption of this basic raw material.43
By September 20th the buildings which were to house the
machinery had been framed, steel and iron for machinery
had been collected, and a forge had been built on the site.
Eighty men were working on the project under the direction
of Engineer-Captain Costanzo.44

42Salvador de Dampier (or Dampierre) had come to
New Spain with the title of enqineur de salpetres. He had
come from France to Spain and had spent some time at the
University of Madrid making experiments with explosives.
He came to Mexico with a salary of 2,000 pesos per year.
His career in America was marked by frequent quarrels with
officials, and when he returned to Spain in 1783* he was
charged with stealing funds appropriated for the purchase
of chemicals, j. Houdaille, "Les francais au Mexique et
leur influence politique et sociale (I7 6 O-I8 OO)," Revue
Francais d'Histoire d 'Outre-Mer. Vol. 48, No. 2 (I9 6 I),

p . 1$8.
43Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, September 26, 1779/
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 85, fol. 3544Same to same, September 29# 1779/ ibid., No. 124,
fols. 59 “ 6 0 .
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On August 27, 1780, exactly one year after he had
first written to Jos6 de Gcilvez of his decision to conr
struct the new establishment, Mayorga reported to Spain
that the new mill was in operation and that the first gun
powder had been produced.

Royal officials had made formal

test firings of the product, and its strength far exceeded
the minimum standards required for the army and navy.45
The summer of 1779 was the only period of rela
tive peace which Mayorga was to enjoy during his tenure of
office.

Within the area dependent upon New Spain for

money and supplies, no army was in action except that of
Bernardo de Gcilvez.

At the outbreak of war between Spain

45An Ynstruccion issued August 1957/ which was
used as a standard of excellence, required that a half
ounce of powder propel a musket-ball 240 feet to be
acceptable for the royal service. Six test shots from
each of several lots of powder were fired at the new
plant; the range of the shots was from 318 feet to 398
feet. Same to same, August 27/ 1779/ ibid., Vol. 127/
No. 619, fols. 14-15. The Spanish treatment of gunpowder
as a crown monopoly provides an interesting contrast to
Great Britain's method of supply. Before and during the
American Revolution, gunpowder used by the British armed
forces was brought from private manufacturers and mer
chants. In 1779 its poor and irregular quality provoked
a strong protest from Admiral Samuel Barrington, then in
command of the Leeward Islands station. In 1787 the
British government began to manufacture its own powder.
Fortescue, History of the British Army. Vol. 3/ P- 547*
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and England both powers had feared and expected assaults
on their respective American colonies by the other, but
only the Governor of Louisiana had taken the offensive.
Sir Henry Clinton, Commander of British forces in the
North American colonies, had admitted his inability to aid
West Florida.

Communication with the Province was so

infrequent that Clinton did not even feel justified in
sending instructions to Brigadier John Campbell,
commanding in Pensacola, and

the only means, therefore, left for me to serve him to
any effectual purpose were by repeatedly representing
his defenseless situation to the Admirals on the
Jamaica and Leeward Island station and requesting that
they would send to Pensacola some ships of war for its
protection,46

Meanwhile in Jamaica young Horatio Nelson, com
manding a battery at Port Royal, was studying French in
the expectation of being captured, for Governor Dalling
of Jamaica had written to Clinton that Count d'Estaing
was at Hispaniola with a fleet and army, and that "his

46Quoted in William B. Willcox, The American
Rebellion; Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of flis Campaign.
1775-1782 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 195*0 »p. 133
[hereafter referred to as Willcox, American Rebellion! .
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descent upon the island may be daily expected." The
Governor had no hope of successful resistance.47
Spain's fears of prompt attacks upon her American
possessions corresponded to British apprehensions.
Repeated warnings had been sent to New Spain since 1776,
urging constant vigilance against a surprise British
attack before the formal declaration of war by either
nation.

There was reason for concern, for as early as

1778-the anticipated entry of Spain into the war had sug
gested to the British a change of strategy, a means of
breaking off the struggle with their colonies in North
America and seeking compensation by the conquest and reten
tion of French and Spanish territory.

Hugh Elliott,

British Minister to Prussia, had advised William Eden,
Undersecretary for the Northern Department, to press for
abandonment of the war with the rebellious thirteen
colonies:

4701iver Warner, Victory; the Life of Lord
Nelson (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p. 26
[hereafter referred to as Warner, Nelson].
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Declare them independent, and add the independence of
all the Spanish colonies and islands. In order to
support this, let our fleets and armies evacuate North
America, fall upon Santo Domingo, Martinique, Cuba and
force free trade in the Gulf of Mexico. The straight
road to the gold and silver mines, the sugar islands,
and the revolt of the Spanish settlements, these will
be the consequences of this vigorous measure. Our
Presbyterian colonies will be more than compensated

Researchers have found similar suggestions among
the memoranda of Lord George Germain, Secretary of State
for the colonies.

Once King George III became convinced

that Spain would intervene, he favored withdrawing British
forces from the north and turning them against the
Spanish and French colonies.49
There were two reasons why such a shift of mili
tary objectives was impossible.

It was by no means cer

tain that Great Britain was capable of capturing and
retaining the island colonies of the Bourbon allies, much
less of penetrating the vast expanse of the Spanish Main.

48Quoted in.William B. Willcox, "British Strategy
in America, 1778." The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XIX,
No. 2 (June, 19^7), p. lOln.
49The King also suggested that New Orleans be
seized, whether Spain entered the war or not. Mackesy,
The War for America, p . 185•
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Secondly, their former American colonies, if freed frcm all
British pressure, would be quite capable of taking and
occupying Canada, an enterprise which they had attempted
before their formal declaration of independence.

If Canada

should fall, Great Britain would lose her last hold on the
North American continent.

Regardless of military logic,

England, over-extended and driven by political necessity,
had to continue the fight in both the northern and southern
hemispheres.
The immediate beneficiary of the dispersion of
British forces was the United States of America, for the
threat of Spanish belligerency influenced British thinking
and action before hostilities began.

In the winter of

1778/ Clinton stated that by cautious defensive action he
might maintain the status quo against the Americans and
the French until next year, but he saw no possibility of
a British offensive in 1779# because

. . . the great possibility there was of our soon
being engaged in one [war] with Spain would put it
out of the power of government to send such augmenta
tions for the army in America as might place it in
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any sort of condition for entering upon an active
campaign in the ensuing summer.50

In December 1779/ when Clinton learned of the fall
of the British posts on the Mississippi, he repeated that
he was unable to send assistance to West Florida.

He again

asked Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica to send a frigate or two to
Pensacola,

"whereby we might be enabled to retain at least

one hold in West Florida"; but he feared the loss of the
whole Province, because

the Indians being somehow estranged from our interests
and the inhabitants averse to military service, he
[General Campbell of Pensacola] had not the slightest
prospect of assistance from either.51

soWillcox, The American Rebellion, p. 107*
51Ibid., p. 154. Bernardo de G&lvez had devoted
much effort to winning over the Indians. One hundred sixty
had joined his march against the British posts on the
Mississippi River, and the Governor was even able to per
suade them to refrain from their usual practice of killing
or mutilating their prisoners. Caughey, G&lvez, p. 1 6 3 .
Throughout his West Florida campaign G&lvez awarded large
silver medals to the chiefs whose adherence he sought. A
quantity of these medals had been struck at the Casa de
Moneda in Mexico City and delivered to Louisiana. G&lvez
to Mayorga, January 20, 1 7 8 0 , AGNM, RC, Vol. ±±8,
expediente 49/ fol. 66.
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While Bernardo de Gcilvez was attacking enemy
posts contiguous to Louisiana, the Governor of Yucatan,
Roberto Rivas de Betancourt, was organizing a similar
expedition against the British logwood cutters in the Bay
of Honduras.52

On July 27, the Audiencia Gobierna of

Mexico had sent 200 guintales of poweb to Yucatan.

After

the news of the war had reached the capital, Yucat&n
received an additional 300 guintales of powder and 100,000
pesos, because Betancourt had complained that lack of
money and powder was delaying offensive action on his
part.53

Two ships carried the supplies from Veracruz to

Campeche, and Betancourt sailed with five schooners and

52Scattered settlements of Englishmen had been
cutting logwood, or campeachy wood, along the shores of
the Gulf of Honduras since the seventeenth century.
Although Spain had frequently attacked the centers of
cutting and had protested against their presence through
diplomatic channels, the Baymen simply fled to the south
when danger threatened and returned when it had passed.
Most of the establishments were in the neighborhood of
Belize, but there were more at Rio Negro, in present-day
Honduras. Carlos III had determined to expel the intruders
altogether, although by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Spain
had agreed to tolerate the cutters indefinitely on condi
tion that their settlements would not be fortified.
Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±936), pp. 41-43, 102, 603•
53Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, September 26, 1779,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 84, fols. 13-15.
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three hundred militiamen almost simultaneously with
Bernardo de Gcilvez' attack on the Mississippi.

By Sep

tember 22nd, Betancourt had taken and sacked three logcutting settlements on and near St. George's Island and
Cayo Cocina, on the coast of present-day British
Honduras.34
At the same time that Governor Betancourt was
moving against the English logcutters a situation was
developing in Guatemala which was to cause the Viceroy
more trouble than British invaders.

In July 1779/ Matias

de Gcilvez, elder brother of the Minister of the Indies
and father of Bernardo, arrived in Guatemala with the
titles of Captain-General and President of the Royal
Audiencia.

Upon his arrival he made a tour of inspection

and began the organization and arming of militia com
panies.55

On August 28th, Matias de Gcilvez asked Moyorga

54Same to same, November 20, 1779/ ibid., Vol. 124,
No. 167/ fols. 39-40. St. George's Island is opposite the
mouth of the Belize River, and Cayo Cocina is eight miles
north of the river.
55Agustin Menos Franco, Estudios histdricos sobre
Centro-America: querras contra los inqleses _y administraci6n de don Matias de Gdlvez (Guatemala: La Academia
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for a million pesos for defense purposes, the first of a
series of peremptory demands which were to cause much
bitterness between the two men.

Mayorga felt that the

resources of New Spain were not at the time adequate to
justify such a disbursement, and in a letter to J6se de
Gcilvez explained why this was so.

The Viceroy acknowl

edged that Matias de Gcilvez had come to Guatemala with a
royal order empowering him to call upon New Spain for what
ever he needed to prosecute the war, but the treasuries of
the viceroyalty had other responsibilities besides that of
maintaining the defenses of Guatemala:

No one knows better than Your Excellency the many
demands which this Exchequer must meet. When news of
the war was received here, the Audiencia Gobierna sent
1#500,000 pesos to Veracruz, Havana and New Orleans,
as well as aid to other places, whose total has now
reached the impressive sum of 1,450,000 pesos,
including the 300,000 pesos for the ships to take to
Manila.56

Guatemalteca de la Lengua, 1959), p. 17 [hereafter referred
bo as Menos Franco, Estudios historicosl .
56Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, September 26, 1779,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 123, foil. 19v.
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Furthermore, the Viceroy speculated, ships might
come to Veracruz any day with orders for him to send money
to Spain.

He had written to the Captain-General of Guate

mala that it was impossible to send him one million pesos.
He had dispatched 100,000 pesos to Guatemala by forced
marches, but he had only been able to gather that sum by
borrowing it from the Factor of the Renta de Tabacos in
Oaxaca.
able.

More money would follow as soon as it was avail
Actually, withou four days he was somehow able to

find the balance of the million pesos and sent it after
the first shipment.57

57Same to same, September 30, 1779/ ibid.,
No. 127, fols. 65 - 65 V. The manufacture and sale of tobacco
was the most profitable of all the crown monopolies in New
Spain. It had been effectively organized during the visi
tation of Jos6 de Gcilvez, and its entire net income was
reserved for the crown. Therefore, the only legal way for
Viceroy Mayorga to obtain money from the Renta de Tabacos
was to borrow it with the expectation of repaying the sum
from some other source before the next remission of money
was made to Spain. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America,
PP. 275-276. Mayorga's concern about the drain on the
resources of New Spain is understandable, for there was in
1779 no precedent for the spending of so much money in so
short a time. The entire cost to New Spain of the Spanish
participation in the Seven Years' War had been 3/390,4-71
pesos, as noted in chapter I, p. 4. Yet in less than a
month after the declaration of war in 1779/ New Spain had
spent 2,950,000 pesos, most of it sent outside the Kingdom.
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As it happened, Guatemala needed help shortly
after Mayorga sent the money.

At dawn on November 20th, a

messenger from Matias de G&lvez entered Mexico City with
the news that the fort of Omoa on the coast of Honduras5®
had fallen to the British on October 16th.

The invaders,

attacking with twelve ships and an undetermined number of
men, had overwhelmed the garrison.

The Viceroy at once

sent a courier to Veracruz with instructions to dispatch
any ship available to Havana to carry an account of the
incident to the Governor and the Commander of the Havana
squadron.

At the moment Mayorga was unable to do more.

There were at his disposal in the harbor of Veracruz only
two lightly-armed brigantines which were incapable of
challenging the twelve ships reported by Matias de Gdlvez.

ssThe pueblo of Omoa was located on the bay of
the same name about ten miles south of the present
boundary between Guatemala and Honduras. The Castillo de
San Fernando, which defended the bay, had been completed
in 1 7 7 5 * Its walls were eighteen feet thick, and if
properly garrisoned it should.have been able to withstand
any siege by the limited British forces available for the
purpose in 1 7 7 9 *
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He would, he assured Jos6 de G&lvez, continue to rush all
possible aid to the Captain-General by land.59
The British had not planned the capture of Omoa.
Three ships of the Jamaica squadron had been cruising in
the Gulf of Honduras when they learned from fugitives of
the Spanish descent upon the woodcutters of Belize.

At

the same time, the British learned that there were two
laden merchantmen at anchor in the bay of Omoa.

There

were aboard the British ships only a dozen soldiers com
manded by a Captain-Commandant, William Dalrymple, but
150 woodcutters joined his small force as volunteers.
This body of men recaptured the logwood settlements and
then passed on to Omoa, where they achieved a complete
surprise and took 265 Spanish prisoners in a bloodless
assault.

The amount of booty was considerable, but its

exact value could not be determined, for Dalrymple seized
everything and divided it among his soldiers, depriving
the seamen and the volunteers of their shares.

General

Dalling, the Governor of Jamaica, urged Dalrymple to blow

S9Mayorga to Jos£ de G&lvez, November 20, 1779/
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, NO. I6 9 , fols. 40-4lv.
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up the fortifications of Omoa and to evacuate the place,
for it was unhealthful.

Dalrymple, however, garrisoned

the fort and sailed away, leaving the men in the fort to
await counter-attack from Matias de G&lvez while they were
reduced by fever and disease.60
As Mayorga reported to Spain, the small garrison
was unable to advance into the interior, and they seemed
to have no plan of campaign (parece no saben donde ir) .
Again he wrote to Cuba to ask that the Havana squadron
attack the fort, for the British warships had departed.
Meanwhile, he would continue to aid Matias de Galvez as
he could.61

Havana sent no help to Captain-General G&lvez,

but this proved to be unnecessary.

When he moved against

the fort of Omoa in November with a motley force of 500
Negroes, Indians, and drafted criminals62 and made

6°Dalrymple was a very young officer who had no
previous service in the tropics, and only Dalling's oppo
sition prevented him from attempting to advance from Omoa
across Guatemala toward the Pacific Ocean. Portescue,
History of the British Army. Vol. 3# P« 308; Mackesy, The
War for AiuSrxc 3./ P. 275.
slMayorga to Jos€ de G&lvez, November 27» 1779/
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 172, fols. 46-48v.
62Ferncindez Duro, Armada. Voir 7/ P* 283*
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preparations for a siege, the British spiked the guns of
the fort and embarked in small boats during the night.
They took refuge on Roatan, one of the Bay Islands 100
miles northeast of Omoa, and Mayorga sent repeated appeals
to Havana to attack the island.

It was ill-defended, and

there the British had stored all the plunder seized at
Omoa.63

However, Juan Bautista Bonet, the Commandant of

the Havana squadron, did not attack, nor did he answer the
Viceroy's letters.
The expulsion of the British from Omoa ended the
immediate threat to the Spanish Mainland, and on Novem
ber 20th, Mexico City learned that Bernardo de G&lvez had
taken the British posts on the Mississippi River.64

By

the same post the Viceroy was directed to increase the

63Mayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, December 27/ 1779/
AGNM, CV, Vol. 125, No. 200, fols. 20-21v. Although a
report to the British Colonial Office disparingly reported
Matias de Galvez' army to be a "party-colored rabble," it
was more than adequate for the recapture of Omoa. Only
seventy-four men of the garrison, mostly Negroes, were
physically fit for duty when Galvez appeared.Mackesy,
The War for America. p. 33564Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, November 20, 1779,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 1 6 3 , fols. 36 V- 3 7 .
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situado of Louisiana, which had been fixed at 300,000
pesos on August 30, 1779, by 144,677 pesos, a sum which
was its Governor’s estimate of money needed to move
against Mobile.65

Bernardo de Galvez spent the remainder

of the year preparing for this expedition and in argument
with the Captain-General of Cuba, who believed that
Pensacola, not Mobile, should be the next objective.66
On the west coast of New Spain and in the Pacific
Ocean there had been no word of British activity.

On

November 21st the annual ship from Manila made port at
Acapulco after a long and arduous voyage begun on May 31st *
She had sighted no sail, and the entire trip had been
without incident.67

The safe arrival of the Manila ship,

65Same to same, .ibid., No. 164, fols. 37~37v 66Caughey, Galvez. pp. 173-174.
67Mayorga to Josd de G&lvez, November 25, 1779>
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 171, fols. 45v-46v. The Comman
dant of the ship, Jos£ de Ampar^n, complained that the
length of this voyage was due in part to his having to
call at Monterey, California, in obedience to a royal
opder issued in 1773* Although a Commandant could'be
fined 4,000 pesos for not calling at Monterey, most pre
ferred to risk the fine rather than to suffer the delay.
Schurz, Manila Galleon, pp. 245-246.
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whose cargo was valued at 477/758 pesos,68 was the last
noteworthy event of 1 7 7 9 *
The fortuitous coincidence of the death of
Bucareli, the designation of Mayorga as Viceroy, and the
outbreak of war had brought about an abrupt transition of
power and an unprecedented burden of responsibility for
the new Viceroy, who began to ask Spain for a replacement
almost as soon as he had assumed power.69
British weakness in 1779 made a direct threat to
New Spain impossible, and it became obvious within a few
months that the role of the Viceroyalty was to be the
support of the armed forces of Spain and France at any
cost to its own economy.

A recapitulation of the money

and goods dispatched to Louisiana, Havana, and other

68Mayorga to Jos£ de Galvez, December 27/ 1779/
AGNM, CV, Vol. 125/ No. 191/ fol. 15v. Schurz has written
that it is difficult to determine accurately the value of
the goods shipped from Manila to Mexico. The merchants of
the islands wished the Spanish merchants to remain in
ignorance of the true value of Philippine commerce, and
the cargo manifests were frequently falsified. Schurz,
Manila Galleon, p. 4569Rivera Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico,
Vol. 1, p. 440.
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points by November 20, 1179, earned Mayorga a letter of
commendation from Josd de Galvez;70 but the brief moment
of good feeling between Madrid and Mexico City was not to
last.

The demands of the ports dependent upon New Spain

soon led to bitter and protracted controversies whose
origin will be traced in the next chapter.

7°Jbsd de Gllvez to Mayorga, May 3/ 1780, AGNM,
RC, Vol. 119, expediente 27, fol. 31*

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

C H A P T E R

I I I

THE WAR GATHERS MOMENTUM

At the beginning of 1780 'there "was no apparent
threat to New Spain; in consequence, there seemed to be
no need for heavy naval units to guard the coasts.
Nevertheless, for the protection of the harbor of Vera
cruz, Mayorga ordered a constant patrol of small boats,
a practice which Julian de Arriga, then Minister of the
Indies, had recommended to Viceroy Cruillas in I7 6 5 . 1
When Jo b 6 de Geilvez wrote the Viceroy that in case of
need he should call on the French West Indies for
assistance, Mayorga responded that he would do so if it

^Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, January 8, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expedients 5/ fols. 7“7V * Arriaga
had once refused Cruillas ' request for a frigate to be
stationed permanently at Veracruz and had advised him to
maintain an offshore patrol which could warn shore
defenses of the approach of suspicious craft. Chapter I,
p. 11.
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were necessary, but that he was unaware of any English
preparations for a descent upon New Spain.2
In January 1 7 8 0 , the Minister of the Indies sent
to Mexico City a detailed account of the progress of the
war in Europe.

He stated in a preliminary paragraph that

the King wished his subjects overseas to be fully informed
of operations in Europe in order that they should not be
misled by false or exaggerated news that had been pub
lished in the London journals.

Having, in effect,

attempted to minimize the impact of bad news to come,
G&lvez proceeded to his narrative.

Gibraltar had been

blockaded by sea and land since Spain's entrance into the
war, and its garrison had been reduced to near starvation.
A combined French and Spanish fleet had threatened England
with invasion and had delayed the relief of the hardpressed fortress.

Yet Gdlvez admitted that on January 16,

1 7 8 0 , a fleet commanded by Admiral George Rodney had

decisively defeated a smaller Spanish force under Admiral

2Same to same, January 3 , 1780, ibid., expediente
40, fol. 52. The Viceroy's answer is given in Mayorga to
Jos4 de Geilvez, May 10, 1780, AGNM, CV, Vol. 126, No. 462,
fols. l88-l83v.
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Juan de Langara and had brought food and reinforcements
to Gibraltar.

Geilvez* explained at length that inclement

weather had dispersed Langara's command and caused it to
be inferior in strength to the enemy at the time of bat
tle.

He praised the stubborn valor displayed by the

Spaniards in the unequal contest, but the fact remained
that Gibraltar had been relieved and that it was for the
time being secure.

The Minister expressed confidence

that any future attempt to break the blockade would be
frustrated.
Abruptly changing the topic, Geilvez promised that
the spring campaign of 1780 would bring decisive actions
that would end the war and establish a peace advantageous
to Spain and France.

In a final paragraph he exhorted

Mayorga to animate the spirits of the soldiers and civ
ilians in New Spain by "sowing the seeds of vigor, of
patriotism and of glory."3

3Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, January 27, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 6 5 , fols. 93”97v * Geilvez
was less than candid in his relation of the attempted
invasion of England^ In July, 1779, a force of 31,000
troops had been assembled in and around LeHavre and
St. Malo to be transported to England by a combined force
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His reference to the spring campaign was the
first notice to New Spain that the relative inactivity
that had prevailed since the recovery of Omoa in the pre
vious November was not to last.

A convoy from Ccidiz had

been expected to sail for America in November or December,
1779 1

it had been delayed.

In January Jos6 de G&lvez

assured the Viceroy that he need have no fear for the
safety of the ships.

There had been urgent reasons for

the postpcnemen t of the sailing date, reasons which would
shortly be revealed . 4

of more than one hundred French and Spanish ships. Poor
staff work, bad weather and disease forced the allies to
return to France in September after cruising aimlessly in
the English Channel without aver having succeeded in
landing troops or in engaging the English naval forces.
Disease struck with such effect that the fleet was unable
to remain at sea. Total casualties are unknown, but the
French alone disembarked more than 12,000 sick at Brest,
and "so many dead had been cast into the sea during the
last days of the cruise that it was a month before the
people of Cornwall and Devon would eat fish again."
A. Temple Patterson. The Other Armada (Manchester:
Manchester-.University Press, i9 60 ) , p p .. 210-212
4 Jos6 de Gdlvez to Mayorga, January 13, i780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 3 6 , fol. 41.
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On February 17 th the Minister of the Indies at
last sent a general account of the coming operations.

America will be the principal theatre of war in
the next campaign which according to all appearances
will be more decisive than the last one. In view of
the general preparations of both powers, especially
of England, the King has resolved that there should
go to Havana in the great convoy which will leave
c£diz in March warships and troops sufficient to form
a strong squadron in those seas, and a body of reserves
capable of supporting the defense of our Dominions, and
an invasion of those of the enemy which can be invaded
with possibility of success.
France is sending to her islands, and they are
already sailing for them, seventeen ships of the line
commanded by Count deGuichen, which happily united,
as is hoped> with the other French naval forces which
France has in those waters, will form at Martinique a
squadron of twenty-nine ships to work vigorously
against the British possessions. In a convoy bound
for the same destination 4,000 regulars are going to
join various regiments in the French islands, and will
form an army which will accompany the operations of
the squadron.
England has ordered ten battalions to embark at
Plymouth under escort of five ships, which will go
directly to Jamaica where the Court of London plans
to assemble by March 8,000 regulars and eighteen
ships of the line and eleven frigates, with the object
of assuring the defense of that island and of threat
ening our possessions. Also, the enemy plans to send
2.000 men to Carolina and Georgia to supplement the
6.000 who are already there, the 8,000 in New York
and the 1,800 in Canada.
Granting this plan of operation, and that on our
part the King wishes that he proceed with all the
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determination and with the vigor which the defense of
our precious Dominions and the national glory inspires,
all Commanders of those Kingdoms and Provinces must
give the most active forethought to being prepared
against an enemy offense without neglecting any chances
of taking the offensive against him which the situation
may offer.
But the two principal objectives to which the force
of our arms must be directed are the conquest and
retention of Florida and the total expulsion of the
English from the coasts of Campeche and Honduras. To
both these en^s Your Excellency must render aid by
sending in agreement with the Governor of Havana and
the President of Guatemala the assistance which may be
felt necessary for their execution. If Pensacola has
already been taken, as some London gazettes have pub
lished, it is necessary to station adequate garrisons
there, because the enemy will make an extreme effort
to recover it. If this is not sc, its conquest must
be begun at once in compliance with the Royal Order of
August 30. The conquest of Florida having been accom
plished, or at the same time if possible, the recovery
of the fortress of Omoa will be dealt with, for it is
quite probable that it may have fallen into the hands
of the English, and the same forces will serve after
wards to dislodge them from the ports which they occupy
on those coasts .
An offer which France has made, and which His
Majesty has accepted, can assist this project greatly
and aid in the protection of those Dominions in gen
eral: it is to station 2 ,0 0 0 men and four warships
at El Guarico [Cap Francois] at the orders of our
President of Santo Domingo, who will confer with the
Governor and the Commandant of Marine at Havana about
the useful employment of these forces. With them, the
body of troops which will go to the island and the
powerful squadron which will unite in its port will be
able to deploy powerful assistance wherever the neces
sity of defense should demand, or the opportunity of
attack offer.
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Your Excellency on your part will assist with
activity and vigor the accomplishment of the fore
mentioned projects in the knowledge that the King will
worthily reward those who distinguish themselves by
their zeal and will not pardon carelessness or delays
in matters so much to the interest of national advan
tage and to the splendor of the Spanish arms and
flag . 5

A week later there followed a more detailed account
of the support which New Spain was to give to the forces
due to come to the Indies.

Twelve ships of the line were

to sail from Cadiz in March bearing 8,000 troops to Havana
as well as a regiment sent to reinforce the garrisons of
Puerto Rico.

Sailing under the protection of the warships

would be a large convoy of merchantmen including azoques.
ships carrying mercury, which was necessary for the
process then in use in refining silver.
Geilvez ordered that the accumulation of foodstuffs
for the subsistence of the troops and the crewmen of the
fleet begin at once at Veracruz, and that preparation be
made simultaneously to draw funds from all available

sJos£ de Geilvez to Mayorga, February 17, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 118, fols. 229“230v. The
threat expressed in the last paragraph is an early example
of the abuse which Mayorga suffered from the Minister of
the Indies.
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sources to meet the expanses of the fleet and army.

Even

the funds allocated for the construction of ships at
Havana, hitherto regarded as sacrosanct, were to be sacri
ficed to the emergency . 6

If the money available to the

treasuries should be insufficient, Mayorga was to seek
loans from private individuals, local cabildos and religi
ous organizations. The Viceroy was instructed to make
prospective lenders understand that the maintenance of
the army and ships would be costly, but since the rein
forcements were destined for the common defense of all
the Spanish colonies, all subjects should be willing to
contribute. 7
G&lvez did not predict the date on which the con
voy would arrive in the West Indies nor the exact nature,
scope or duration of operations in America, but his dis
patch made it clear that he expected the support of so
many men and vessels to strain the financial resources of
the viceroyalty.

Even if New Spain succeeded in promptly

6 See Chapter I , p . 19 •

7Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, February 24, I78 O,
AGNM, HC, Vol. 118, expediente 126, fols. 240-240v.
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producing all the money and food asked of it, supply was
only one aspect of the logistical problem involved.
Transportation was the other.

As far as maritime traffic

between New Spain and the West Indies was concerned, the
Viceroy was almost completely dependent upon the Comman*{

dant of Marine at Havana, for there was no permanent
squadron of warships or of chartered merchantmen at Vera^
cruz which could be used in the royal service.

He was

further limited in the shipment of cargoes from New Spain
by orders from Spain which restricted the type of vessel
which he was empowered to charter or commandeer. The out
break of war in the summer of 1779 an<3 the consequent need
for large-scale movements of men and cargo upon short
notice caused a shipping shortage whose effects were felt
immediately.

The arrival of twelve warships and more

than 8 ,0 0 0 men whose subsistence depended upon a service
of supply from New Spain could only aggravate a situation
which was already critical.
On September 1, 1779/ Jos6 de G&lvez had reminded
the Viceroy that long-standing and repeated royal orders
forbade the shipment of crown funds from Veracruz in other
vessels than warships of the Real Armada, and he had sent
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a similar warning to Juan Bautista Bonet, Commandant of
Marine at Havana, by the same post.8

Yet from the very

beginning it had been impossible for royal officials in
New Spain to comply with the orders to which Geilvez had
referred, because royal ships were seldom at their dis
posal when they were needed.

News of the declaration of

war had reached Mexico City on August 13th, and the
Audiencia Gobierna.. ruling.New Spain in the absence of a
viceroy, wished to send emergency aid of food, gunpowder,
and 500,000 pesos to Cuba with all possible speed.9

On

August 19th the Administrador de la Real Hacienda,
Pedro Antonio de Cosio, found that there were no ships of
the Reel Armada at Veracruz, and he attempted to charter
three merchant ships then in port to carry the cargoes to
Havana.

Two of the ships were registros from CAdiz, and

the third had come from La Guaira, the port of Caracas.
The masters of the ships signed contracts providing for
monthly rentals of their ships ranging from 1,250 to 1,500

8Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, September 1, 1779/
AGNI-l, RC, Vol. 117, expediente 139/ fol. 270.
9See pp.

58-59*
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pesos, and they expressed willingness to sail as soon as
their freight could be delivered to Veracruz and loaded.
At that point the officers and crewmen of the three
ships, apparently acting in concert, refused to sail,
alleging that they feared being caught in the cordonazo.
the Spanish seamen's term for the equinoctial storms pre
vailing around St. Francis' Day, October 4th.

Viceroy

Mayorga took office on August 23rd, and when he learned
of the delay, he consulted his Fiscal . 10 who advised him
that the need to aid Cuba took precedence over extraordi
nary methods or expenses involved in making delivery.
The master of one of the ships, the San Christoval. then
proposed that the Real Hacienda guarantee him the full
value of his ship, 45,000 pesos, in the event of her loss
by storm or enemy action.

Ke declared that if he were

insured against loss, he could persuade his crew to sail.

10Mayorga's action in seeking advice from this
official was undoubtedly taken to protect himself against
any future challenge of the legality of his procedures.
The Fiscal has been defined as a "sort of royal watchdog
who defended the king's interests wherever they might
appear." Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, p. 120n.
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The Viceroy had no choice but to agree to the master's
terms, and by September 26 the San Christoval was loaded
and ready to sail, while negotiations proceeded with the
other two shipmasters.

Already six weeks had passed since

the Audiencia Gobierna had- decided to rush aid to Havana . 1,1
I

While Mayorga discussed the terms of the charters
with the shipmasters, he grew increasingly concerned about
the absence of news from Spain.

On October 2nd, he com

plained to Jos6 de Geilvez that the mail which should have
left L,a Coruna on the first of July had not yet reached
Mexico, and that lacking any notice of the progress of
the war, he was at a loss as to how to proceed.

Under the

circumstances he felt that it was best to send a small
craft to Havana to seek information and to ask the Comman
dant of Marine to order several ships to Veracruz.

Even

if Havana had no mail or cargo to deliver to Mexico, the

aiMayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, September 26, 1779/
AGNM, CV, Vol. 1 2 3 , No. 119, fols. 53 - 5 6 . The minister
approved the chartering of the ships, and stated in his
reply that when the supplying of an important port was
concerned, expense and the letter of the law could not be
primary considerations. Josd to G&lvez to Mayorga,
January 10, 1780, AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 26,
fol. 3 5 .
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ships could sail to Veracruz in ballast and return loaded
with the materiel which the Viceroy was finding difficulty
in transporting to the island . 12
It was not until mid-November that the emergency
remission of supplies from New Spain to Cuba was completed.
The San Christoval had cleared port before the expected bad
weather, but the other two vessels had to remain at Vera
cruz while nortes slowed their loading and prevented their
sailing.

Three other merchant ships entered the harbor

during October, and they were promptly chartered and
insured by the Real Hacienda. Meanwhile, in response to
the urgent orders of the Viceroy, freight was moving to
Veracruz faster than it could be loaded.

Since there were

now five bottoms available, the Viceroy determined to fill
them to capacity, so that the final amount of money and
provisions exceeded the original quantities ordered by
the Audiencia Gobierna.
The money from Havana was distributed among the
most seaworthy vessels, and on November 15th the five

12Mayorga to Jos4 de Geilvez, October 2, AGNM, CV,
Vol. 123, No. 130, fols. 67 - 67 V.
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ships sailed, carrying 1,100,000 pesos, flour, dried
vegetables, copper, and lead.

Before they sailed, the

Viceroy received a: reply to the appeal for ships which he
had made to the Commandant of Marine.

Juan Bautista Bonet

promised to send on ship every twenty-five days to pick
up whatever cargo might be ready for shipment to Cuba.
Mayorga correctly foresaw that such a limited and infre
quent freight service would be inadequate, and he observed
to Josd de Gdlvez that those commanding in Cuba seemed
strangely indifferent to the money and food which they
claimed to need so badly, else they would have allotted
more cargo space to bring them.

The Viceroy added, with

considerable understatement, that to supply Havana ’has
caused much labor and harassment" (han costado algunas
fatigas y desuelos) .13
New Spain could serve the needs of the Province
of Louisiana more expeditiously than those of Cuba.

13Mayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, November 20, 1779#
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 158 , fols. 27-31V . The char
tering of the additional ships was approved by the King.
Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, May 3» 1780, AGNM, RC,
Vol. 119# expediente 2 7 } fol. 31-
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Situados paid by New Spain to Louisiana reached New Orleans
indirectly, for they were paid first to Havana, but Gov
ernor Bernardo de Gdlvez did not have to depend upon Cuba
for food.

Since the acquisition of the Province by Spain

it had been supplied from Veracruz.

However, in the autumn

of 1779 only one vessel, privately-owned, regularly sailed
between New Orleans and New Spain.

Governor Geilvez hoped

soon to be able to assign an additional ship to this traf
fic, but for the time being the brigantine Santa Rosa was
the only link between the ports of New Orleans and Vera
cruz.

Recognizing that, besides its normal requirements,

Louisiana must stockpile material of all kinds for the
coming expedition against West Florida, the Viceroy
directed the port officials of Veracruz to expedite the
servicing of the Santa Rosa or of any other vessel from
New Orleans.

Ships from the Province were to be loaded

without delay, and it was not necessary to consult the
capital before doing so.

The values of the cargoes were

to be deducted from the sum of the annual situado . 14

i4Mayorga to Jbsd de Gdlvez, November 20, 1779»
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 166, fols. 3&-38v. These orders
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On January 10, 1780, two letters from Madrid
commented on the difficulties of transport between Mexico
and Cuba.

The first stated that the King realized the

necessity for chartering merchant ships when no crown
ships were at hand, and continued with the ambiguous
statement that:

It has pleased the King to resolve that during the
war shipments of money and foodstuffs should not be
entrusted to merchant ships, unless there should be
an urgent reason, and then it is necessary to follow
the Law of Necessity.15

The second letter of the same date, January 10,
I78 O, approved Mayorga's request to Havana for more ships,
and stated that the Havana Commandant of Marine had been
ordered to send ships to Veracruz at more frequent

were approved by Josd de G&lvez; Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga,
April 26, 1 7 8 0 , ibid., Vol. 118, expediente 172, fols. 317”
317v.
15Jos6 de Geilvez to Mayorga, January 10, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 24, fols. 31”31v.
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intervals than the monthly mail boats.

No vessel was to

return empty from Veracruz.16
The quarrel about shipping between the Viceroy
and the officials of Havana continued to reverberate long
after the immediate emergency of autumn, 1 7 7 9 /

passed.

While Mayorga had been attempting to find ships to move
cargo to Cuba, the Intendant of the Army in Havana,
Juan Ignazio Utriza, had addressed complaints to Madrid
and had alleged that the island could not long maintain
its armed forces nor even survive unless New Spain
delivered money and food.

Through Josd de G&lvez the

king tried to soothe both parties.

The Intendant of the

Army in Havana was told that the demands upon New Spain
were great, because the Viceroyalty was the sole source
of money for all Spanish North America, and that Havana
should avoid making excessive requests and should practice
economy.

On the other hand, the Viceroy was urged to

realize that Havana was the most important military post

16Same to same, ibid., expediente 2 5 / fol. 33*
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in America and that its needs must he given preferential
treatment.17
On the Pacific coast of New Spain, as on the
Atlantic coast, the initial demands of the war had created
a shortage of shipping.

To send two ships to the Philip

pine Islands with emergency aid had required an extra
ordinary effort.18

At Acapulco the annual ship was load

ing and preparing to receive 4-00 soldiers being sent to
reinforce the Manila garrison in compliance with a royal
order of January 1 7 8 0 . The mixed body of infantry and
dragoons had been drawn from all the veteran infantry
regiments then in New Spain:

those of Granada, Asturias,

the Crown, and from the Dragoons of Mexico and Spain.
March 1, I78 O, the troops were enroute to Acapulco.

By
All

the men had received two months' pay, and their heavy
Spanish army uniforms had been left in storage in Mexico
City.

The troops wore instead light, loose linen trou

sers and jackets which Mayorga had ordered made for them

l7Same to same, January 2k, IjB/O, ibid.,
expediente 5k, fols. 6k-6kv.
18See pages Jiff.
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because of the heat of their new station.

The infantry

carried with them an issue of ninety-six sabres, not the
normal weapons of foot soldiers, to be used to repel
boarders if their ship were attacked.19

A ship had been

transferred from San Bias to escort the Manila ship, for
Jos£ de Gcilvez had warned that the English squadron of
Admiral Edward Hughes might be in the Pacific Ocean on
its way to attack the galleon, the Philippines, or the
coasts of New Spain and Peru.20
The Viceroy could do no more than warn the
officers commanding on the west coast of the possibility
of an English attack.

After two vessels had been sent to

19Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, March 4, 1 7 8 0 , AGNM,
cv, Vol. 126, No. 420, fols. 144-145.
2°Josd de Gcilvez to Mayorga, February 18, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 119/ fols. 231“231v.
Sir Edward Hughes had sailed for the East Indies in
March, 1779/ *>ut reports reaching Spain had greatly
exaggerated the strength of his squadron. In the Indian
Ocean Hughes was for two years out-maneuvered and out
fought by Pierre Suffren de Saint Tropez, the greatest
French seaman of the w a r . Hughes never reached the
Pacific. William Laird Clowes, assisted by Sir Clements
Markham, Captain A. T. Mahan, and H. W. Wilson, A History
of the Royal Navy from the earliest Times to the Present.
7 Vols. (Bostonc, Little, Brown and Company, l897~1903) /
Vol. 3/ P* 543 [hereafter referred to as Clowes, Royal
Navy] .
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the Philippines and another detached to escort the galleon,
there were no more ships of the Real Armada in service on
the Pacific coast.

In San Bias there was only one unsea

worthy ship, in such bad condition that she had been
careened and was undergoing a major overhaul.

Since he

lacked means of carrying provisions to the missions and
presidios of the Californias, the Viceroy commandeered a
privately-owned Peruvian merchantman which had sailed
from Guayaquil to Acapulco with a cargo of cacao.

The

Peruvian was ordered to San Bias in March 1780, and there
she received the crew and the armament of the unservice
able royal ship . 21
The problems of the west coast had been resolved
for the time being, but an emergency had arisen in the
Captaincy General of Guatemala.

In February the English

had landed, 500 strong, at the mouth of the San Juan
River in Nicaragua in an attempt to establish a chain of
forts across the Central American isthmus from ocean to
ocean.

The Spanish were not unduly alarmed, however, for,

21Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, March 3/ 1780, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 126, No. 410, fols. 126v-128.
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due to grave errors in logistics, the invaders could not
begin the ascent of the river toward their first objec
tive, Lake Nicaragua, until April.

Ignorance of the area,

its terrain, the climate, and disease, worked to frustrate
their effort.

The little army required almost a month to

struggle the hundred miles upstream to Fort San Juan,
which guarded the eastern end of the lake.

Even though

the English and their Indian and zambo allies had not yet
come into contact with any Spanish armed forces, their
leaders realised that their force was already spent.22
Of more immediate importance to the Viceroy were
the unceasing needs of the military and naval establish
ments of Cuba, the expedition of Governor Barnardo de
Gcilvez against Mobile and Pensacola, and the preparations

22"The expedition was, like so many of the oper
ations of the time, conducted without regard to climate,
the season of the year, the experience of the troops or
the health of those concerned in its execution." Warner,
Nelson, p. 2 7 . Lord George Germain, Secretary of State
for the American Colonies, called the attempt "ill con
cerned and worse executed, " and he blamed the greed of
Governor Dalling of Jamaica for its failure. Mackesy,
The War for America, p. 337*
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for the arrival of the fleet from Spain with its thousands
of mouths to feed.

In March 1780 the Viceroy represented

himself to Jos4 de Gcilvez as waiting in Mexico City alert
for calls for aid from any quarter.

From the beginning of

the war, he wrote, he had kept constantly in mind the dis
astrous outcome of the last war with the English, and the
mistakes of the past would not be repeated if the resources
of New Spain could prevent it, for "more than three quar
ters of its revenues are now spent for assistance to for
eign points, and within the Kingdom funds have been spent
only for the most indispensable needs."23
The behavior of the Governor General of Cuba, tiie
Intendant of the Army, and the Commandant of Marine con
tinued to provoke the anger of Mayorga, and in the spring
of 1780 Bernardo de Gcilvez, Jos£ de Gcilvez, and the King
joined him in condemnation of the Havana officials.
The Governor of Louisiana ran afoul of the
obstructionist attitude of Havana as soon as he began

23Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, March 5/ 1780, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 126, No. 425/ fols. 151-151v. Another paragraph
of this letter stated that the kingdom was peaceful and
prosperous. Aside from the necessary disruption of
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preparations for his descent upon Mobile and Pensacola.
The forces with which he had taken the> English posts on
the Mississippi River were inadequate for the siege of
fortifications like those of Mobile and Pensacola, and aid
from Havana.

Yet help was slow in coming; and Navarro,

the Governor, was reluctant to release soldiers to rein
force Gcilvez.

Twice he attempted to substitute alterna

tive plans for the projected sea-borne attack on the two
enemy forts.

He first maintained that Pensacola would

capitulate after a naval bombardment, and that no troops
at all would be needed.

Mobile would fall automatically

without having been invested.

The strenuous objection of

the young Governor, who knew the power of the batteries
which defended the bay of Pensacola, then caused Navarro
to recommend that land forces alone besiege both Mobile
and Pensacola.

Both forts, he claimed, would surrender

without bloodshed on either side.

In any case Cubs could

overseas commerce, all activities of New Spain continued
the normal routine (el mismo giro) .
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not spare the 7,000 men called for in Gcilvez' plan.

Half

that number would be enough . 24
Despairing of immediate aid from Cuba, Gcilvez
sent a trusted subordinate to plead with the captain
general; and on January 2, 1780, he sailed from New Orleans
with 754 men traveling in twelve small vessels.

On Febru

ary 24th, after he had already entered Mobile Bay, 567
soldiers from Havana joined him.25
While Gcilvez made ready to besiege Mobile, the
Viceroy of New Spain wrote the Minister of the Indies to
complain that he had been completely excluded from the
planning of the expedition.

The royal order of August 29/

1 7 7 9 / which had given general directives for the project,

had expressly provided that the commanders of the land and
sea forces in Havana act in concert with the Governor of
Louisiana and the Viceroy of New Spain, and that movements

24When Navarro made a report of his actions to
Spain, the King received it “con much disqusto." and
ordered that more reinforcements be sent from Havana at
once. Caughev. Galvez, pp. 173-174.
25 Ibid.. pp. 174-175.
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of ships and men be coordinated in order to avoid delays.
Identical copies of the order had been sent to Havana and
to Mexico City.

Yet when Mayorga received the order on

January 26, 1780, via Havana, it had been accompanied by a
letter from Governor Navarro whose substance was directly
contradictory to the orders from Spain.
Navarro asserted that it was inconvenient for him
.v

and his naval commander, Juan Bautista Bonet, to coordi
nate their planning with Mayorga and Bernardo de Gcilvez,
for the uncertainties of sea communication would delay
the execution of the enterprise.

The governor then

informed the Viceroy of what had been planned in Havana
and what Havana expected of New Spain.

Bernardo de Gcilvez

was to begin operations at Mobile, and he would be sup
plied from Havana.

The Viceroy was to send a fully equip

ped veteran regiment to Veracruz at once; and there it
must wait until ships came from Havana to transport it to
Cuba, where it would be employed as the Governor and the
Naval Commandant saw fit.
Then by a private vessel which arrived at Veracruz
on February 21, Mayojtga received another letter from
NOvarro, dated February 7th-

H© was told that Gcilvez was
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enroute to Mobile, and that reinforcements were moving to
him from Havana.

Chartered ships would shortly call at

Veracruz to load the regiment supposedly waiting in that
port, together with the munitions and stores which were to
accompany i t . The Viceroy could not comply with this
order, and he explained his refusal to Jos£ de Gcilvez.

I am in the firm belief that the many dispositions
I have made since my entrance into this command to aid
and support the needs of Havana show how clearly I
have accorded them the special care they merit.
Equally I understand the importance of this under
taking, and I' foresee the usefulness that must follow
its success, and these considerations must add to my
distress when I feel the impossibility of being able
to station a completely equipped regiment in Veracruz
as has been demanded of m e .
The unhealthful climate of that port has already
reduced the numbers of the only three veteran regi
ments stationed in this Kingdom: by this misfortune
a considerable number of their officers and men have
been, lost, as is the case with the Lancer Squadron of
Veracruz, which is the primary defense of Veracruz
and its adjacent coast.26

260nly compulsion could make men serve in a mili
tary unit stationed at Veracruz. The unhealthfulness of
the port was so feared by those who lived inland that
Viceroy Bucareli had been forced to fill the vacancies in
ranks at Veracruz with criminals, and he had suggested to
judges that they keep the needs of Veracruz in mind when
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Furthermore, 400 men have just been taken in
compliance with a Royal Order to reinforce the
defenses of the Philippine Islands.
With all these reductions of strength, Your Excel
lency will understand how few are the veteran troops
remaining in the vast extent of this Kingdom, and if
the aforementioned Regiment should be with-drawn, the
Kingdom would be left scandalously defenseless, which
is contrary to many repeated Royal Orders. In view
of all this I find no more opportune solution to
reconcile the needs of this Kingdom with those of
Havana than to send to the latter port, if it is abso
lutely necessary, the help cf 400 veteran troops, but
only at a pre-determined date.

sentencing felons. Bobb, Bucareli, pp. 105-106. In 1782
and 1783 Mayorga ordered the drafting of provincial mili
tiamen to fill the ranks of the three veteran regiments
stationed in New Spain. At once the Viceroy's secretary
was deluged with letters from village priests, wives and
employers begging for exemptions for their parishioners,
husbands, and laborers. Nearly all the requests expressed
fear that the drafted men would be transferred to Veracruz.
Many militiamen fled their units and homes. The penalty
for desertion from a provincial militia unit was increased
in 1 7 8 2 . A captured deserter was forced to run a gauntlet
of 200 men who wielded ramrods. After he recovered from
this punishment, he was to serve six months in prison
wearing grillos, heavy leg-irons which made walking almost
impossible. Even this severe penalty did not reduce
desertion. Carmen Velazques. El Estado de Guerra, pp. 128,
129/ 134. Mayorga permanently stationed his veteran regi
ments at Jalapa, Cordoba, and Orizaba, towns far enough
from the coast to be regarded as healthful. Mayorga to
Josd de Gcilvez, March 5/ 17^0/ AGNM, CV, Vol. 126, No. 425/
fols. 151-151v.
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Thus I have answered the Governor of Havana.27

Bernardo de Gcilvez had to attack Mobile with no troops
from Mexico and v/ith only 567 men from Havana.

The fort

capitulated after a short siege, and the Spaniards took
formal possession on March 14th.

An English relief column

of 1,000 men from Pensacola had almost reached Mobile When
its commander heard of the surrender and retreated hur
riedly.

Gcilvez, Who had only 1,400 men at his disposal to

hold Mobile, to guard his 300 English prisoners, and to
confront the relief expedition, was forced to allow the
enemy to fall back on Pensacola unmolested.

He expressed

his regret to his uncle, Jos£ de Gcilvez, as follows:

I cannot give expression to the sentiments with which
all the individuals of my small army saw the retreat
of General Campbell without coming to grips with us,
nor could we reflect without sadness that if an expe
dition from Havana had arrived to join us we could
have succeeded over the English the same as Saratoga.28

27Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, March 3/ 17^0, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 126, No. 4l8, fols. 139-143.
28Quoted in Caughey, Gjilyez, p. 184.
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Ever since "he had assumed office Mayorga had
complained to Spain concerning the excessive demands and
the inactivity of those who commanded at Havana.

Before

and during the expedition against Mobile, Bernardo de
Gcilvez had added his voice to that of the Viceroy, and
their combined accusations provoked a strong letter from
Jos4 de Gcilvez which promised changes for the better. On
April 22, I78 O, the Minister of the Indies wrote of his
intentions to the Viceroy.

I have presented to the King Your Excellency's
letter of last December 27/ no. 200, in which you give
notice of having sent to the Governor and the Comman
der of the Squadron of Havana proper warning that the
English were holding on the island of Roat&n the
stocks of dyewood, the ships and the other goods which
they seized at Omoa the previous October 20, with the
object that they at once undertake the not very dif
ficult task of recapturing them. Your action has
merited the Royal approval, although its effects have
not corresponded to the well-conceived hopes expressed
by Your Excellency, since until February 26, the date
of the last news from Havana, the President of Guate
mala had received no assistance from the squadron
anchored at Havana nor had it even been reported that
the expedition against Pensacola and Mobile had
departed, due to the delays of the Commandant of
Marine.
In view of this juncture, so extraordinary and so
directly opposed to the most positive Royal Orders,
his Majesty has taken opportune measures to liven the
spirits of those who must execute those orders, so
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that in the future without being detained by apparent
risks of the sea or of the enemy they will initiate
with speed and vigor whatever military action they
may judge worthy of the glory and honor of our arms . 29

If Bernardo de Gcilvez and Viceroy Mayorga had
expected an immediate change of command in Cuba as a conse
quence of this letter, they were disappointed.

Bonet was

not relieved of his command until after the great convoy
arrived from Spain in October, because his replacement was
to be Josef Solano, commander of the convoy.

While Bonet

held office he continued to hamper Bernardo de Gcilvez'
efforts to follow the conquest of Mobile by a swift descent
upon Pensacola before that post might be reinforced from
Jamaica.

On February 15 th and again on March 7fch expedi

tions sailed from Havana against Pensacola only to turn
back without having accomplished anything.

On the first

occasion the captains were deterred by news that Pensa
cola had received strong reinforcements from Jamaica.

On

the second approach, they decided that the entrance to the

29Jos£ de Gcilvez to Mayorga, April 22, I7 S0 , AGNM,
RC, Vol. 118, expediente 166, fols. 310-.311-
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b a y .was impassable..because. of.-shaal ..water..

Both

suppositions were false.
In April, 1 7 8 0 , Bernardo de G&lvez made another
attempt to persuade Havana that the forces available at
that time were capable of taking Pensacola, but he failed,
for the authorities had decided to await the reinforcements
to be brought to America by the convoy . 30

In May Gcilvez

had no choice but to return his troops to Havana and New
Orleans and to leave a garrison at Mobile.
The English prisoners taken during Galvezs cam
paign were sent to Veracruz, and in May Jos£ de Gcilvez
requested a complete list of these prisoners and their
ranks, for at the time Madrid and London were in the
process of arranging an exchange . 31

But the Viceroy had

3 °Caughey, Galvez, pp. I88 -I 8 9 .
3 lJos£ de .Gcilvez to Mayorga, May 9/ 17^0/ R C »
Vol. 119, expediente 52 , fol. 6 l .
The two powers reached
agreement on a man-for-man exchange in July, 1 7 8 1 . This
was the only formal exchange agreement made during the war,
but exchanges were in fact continually made. The English
made special efforts to recover their men, for the Span
iards "had deplorable habits both as gaolers and goaled."
Olive Anderson, "The Establishment of British Supremacy at
Sea and the Exchange of Prisoners of War, l6 8 Q -1 7 8 ^ ." The
English Historical Review. No. CCXIV (January, i960 ),
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already rid New Spain of the forty officers and three
hundred thirty enlisted men whom Bernardo de Gcilvez had
sent to his kingdom.

Mayorga stated that he understood

why the Governor of Louisiana had promptly removed the
prisoners from West Florida, for Mobile, immediately after
its capture, had been threatened by the advance of an
enemy force from Pensacola, and to detach men to guard
the prisoners would have further weakened Galvez' already
small army.

PP* 79/ 88. Yet conditions in all Spanish prisons could
not have been uniformly bad. On January 4, 1781,
John Laforey, Commissioner of the Navy at the Leeward
Islands wrote to Admiral George Rodney:
"The Star is to take from hence about 60 Spanish prisoners
which General Burt and myself think, will be a proper com
pliment to the Spanish Governor of Porto Rico for his
Humanity and Good Treatment to the crew of the Deal Castle
which Lieutenant Gerard has reported to u s , and as these
prisoners are very sensible of our reciprocal Conduct
towards them here it may be the means of establishing a
good intercourse in our future exchanges."
Lord George Rodney, Letter-Books and Order-Book of George.
Lord Rodney, Admiral of the White Squadron [hereafter refe
referred to as Rodney, Letter-Books] , 2 Volumes.
(New
York: The New York Historical Society, 1932-1933)/ Vol. T,
pp. 132-133.
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Yet there were, according to the Viceroy, good
reasons for not allowing the prisoners to remain in New
Spain.

Veteran troops would be needed to guard them, men

who might be needed to repel an English attack.

The only

secure place of confinement was the fort of San Juan de
Ultia, where they would be able to learn the state of the
Spanish defenses. Under pretext of a parley or an exchange
of prisoners English warships would enter the port and
study its facilities.

At the advice of Inspector General

Pascual de Cisneros32 and the vote of the Real Acuerdo,
the Viceroy decided to send the English to Havana.

Pri

vate vessels found at Veracruz were commandeered for the
purpose, and on August 26 the prisoners left Veracruz for
Cuba . 33

32Pascual de Cisneros was Inspector General of
the army of New Spain, in charge of the raising, instruc
tion, discipline, and administration of all troops in the
kingdom. Such inspectors were regularly assigned to units
of the Spanish army, and their authority had definite geo
graphical limits. The title "Inspector General" indicated
a position, not a military rank. Cisneros had come to New
Spain during the administration of Bucareli with the rank
of Mariscal de Campo. McAlister, "Reorganization of the
Army of New Spain," p. 9n ? Bobb, Bucareli, p. $1.
33The Viceroy wrote that each enlisted man receive
two reales and each officer one peso, per day for their
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The expedition against Pensacola remained the
principal concern of the Viceroy after the capture of
Mobile.

The Manila galleon and its escorting vessel

sailed from Acapulco on March 15th, bearing 6 l8 ,88 l
pesos ; 34 and Guatemala was assured of continued aid from
New Spain ; 35 but the volume of correspondence concerned
with the flow of aid to Havana and Louisiana is indica
tive of official preoccupation with affairs in that area.
Relations between the Viceroy and Havana continued bad,
and Mayorga's gratuitous comments on the conduct of the
war in the West Indies and in West Florida make it obvious
that he held Havana in general and Juan Bautista Bonet in
particular personally responsible for every mishap.

subsistence while in Veracruz, and that they were treated
with the greatest urbanidad _y atencidn. Mayorga to Jos6
de Gcilvez, August 27, 17^0, AGNM, CV, Vol. 127, No. 69 ^,
fols. 72-73v. The transfer of the prisoners to Havana
was approved, in Jos£ de Gcilvez to Mayorga, February 1 7 ,
1781, AGNM, RC, Vol. 12C, expediente 3 8 , vol. 7 1 .
34Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, May 26, 1 7 8 0 , AGNM,
CV, Vol. 126, No. 477, fols. 206-207.
3SMayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, February 7, 1780,
ibid., No. 327, fols. 35v-36.
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In February 1780 the Viceroy went back six months
in tipie to call to the attention of Jos6 de Gcilvez a royal
order of August 29, 1779, and to file a belated complaint
against Havana's extravagant demands for gunpowder.

At

thac time New Spain had been directed to send 2,000
quintales (100 tons) to Havana, part of which was to be
sent to Cartagena de Indias. 36

Mayorga wanted to know

what had happened to "the immense [but unspecified]
quantities" which had been sent.

New Spain had only been

able to send such an unprecedented quantity at the cost of
reducing the magazines at Veracruz to a dangerously low
level; and the new fort at Perote, which guarded the road
to Mexico City, now had only 300 of the 1,500 quintales
which regulations prescribed.

A new powder factory was

under construction, and it would supplement the old fac
tory at Chapultepec, 37 but the combined production of the
two establishments would not be sufficient to satisfy

36See Chapter II, p. 6 9 .
37See Chapter II, p. 76ff.
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Havana if that port continued to ask for powder at the
present rate . 38
After the two ineffectual sallies hy the Havana
squadron against Pensacola in February and March of 1 7 8 0 ,
the Viceroy returned to the attack.

In a letter of Jos6

de Gcilvez concerning the shipment of food to New Orleans
he made the following comments

By the latest ship which has come from that Province
[Louisiana] its Intendant, don Martin Navarro,
advises me that the squadron under the command of
Lieutenant General Juan Bautista Bonet, although it
had arrived close to Pensacola, gave little aid or
satisfaction to the Governor of that Province don
Bernardo de Gcilvez. In truth it seems to me that this
attempt upon Pensacola is causing him a great deal of
trouble,and I believe thht if the squadron had moved
from Havana without delay, success would have already
followed with the same felicity which accompanied that
General's capture of Mobile . 39

By the same post the Viceroy sent to Bonet a copy
of the royal order requiring that all monies be shipped in

38Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, February 24, I78 O,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 126, No. 341, fols. 46 v - 4 7 v .
39Same to same, May 20, I78 O, Ibid.. No. 515/
fols. 256 - 2 57 v.
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vessels of the Real Armada, and stressed the need to
comply with i t . 40

Only six days later, with tireless

redundancy, he repeated to Jos6 de Gcilvez the whole account
of having been forced to charter merchant ships to supply
Havana, while regretting the necessity of doing so . 41
Whether or not Mayorga was justified in assigning
the blame to Bonet, Gcilvez 1 offensive in West Florida was
halted until the arrival of the convoy, and these rein
forcements from Spain also affected the course of British
sea action in the West Indies.

Admiral George Rodney

spent the spring fighting a series of indecisive actions
with the French Admiral de Guichen in the Leeward Islands.
Near the end of May he learned that twelve Spanish ships
of the line and numerous lesser vessels had sailed from
C&diz a month earlier.

To allow the French and Spanish

fleets to join forces would be to lose command of the sea
and to place his eighteen ships in opposition to an
Allied fleet of twenty-seven.

Rodney attempted

4°Same to same, May 26, 1780, ibid.. No. 483,
fols. 213 ~213 v.
41Same to same, June 1, I78 O, ibid., No. 559,
fols. 291 - 2 9 3 .
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simultaneously to hold de Guichen in port at Martinique
and to intercept the Spaniards.
instances.

He failed in both

Solano sighted the English fleet without being

seen, passed to the north, and evaded the squadron.

Mean

while, de Guichen's ships sailed unmolested from Martinique
to join Solano at the French island of Guadeloupe on
June 9 th.

The British stopped all their convoys, and

Rodney prepared to meet an enemy descent upon the Britishheld islands . 42

42 Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 332-333*
Rodney's failure to bring the enemy to a decisive battle
caused protests from the planters, and all the British
West Indies feared invasion. Indecisive operations of the
type described above had made the islands a graveyard of
military and naval reputations. Lord Charles Cornwallis,
no stranger to misfortune, expressed, in 1 7 9 6 , the general
distaste for service in the West Indies in a letter to
Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, in terms which
might have been used by officers in previous wars:

"I never did, my Lord, express a desire to go to the Lee
ward Islands, considering from the number of them and
their jarring interests, that it was a station where an
officer, instead of gaining credit, was likely to lose any
little reputation he might have acquired. I hardly know
of an instance where it has happened otherwise except in
the case of Lord Rodney and that only the last time he was
there; but he was a particularly "fortunate man."
Quoted in H. W. Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748,
3 Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920),
Vol. Ill, p. 77*
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Only in Nicaragua was there any offensive activity
by the enemy in the spring and summer of 1 7 8 0 .

The small

English expedition, which had begun the ascent of the San
Juan River toward Lake Nicaragua, had caused little con
cern to Matlas' de Gcilvez.

He wrote to Mexico City that

shipments of money and supplies from New Spain could be
suspended for the time being, for they were not needed . 43
But the English and their zambo allies, although they
lost men daily from fever, sunstroke, snakebite, and
desertion, dragged heavy artillery more than one hundred
miles from the coast to the fort of San Juan thirty miles
from the lake.

They began a siege on April 13th, and six

days later the garrison capitulated for lack of water . 44

43Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, May 8 , I78 O, AGNM,
cv, vol. 1 2 6 , No. 46l, 187 - 1 8 8 .
44Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 3/ P- 3^5* The
captured garrison of the fort sailed under cartel in a
small English vessel for Santiago de Cuba. The craft
foundered in a hurricane; the English crew, four Spanish
officers, and three hundred two Spanish enlisted men
died. The only prisoners who survived were one officer
and four men who were too badly wounded to make the voy
age. Fernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7 # P* 284.
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Matias de Galvez soon called for help.

On

April 21 he asked Mexico City for 100,000 pesos and one
hundred quintales of powder to be sent to Realejo as soon
as possible.

By the time his letter reached the capital,

the Viceroy had heard from other sources that the fort of
San Juan was under siege.

F e e i n g that Reale jo was too

close to the scene of combat, he directed that the money
and powder be sent instead to Sonsonate.

He added one

hundred quintales of potassium nitrate to the shipment, and
expressed the hope that Guatemala could begin the
manufacture of explosives for its own use . 45
It was not necessary to expel the English from
Nicaragua by force.

By the time the Viceroy ordered a

ship from Acapulco to carry supplies to Sonsonate, sick
ness had reduced the numbers of the invaders to the point

45Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, May 26, I7 8 0 , AGNM,
CV, Vol. 126, No. 479, fols. 209-210v. Realejo was only
twenty miles northwest of Le6 n, one of the expressed
objectives of the English. Sonsonate, fifty miles westsouth-west of the city of San Salvador, was more than one
hundred miles farther up the coast. The ship used to
transport these stores to Maties de Gcilvez was Nuestra
Senora de Balvanera. the Peruvian merchantman which had
been chartered by Mayorga for such service.
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that there were not enough able-bodied men for camp duty . 46
The Governor of Jamaica continued to send useless rein
forcements, and altogether 1 ,^ 0 0 men were sent to
Nicaragua, but by September there were only 320 men fit
for action.

Colonel Kemble, the English commander, hoped

at least to maintain a beachhead on the coast from which
to renew the advance later; but this proved to be impos
sible.

Troops from England which had been intended for

use in Nicaragua were held up in Jamaica by fever, scurvy,
and the threat of imminent invasion by the combined fleets
of Solano and de Guichen . 47

46 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 3/ P- 3^6. Lieu
tenant Horatio Nelson had accompanied the expedition
upriver, although he did not take part in the final oper
ation against the fort of San Juan, for he was recalled to
^'Jamaica to command a frigate. The order may have saved his
life, for he was ill with fever at the time of his recall.
When he returned to Jamaica, his illness caused him to
resign his new command and to remain ashore for a year
until the fever had runs its course. Warner, Nelson,
p. 2 8 .
47 Mackesy, The War for America, p. 336. The
effects of contagious diseases and deficiencies must be
considered in almost all studies of military or naval cam
paigns in the eighteenth century. Four thousand one hun
dred men had been sent from England to Jamaica in the
spring of 1 7 8 0 , of whom 1 ,1 0 0 had died and 1 ,5 0 0 were ill.
When they arrived at Jamaica they had been at sea for

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140
The Minister of the Indies had never doubted that
the English would fail, although he deplored their ability
to land on the mainland at will.

As he wrote to Mayorga:

The British Ministry has repeatedly stated throughout
Europe that an expedition sent by the Governor of
Jamaica had on April 29 last taken the fort of Pan
Juan of Nicaragua, and from there the enemy were
attempting to mount to the great lake and to penetrate
with their conquests as far as the South Sea. This
news affirms the boldness with which the project to
open communications between the Atlantic Ocean and the
Pacific has been followed. Although the impossibility
of such communication has been amply proven, and con
sequently the inaccuracy of their plans, nevertheless
the King considers as one of the greatest evils that
the English should make themselves masters of the navi
gation of the lake, and at the same time should have
an establishment as they have on the southern coast of
Nicaragua. Moreover, the repeated calamities with
which Divine Providence has seen fit to afflict the
Kingdom of Guatemala leave it in no state to resist
the force of a powerful enemy, and to be the theatre
of a bloody war: the English are making use of this
state of affairs, and for the same reason, appear to
try to direct toward it all their attacks. Therefore
His Majesty wishes that from this time forward there

twenty weeks„ Conditions aboard ships can be deduced
from the following figures: during the four years 1776 1779/ the British Navy lost ±*,243 men hy enemy action and
±8,541 by disease. In the same period, 42,069 men
deserted. Clowes, The Royal Navy. Vol. Ill, p. 339*
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be employed all possible means to thwart such
destructive attempts. . . , 40

G&lvez continued his letter with instructions for
driving out the English, but even as he wrote the enemy
survivors were in retreat toward the coast after having
evacuated the fort.

In November, before the minister’s

letter reached Mexico, the last of the English had
evacuated Nicaragua and had returned to Jamaica . 49
Poor communications, the result of distance and
wretched roads, impeded the Viceroy's appreciation of
what was currently occurring in the Captaincy General of
Guatemala, and the same factors limited his grasp on
affairs within his own domain.

The press of business in

the capital made it impossible for him to travel exten
sively, and the execution of orders depended upon the

48 Jos6 de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 15, 17^0,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 119, expediente 162, fols. 101-102v.
49 Mackesy, The War for America, p. 336.
The
author of a recent history of the administration of
Matins Gcilvez in Guatemala asserts that the English did
not voluntarily abandon the fort of San Juan, but were
driven out by militiamen led by Gcilvez. In this account
the author criticizes other historians for not having
mentioned this assault. He states that "several authentic
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ability and zeal of his subordinates.

This was

particularly true of the administration of affairs at
Veracruz, which combined the functions of principal port'
and the largest single defense installation.

Unlike his

predecessor, Bucareli, who had entered New Spain through
Veracruz and had at that time inspected its defenses,
Mayorga had never seen the port, for he had come directly
I
to the capital from Guatemala. In the summer of 1780
something prompted Mayorga to visit the port.

The expla

nation of his trip of inspection, as given to Jos6 de
G&lvez, reveals that he did not trust the officers at
Veracruz, although his letter did not state specific
reasons for his suspicions.

I took possession of it [the kingdom of New Spain]
without having seen either the port of Veracruz, its
fort, or its coast; therefore, having confidence in
its Governor, Brigadier don Joseph de Carri6 n y
Andrade, I accepted what he proposed to me for the
defense of that port because of the present war,

documents of that period mention it, " but he does not
identify his sources. Menos Franco, Estudios Historicos.
P. 72.
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until for well-founded reasons of distrust I resolved
to travel to that city . 50

The Viceroy left Mexico City on July 3r<l/ an(^
wishing to make his absence from the capital as brief as
possible, he entrusted the inspection of the coast adja
cent to Veracruz to Matins de Armona, Lieutenant Colonel
of the Regiment of the Crown.

The Governor was ordered to

muster the entire garrison and all the presidiarios of
San Juan de Uluci as soon as the Viceroy arrived . 51

All

ammunition magazines and food storehouses were thrown open
for inspection.

At this time the Commandant of Artillery

of the fort, Miguel Puchalt, complained to the Viceroy
that the magazines contained only one-half the quantity of
gunpowder they were capable of holding.

The Governor

answered the criticism of Puchalt by asserting that the

soMayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, September 30, 1780,
AGNM, CV, vol. 127, No. 728, fols. 110-llOv. In 1762
Cruillas had come from the capital to inspect the forti
fications and troops on the Gulf coast, an action which
had earned the approval of his superiors in Spain.
51There is no one-word English equivalent to this
term. A presidiario is a prisoner sentenced to labor
within the confines of a garrison.
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magazines could never be kept charged to capacity because
of the frequent shipments of explosive to other ports.
Unfortunately, due to the brief time available and the
fact that the necessary records were scattered and not
immediately at hand, it was impossible for the Viceroy to
trace the movements of war materiel through Veracruz.

It

was only possible to inventory what was actually on hand:

4,569 quintales of gunpowder and 50,000 musket cartridges.
A new storehouse capable of holding 800 quintales was
under construction.

If the new storehouse were kept

filled, an4 if the fort's magazines were maintained at
their current level, Mayorga felt that the supply would be
adequate.52
The two companies of artillerymen who served the
guns of the fort had been quartered within the city itself
prior to the coming of the viceroy.

Acting upon the prin

ciple that their duty was to defend the fort and to remain
close to their pieces at all times, he ordered them quar
tered within the fort itself, thereby saving the crown

52Mayorga to Jos£ de Galvez, September 30, I78 O,
AGNM# CV, Vol. 127, NO. 730, fols. lllv-113.
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one thousand pesos monthly.

Each week the gunners were

to come to the city in small detachments to be trained
in a school of practical gun handling.

The presidiarios

of the fort and picked members of the urban militia were
to join the training sessions, so that in an emergency
they might aid the regulars in serving the guns.5a
Mayorga found that two companies of urban militia
were quartered in the city of Veracruz, and he ordered
them moved to the outskirts of town where they could be
housed more economically.

Prom their new stations they

could be quickly deployed to meet a threat from any
direction.-54
While the Viceroy was still in Veracruz he was
joined by Lieutenant Colonel Matias de Armona who had
been sent to inspect militia units north and south of the
port. Armona returned with the recommendation that no
mere coastal defense batteries be constructed.

They

53Same to same, September 30, 1780, ibid.. 127/
No. 729# fols. 111-lllv.
54Same to same, September 30, 1780, ibid.,
No. 734, fols. 120-120v. Another reason given for
moving the militia out of town was that they molested the
citizens of Veracruz.
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would be useless against a landing force, which could
shift its operations to one of the many undefended beaches.
He urged, instead, the erection of watch towers equipped
with rockets and signal flags from which likely invasion
beaches could be kept under observation. 55
Expressing himself satisfied with his inspection,
Mayorga returned to the capital on July 30, only a few
days before Solano's long-awaited convoy made port at
Havana bearing 12,000 troops.

This was the force which

was to aid the expedition against Pensacola and which the
English feared would invade Jamaica, but at the time of
their arrival both the troops and the seamen were unfit
for action.

Yellow fever had broken out in the Spanish

fleet, and when Solano joined de Guichen the fever spread
to the French ships.

Far from attacking Jamaica, the

allies soon had to divide their forces by segregating the
sick on certain vessels.

The Spanish fleet was so

enfeebled that Solano asked the protection of de Guichen
while he completed the last leg of his voyage through the

55Same to same, September 30, 1780, ibid.,
No. 7 3 5 , fols. 121-121v.
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islands to Cuba.

The plague-stricken ships sailed slowly

northward discharging sick at Dominica, Guadeloupe,
Martinique, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo.

After the

Spaniards anchored at Havana on August 3r^, de Guichen
sailed for Europe, escorting French merchantmen from the
islands . 56

56Ferncindez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7* P* 286. The
Spanish convoy consisted of thirteen ships of the line,
two frigates, and one hundred forty-seven merchantmen,
with some of the last-named type being used as troop trans
ports . The wastage of men through sickness was probably
the result of carelessness, rather than ignorance or lack
of resources, for the marine sanitary service in the prin
cipal ports of Spain was very good, and visiting French
officers who made use of their facilities expressed admir
ation at the care given to the sick. On campaign, when
the welfare of the men depended upon the care of seagoing
officers, the situation was quite different. A French
historian of the period has explained the epidemic sickness
in Solano's convoy as follows:
"The Spanish officers found details beneath the dignity of
a commander, and they neglected the most elementary pre
cautions . . . . This contempt for details is perhaps the
most characteristic trait of the Spanish officer, and it
is indeed this which made the Spanish navy incapable of
fighting the British navy with advantage."
George Desdevises du Dezert, "Les institutions de
1 'Espagne au XVIIIe sifecle: la marine," Revue Hispanique,
LXX (1925), P. 490.
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Governor Bernardo de G&lvez, promoted to the rank
of Mariscal de Campo. had come to Havana the day before
the fleet from Spain made port; and he spent several weeks
in conference with the military and naval commanders of
that port.

On August 11th a -junta decided that 3/800 men

should sail for the attempt on Pensacola under the Gov
ernor 's command, and on October l6 th a squadron of seven
ships of the line and fifty-seven lesser vessels left
Havana bearing 3/829 troops . 57

Two days after their

departure a hurricane struck the expedition.

For six days

the storm drove the ships westward, dispersing them to
Mobile Bay, the mouth of the Mississippi and the coast of
Campeche.

Only one vessel was <sunk, but after a month and

a half spent in a vain effort to reunite the fleet, Galvez
t

had to return to Havana still now knowing the location of
half his ships . 58

57 Caughey, Gdlvez. pp. 192-193-

58Bernardo de Galvez (?), Diario de las operaciones
de la expedicion contra la Plaza de Panzacola concluido
por las Armas de _S. M. Catolico, baxo las ordenes del
Mariscal de Campo D. Barnardo de Galvez (apparently printed
at Madrid c. I7 8 I; facsimile reproduction of the first
edition with foreword by N. Orwin Rush, Tallahassee,
Florida: n.p., 1966 ), p. 1.
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When news reached Mexico City that crippled ships
from Galvez' expedition had been driven ashore in Campeche,
the Viceroy sent a courier to Veracruz with orders that
two ships should sail at once with 50,000 pesos and sup
plies for their relief, and by letter he urged the masters
of Gcilvez' ships to make their crafts seaworthy and to
rejoin their commander in the shortest possible time.59
This was the second time within a month that New Spain had
been asked to relieve storm damages.

On the day Bernardo

de Gcilvez had sailed from Havana he had written to Mexico
asking immediate aid for Louisiana, whose crops had been
destroyed by a recent storm.

On November 8th, the same

day that the request had been received, it had been
answered by diverting in two ships some of the provisions
which had been collected for Havana, although Mayorga
assured Josd de Gcilvez that the emergency aid given to
Louisiana would not interfere with transportation of food
to Cuba.60

59Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, November 20, 1780,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 127, NO. 8 0 0 , fols. I95 -I9 6 V.
eoMayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, November 29, 17^0,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 1 2 7 , No. 799, fols. 194v-195.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150
The notice of the dispersal of Bernardo de Gcilvez '
fleet and the destruction of crops in Louisiana had been
accompanied by a warning from Havana whose substance was
that the English forces of Jamaica had been reinforced and
that another invasion would shortly move to join the small
army already in Nicaragua.

One of the ships lying dis

abled on the coast of Campeche was an aviso from Havana
which had been bound for Guatemala carrying a similar
warning to Matxas de Galvez.

Mayorga at once sent a cou

rier to the Captain-General with a copy of the letter he
had received from Havana.

The simultaneous arrival of so

much bad news caused the Viceroy to write to Jos6 de
Gcilvez that

"the eighth day of the current month [November]

was one of the most bitter I have had in my life . 1,01
The violent weather of the Gulf of Mexico was a
contrast to that of the Pacific Ocean.

The galleon from

Manila made port at Acapulco without incident on Octo
ber 27 th.

On her last voyage the ship had spent the period

6 Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, November 20, 1780,
ibid., No. 8 3 7 , fols. 231-233^. The warning of an impend
ing English invasion of Nicaragua had no basis in fact.
In November the English were in the process of withdrawing
the remnants of their small army.
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from November 25/ 1779/ to May 26th in harbor.

The Viceroy

felt that shortening her stay in America would reduce the
danger of the vessel's being intercepted by an enemy,
therefore, he tentatively ordered that the sailing date for
the return voyage be set for January 15, 1781*
Of greater concern to the viceroy than the fate of
Gcilvez' fleet or the Manila galleon was the formation of a
rich convoy for Havana and C&diz.

With Solano's fleet from

Spain had come a shipment of mercury, indispensable for the
refinement of Mexican silver.

The asoques and three

escorting warships had reached Veracruz on September 23rd,
and the eastbound convoy was to have sailed on Novem
ber 1st, but the same winds which had scattered Gllvez'
ships had delayed the discharging and loading of the ships
at Veracruz.

The date of departure was reset for

November 20th.
As usual, the most valuable items were divided
among the most heavily armed ships.

On this occasion the

cargo capacity of the three warships was insufficient to
accommodate the most precious freight:
and indigo.

silver, cochineal,

Three merchant ships, considered the most

seaworthy and the best-armed of those in port at Veracruz,
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were selected to share the responsibility of carrying the
premium

goods. Although the goods of private merchants

were to

travel in the convoy of 58 ships, the

principal

concern was the safe conduct of 6,680,647 pesos destined
for the royal service.

Three million of this sum was

bound for Spain; it was money collected by the royal
tobacco monopoly.

One million four hundred one thousand

six hundred and seven pesos were to go to Havana for the
maintenance of the garrisons of Cuba, the expenses of the
Havana squadron and the purchase of tobacco for the crown
monopoly.62

Havana was also to receive 1 ,3 8 2 ,3 9 6 pesos

for the payment of situados to the Windward Islands.
There was a separate allotment of 796,444 pesos for the
maintenance from June to December of the warships which
had recently come from Spain.

One hundred thousand pesos

were to be paid to the royal treasuries of Havana to
reimburse themfor an emergency draftfor that sum made

62The manufacture and sale of tobacco were the
most lucrative of all the royal monopolies. The effective
organization of the monopoly had been accomplished during
the visitation of Jos£ de Gcilvez. In the early 1770's the
annual revenue amounted to 1,500,000 pesos; in the course
of two decades it rose to 4,500 pesos. Haring, The Spanish
Empire in America, pp. 275“276.'
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"by Matias de Gcilvez in the first months of his service in
Guatemala.
No one in Veracruz knew the state of affairs at
Havana; it was feared that the hurricane which had wrecked
G&lvez' enterprise might have damaged or dispersed the
entire squadron based on Havana.

Therefore, the Viceroy

ordered three small craft to precede the convoy with twoday intervals between their sailings, so that Havana might
be prepared to receive and to protect the treasure ships.
The viceroy informed Jos6 de Gcilvez of the depar
ture of the convoy, and concluded his account with a
warning of trouble to come.

The intelligence of Your Excellency will well
recognize that the Rivers of Silver which flow from
this Capital to all parts can be exhausted, and this
on account of the continuing needs of the Armada of
Havana and its Army; it pains me that Your Excel
lency must consider that although until now I have
asked nothing from the merchants in the way of Dona
tions or Loans, I fear that I shall be forced to
those recourses should the war continue, and may God
grant that they suffice.63

63Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, November 20, 1780,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 127, No. 827, fols. 231-233v.
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In Spain the King and his Ministers remained in
ignorance of all that had occurred in the West Indies
since February 26th, the date on which the last post had
left Havana.

Unaware of the circumstances which had frus

trated his nephew's attack on Pensacola, Jos£ de Gcilvez
assumed that the British post had already fallen or would
soon do so.

On October 19, 1780, he wrote a letter to the

Governor of Havana in which he outlined the course of
action to be followed in the American theatre, and a copy
of this letter was sent to Viceroy Mayorga.64
The minister wrote that a French fleet of at
least twenty ships of the line carrying 3,000 troops would

64 Jos£ de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 19, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 21, mui reseryada,
fols. 32-39v. The length of this letter, sixteen pages,
precludes its quotation .in extenso in this paper, and
its contents are summarized in the paragraphs Of the text
which follow. Although Jos6 de Gcilvez stated that he had
received no definition or detailed news (noticias
circunstanciadas) from Havana since February 26, he
referred in this letter to the ineffectual attack made
upon Pensacola in March. The squadron of Count de Guichen
had sailed to Cddiz after leaving Havana in August, and
it is likely that the minister had learned from this
source of the failure to follow up Barnardo de Gcilvez'
victory at Mobile. Obviously no official explanation of
the protracted delay had come from Havana.
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arrive in Martinique in January or February of the coming
year.

The new arrivals, when joined by the nine ships and

2,000 men already in the French West Indies, would be
superior in strength to the English land and sea forces,
and an offensive move on the part of the latter would be
impossible.

Unless Admiral Rodney's strength should be

considerably reinforced-— and Gcilvez regarded this as
unlikely— the combined forces of the Bourbon allies could
successfully invade Jamaica . 65

Gcilvez believed that

Rodney would be forced to divide his fleet in order to aid
General Clinton in New York, because another French fleet
under de Ternay was enroute to North America,

"superior to

that which the enemy have in New York, and to circumscribe
within very narrow limits the forces of General Clinton . " 66

6SCount Floridablanca proposed the joint expedi
tion against Jamaica and outlined the details of its execu
tion in a letter to Count Aranda, the Spanish Ambassador to
the Court of France, dated September 5» 1780. Florida
blanca asserted that the combined forces must be ready to
move against the island by the first of the coming year, so
that the operation could be carried out before the season
of hurricanes and hot weather. Danvila, Carlos III.
Vol. 5, p. 132.
66Josd de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 19, 1 7 8 0 ,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 12, expediente 21, fol. 32v. Gcilvez'
forecast of Rodney's actions was correct. The English
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Gcilvez hoped that the junta of Generals at Havana
had already resolved to send an expedition against Pensa
cola.

Optimistically, he expressed the hopes of the King

in the future perfect tense:

admiral was well aware of the epidemic disease raging in
the French and Spanish fleets, and he knew that the allies
were incapable of taking the offensive. Therefore, when
word came to him that six French ships and 2,000 troops had
reached Newport, Rhode Island, on August 11th Rodney sailed
for North America believing that no one knew of his depar
ture. As he reported to Philip Stephens, Secretary of the
Admiralty, on September
"I flew with all the despatch possible to prevent the
Enemy's making any Impression upon the Continent before my
Arrival there, having left under the Command of Commodore
Hotham, a sufficient force to Secure His Majesty's Caribee
Islands, and without any person whatever in the West Indies
(General Vaughn and Mr. Hotham excepted) having the least
surmise that I had left that part of the world."
George, Lord Rodney, Letter-books and Order-book of George,
Lord Rodney Admiral of the White Squadron 1780-1782,
2 Vols.
(New York: The New York Historical Society, 19321933)/ Vol. 1, pp. 9-10 [hereafter referred to as Rodney,
Letter-Book] . Rodney's dramatic sally to New York accom
plished nothing. He quarreled with the North American com
manders, never fought the French squadron, and sailed back
to the West Indies on November 16, 1780, having "stripped
the storehouses, impressed 400 seamen, and carried off two
frigates on his departure. Muddle and friction were the
result." Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 351-352.
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So His Majesty believes that the Junta of Generals
will have directed all their attention to the first
objective, the taking of Pensacola, with such vigor
that at this date it will already be under their
domination,67

Proceeding on- the assumption that the conquest of
West Florida had been accomplished by the time he wrote,
the Minister of the Indies directed that ten ships of the
line were to be secretly made ready for sea at Havana.
When word should come that the French fleet had arrived in
the West Indies, all the troops which could be safely with
drawn from Cuba were to be embarked on the ships with six
months' rations.

Elaborate precautions were to be taken

to conceal the destination of the Spanish force, and rumor
was to be circulated that it was to sail for Spain.

An

embargo was to be laid on all shipping from Cuban ports,
and all travel by road was to be forbidden until the eastbound ships had cleared the Old Bahama Channel, a narrow
!

and difficult passage off the north coast of Cuba.

Once

the squadron had shaped a course toward the south to join

67Jos6 de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 19# 17^0,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 21, fol. 33-
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the French, normal land and sea traffic would be resumed.
The Spanish were to meet the French at Cap Francois, in
French Santo Domingo, and picket ships would be sent out
to observe the activities of the British at Jamaica.
Perhaps Jos6 de Galvez feared that the Spanish
ships would not sail, as ordered, with six months' rations
aboard or that the attack on Jamaica would be delayed.
The Governor of Santo Domingo was ordered to supply the
fleet with whatever food he could collect, and the Dutch
of St. Eustatius and the Danes of St. Croix and St. Thomas
were confidentially asked to help supply the needs of the
seamen and troops. 68
The whole enterprise was contingent upon the
arrival of the fleet from France, but it did not sail at
the time predicted by Gcilvez and recommended by Floridablanca.

Count de Grasse did not sail for Martinique

until March 22, 1781, with twenty ships of the line; and

68Maritime trade between neutral nations and her
enemies in the West Indies had been a problem for England
since the War of the Spanish Succession. Richard Pares,
War and Trade in the West Indies. Chapter VIII, "The
French Colonies and the Neutral Traders," pp. 326-390,
passim. How the English dealt with the principal
offenders, the Dutch, is described in the following chapter.
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he bore no definite orders to attack Jamaica, but to act
as circumstances dictated.69

In spite of the fact that

Havana was not required to reduce its land and sea forces
to attack Jamaica, for the rest of the year its Junta de
Generales showed little initiative in pressing the war
against the English.

For months Bernardo de Gcilvez had

urged the reinforcement of the garrison of Mobile, because
he feared a counter-attack from Pensacola.

His insistence

finally caused Havana to dispatch two warships, two storeships , four transports, and five hundred soldiers.

The

effort failed lamentably.

Because of the strength of his [Gcilvez'] arguments
the Junta de Generales ordered that there be made
ready enough ships to transport 500 men and a quantity
of foodstuffs, and this small convoy made sail on
December 6 under the command of Capit£n de Navio
Joseph de Rada; but although after a few days he
arrived safely at the mouth of Mobile Bay, he
decided not to enter the bay on account of having
found (so he asserted) a shift in the channel, and he
at once made sail for Balize on the Mississippi River,
at whose entrance he left the convoy and returned to
Havana.70

69Mackesy, The War for America, p. 38770Piario, p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160
The year 1780 ended in anti-climax.

Mobile had

been captured, the land and sea forces of Havana had been
reinforced and a valuable convoy had been sent to Spain.
Yet numerous delays had prevented the taking of Pensacola,
the French fleet had not yet arrived to join in an attack
on Jamaica, and the English invaders of Nicaragua had
been defeated by nature and problems of logistics rather
than by Spanish arms.
The coming year, I7 8 I, was to be the high point
of the Bourbon military effort in America.

The conquest

of West Florida would be completed, and the British will
to continue the war against their former colonies in North
America would be broken by the surrender of Cornwallis at
Yorktown.

To this victory of French and American arms,

New Spain would make an unpublicized but important
contribution.
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1781:

IV

THE YEAR OF VICTORY

After the capture of Mobile by Bernardo de Gcilvez
in March 1780, the English at Pensacola waited in expec
tation of an early attack.

Unaware of Gcilvez' failure

to secure adequate support from Havana and of the dis
persal of his invasion fleet by an October hurricane,
General Campbell could only speculate as to why the Span
iards had not appeared.

At first he was unable to believe

his good fortune, but by the end of the year he had deter
mined to counter-attack and to attempt the recovery of
Mobile.

At daybreak on January 7/ 1781, three hundred

English troops and an equal number of Indian allies fell
upon an outpost of Mobile called the Village, which was
located on the eastern shore of the bay.

Although the

garrison of 150 Spaniards were taken by surprise, they
inflicted such heavy losses on the attackers that the
English retreated toward Pensacola.

The brief battle was

161
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of great aid to Bernardo de Gcilvez in his continuing
efforts to stir Havana to action, for the British attempt
on Mobile made it obvious that more support would have to
be sent to West Florida if what had been gained was to be
retained.1
Although the English were negligent in not rein
forcing Pensacola during the first months of 1781 while
time remained to do so, in another area of America they
took swift action to correct a practice which had caused
them serious damage since 1 7 7 6 :

the traffic of the neu

tral Dutch with the enemies of England.

On January 5/

1781, Spain warned all her American colonies that England
had declared war on Holland on December 21, 1780, and
advised that all its subjects having commercial relations
with the Dutch take the proper precautions . 2

Before the

letter was received, the principal supply depot for Dutch
trade in the West Indies with England's enemies, the island

2Caughey, Galvez, pp. 19^-1952 Jos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, January 5 , I7 8 I, AGN,
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 5/ fol. 9»
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of St. Eustatius, had fallen into the hands of Admiral
George Rodney.3

The immediate consequence of the capture

of the island was the abrupt stoppage of the flow of sup
plies to the United States and to the French and Spanish
islands and the enrichment of Admiral Rodney and General
Sir John Vaughn from the great quantities of merchandise
seized on St. Eustatius.

The second and more important

consequence was that Rodney and Vaughn lingered at the
island for three months taking inventory of their new
riches and loading them into twenty-six vessels for ship
ment to England.

The Admiralty in London feared that

Rodney's preoccupation with his spoils would allow
de Grasse's fleet to reach Martinique unchallenged.
Rodney had been warned of the coming of the French in
February; but instead of stationing his fleet to windward

3A great portion of the war materiel that reached
American armies from French sources had been carried by
the Dutch. Eighteen shiploads of gunpowder for America
had sailed from Amsterdam to St. Eustatius between
January 1 and May 1 5 , 1776 / alone. Bemis, The Diplomacy
of the American Revolution, pp. 120-121.
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to intercept de Grasse, he employed his strength to guard
the sailing of his loot-laden ships from St. Eustatius. 4
The time which the English might have used to
strengthen Pensacola was fast running out.

The bulk of

the naval forces was under Rodney's orders, while Admiral
Peter Parker, in command of the Jamaica station, continued
to ignore Sir Henry Clinton's appeals that he aid Pensa
cola.

Unable to aid the port himself, Clinton afterward

blamed Parker for its loss . 5

4The fears of the Admiralty were realized, for
in mid-May de Grasse's twenty ships of the line sailed
safely into the harbor of Fort de France, Martinique, to
join the four already there. See Mackesy, The War for
America, p. 417. Rodney's many enemies in England were
bitter in their criticism, and the Admiral later published
a pamphlet in his own defense, entitled Letters from Sir
George Brydges, now Lord Rodney, to his Majesty's Ministers,
etc. etc. relative to the Capture of St. Eustatius, and
its Dependencies and Shewing the State of War in the WESTINDIES at that Period ( London; np. n d ., 1784?TT Rodney's
■precautions in guarding the sailing of ships loaded with
goods from St. Eustatius were vain. Twenty-two of these
vessels were later captured by a French squadron as they
approached the English Channel, Fernandez Duro, Armada,
Vol. 7, p. 289.
5Since the outbreak of the war with Spain Clinton
had been urging that Pensacola be strengthened. After its
capture he wrote:
"This remaining hold of that valuable province might have
been preserved to us somewhat longer by the presence there
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It was only through subterfuge that Bernardo
de Galvez succeeded in persuading the Havana authorities
to release troops for the conquest of Pensacola.

They

agreed to give him 1 ,3 1 5 men to reinforce Spanish defenses
on the mainland, with the understanding that if he could
withdraw enough men from New Orleans and Mobile, he would
be permitted to attack Pensacola,

G&lvez had no intention

of sending the troops from Havana to the area of West
Florida already under Spanish control.

Having alerted

New Orleans and Mobile to send all available forces on
a march overland to join him, he sailed from Havana on
February 27, 1781, with five ships and 1,3 15 men for
Pensacola. 6

of even a single frigate had Sir Peter Parker, who com
manded the squadron on the Jamaica station, been properly
attentive to my repeated solicitations for this small
mark of his watchful regard over that important possession,
which it was certainly no longer in my power to assist in
any other way."
Quoted in Willcox, The American Rebellion, p. 31^•
6 Caughey, Galvez, pp. 1 9 8-1 99 -

(
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Both land and sea forces were under the sole
command of Bernardo de Gcilvez during this operation, and
Juan Bautista Bonet, Commandant of Marine at Havana, had
directed the captains of the ships to obey the young
Mariscal de Campo.

Bonet's tenure of command was drawing

to a close, for both Bernardo de Galvez and Mayorga had
complained repeatedly to Spain of his lethargy and inaction.
On February 12, 1781, Jose de Gcilvez had ordered that he be
relieved and that Gefe de Escuadra Josef Solano, who had
commanded the August convoy from Spain, assume his duties . 7

7Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, February 12, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 16, f. 24 . Juan Bautista
(or Jean Baptiste) Bonet was apparently an able man whose
unfortunate personality caused him to quarrel with all
his associates and superiors. The son of a French ship
builder who had moved to Cartagena during the reign of
Felipe V, Bonet had risen to prominence under Ensenada,
and had successfully stimulated dockyard work at Callao
and Valparaiso before coming to Havana. There he improved
operations at the royal arsenal, but he was manifestly
unsuited for the authority of a Commandant of Marine, the
position to which he was promoted in 1776. Three succes
sive Captains General of Cuba endured almost incessant
quarrels with the testy Frenchman. After his removal,
Bonet returned to Cartagena, where he continued to serve
the Armada until his death in 1784. J&cobo Pazuela y
Lobo, Diccionario geogr6 fico. estadlstico, histbrico de
la Isla de Cuba, 4 Vols. (Madrid: Imprenta del Establecimiento de Mellado, 1 8 6 3 -1 8 6 6 ), Vol. 1, p. 188.
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When the notice of Bonet's removal came from Spain, the
Viceroy approved the change, and commented that "Solano
has always shown me the same confidence which the King
merits . 1,8
By the same post which brought news of Bonet's
dismissal came a rebuke to the Viceroy for not having sent
sufficient aid to Matlas de G&lvez and the Captaincy
General of Guatemala.

Jos6 de G&lvez, allegedly express

ing the thought of the king, wrote that his Majesty could
not understand why Mayorga had not sent troops from New
Spain to aid Matias de G&lvez against the English who were
ascending the San Juan River.

He hoped that Mayorga had

remedied that error since the last mail had arrived.
Gctlvez concluded by stating that troops should have been

8Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, July 3/ 1781# AGN, CV,
Vol. 129, No. 1029, fols. ^3-43v. It is interesting to
note that the copy of this letter in Mayorga's correspon
dence is written in the clear, regular hand of an
escribano. and that in the right-hand margin there appears
the single word cabal, which may be translated as "just,"
"fitting" or "perfect." The writer of this gloss is
unknown, and the script differs from that in which the
letter is written. If one can judge from the shade of
the ink, the marginal comment is of the same date as the
letter itself.
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sent "because of Your Excellency's practical knowledge of
the defenseless state of that Realm, since it was so at
the departure of Your Excellency for New Spain."9
Before this letter there had been occasional notes
of asperity in the communications which the Minister of
the Indies had sent to Mexico, but there had never been
an accusation that Mayorga had been derelict in his duty
as Captain General.

The last sentence could have been

interpreted as an implication that Guatemala was in a
"defenseless state" because Mayorga had left it in that
condition.
When the Minister of the Indies wrote his letter
of complaint to New Spain he was unaware of the English
withdrawal from Nicaragua and of his nephew's latest
attempt to lay siege to Pensacola.

Yet in spite of delays,

frustrations and unexpected English attacks on the main
land, the principal objectives of Spain's war effort in
America had remained substantially the same as they had

9Jose de G&lvez to Mayorga, February 15, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 24, fols. 52-52v.
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been when they were first stated in 1779*

Both the

Governor of Havana and the Viceroy of New Spain received
an account of these aims in February, ±7 8 1 .

The eleven-

page document, divided into fifteen points of emphasis,
recapitulated what had been planned previously:

the

expulsion of the English from West Florida and from the
mainland of Central America, and the conquest of Jamaica,
Two new directives had been added.

Point five provided

that once the English had been driven from Central America,
the Mosquito Indians and the zambos, who had consistently
aided the English, were to be completely exterminated, if
possible. 10

The tenth point named another objective:

It is also advantageous that when the circumstances
permit, an expedition against the Isle of Providence

l0The Mosquito Indians lived on the east coast of
Nicaragua, and they had been friendly to the English for
more than a century. At one time England claimed that the
Mosquitos had ceded territory to them during the reign of
Charles I, but Spain denied this. Although they were never
a large tribe ( 9 ,000 -1 1 ,0 0 0 in 1730 ), their fighting men
made valuable, if somewhat undependable, allies to the
English. Fugitive slaves from Spanish territory had joined
them, had mated with the Indian women, and had produced
zambos who were equally unfriendly to the Spanish. Pares,
War and Trade in the West Indies, pp. 97 -101.
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should be formed, and that the greatest effort
should be made to expel the English from it, to
forbid that place to its corsairs and pirates,
who sail from there to infest the adjacent seas.11

While Jose de Galvez planned beyond the conquest
of Pensacola, Mayorga continued to accumulate stocks of
food to meet the demands of Havana and Louisiana.

He

approached three large-scale producers of grain as possible
sources of supply:

the Provincial of the Augustinians in

Michoacctn, the Count of Regia12 and the Bishop of the
Diocese of Michoacetn.

The Viceroy did not ask for dona

tions of grain; he proposed to the three individuals that
they sell the bulk of their crops to the crown and set
their own prices.

The three, ail of whom possessed what

i:LJose de G&lvez to Mayorga, February 12, 1781/
AGN, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 22, fols. 40-45.
l2Pedro Romero de Terreros, Count of Regia, was
one of the wealthiest men in New Spain. He owned silver
mines near Pachua, fifty miles northeast of Mexico City,
one of the oldest silver-mining centers of the kingdom.
He had retired from mining years before as the result of
continued labor troubles, but Viceroy Bucareli had persuaded
him to reopen his mines in 1775* In 1776 the Count had
offered to pay for the construction of two warships at the
Havana yards, a donation which Bucareli regarded as equi
valent to 450,000 pesos.
Bobb, Bucareli. p. 114, pp. 177“
179.
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the Viceroy referred to as opulentes haciendas. promised
to sell him all the grain that could be spared.

Their

responses, wrote Mayorga, meant that henceforth

grain

could be sent to Havana and Louisiana in any quantity
needed.

But, as the Viceroy pointed out, in order to

increase the flow of grain from Veracruz, more ships would
have to be sent to that port from Havana.

The ships cur

rently engaged in traffic between the two ports could not
even handle the food in storage in Veracruz and Puebla.
The three vendors of grain to the crown were far
from being war profiteers, according to the Viceroy:

It is most praiseworthy that these good vassals,
the first two of whom [the Provincial and the Count]
are completely ignorant of the price of wheat,
declared their satisfaction at being able to con
tribute whatever they can to sustain the laudable
objectives of the day, and the Count of Regia so
affirms his love for the King that he has offered,
without limits, all that may be necessary for the
satisfaction of the needs of the Kingdom.
I intend to pay justly for the wheat which the
three have collected or may collect, with the price
to which it may rise.13

1M a y o r g a to Josfe de Galvez, March 15/ 17Sir AGN,
c v , vol. 128 , No. 971 , fols. 139- 140 .
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The public spirit of the three wheat-growers
elicited the personal thanks of the King, which the Vice
roy was told to convey to them.

Jos6 de Galvez warned

Mayorga not to take advantage of their generosity, for
"the King has ordered that the wheat offered be paid for
in a just manner."14
The subsistence of the land and sea forces based
in Cuba depended upon the resources of New Spain and its
transportation through Veracruz.

In the spring of I7 8 I

the Viceroy became concerned about the safety of that
port.

Havana had sent a warning that an invasion force was

gathering in Jamaica, although its destination was unknown.
The imagined danger to the Gulf Coast caused Mayorga to
break his repeated resolve not to expose his veteran troops
to the dangers of the unhealthful littoral.

In March he

ordered one battalion of the Corona regiment and one squad
ron of the Dragoons of Spain to Veracruz.

At the same time

he published a bando ordering all Veracruz merchants to
transfer their funds from the city to the interior.

The

14Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, September 12, 1 7 8 1 ,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 64, fol. 159*
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merchants were also privately advised to send their
families to places of safety away from the coast, but
they were cautioned to accomplish their evacuation dise
cretely so .as not to create public alarm.15
The warning from Havana had no basis in fact.
Reinforcements of ships and troops had arrived in Jamaica
in January, but they were not destined for an attempt
upon New Spain.

In any case, the English in the West

Indies had learned, in February, of Count de Grasse's
expedition to America, and this potential threat had elimf
nated the possibility of action against the Spanish
mainland.16
Before de Grasse had sailed, Madrid had taken
steps to provide assistance to his fleet once it reached

lsMayorga to Jos£ de G&lvez, March 15, 1781/ AGN,
c v , Vol. 128, No. 971, fols. 13 9-1 40 .
l6Havana had greatly overestimated the strength
of the forces in Jamaica. Although Bernardo de Gcilvez'
siege of Pensacola lasted from February to May, Jamaica
was powerless to relieve the port. A weak force sailed
from the island toward Pensacola, but it turned back
without having sighted the Spanish. Mackesy, The War
for America. pp. 4 l5 “4 l 6 .
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American waters; and the burden fell, inevitably, upon the
treasuries of New Spain.

New Spain had financed and sup

plied American, French, and Spanish operations on the main
land of North America and in the Gulf of Mexico.

Although

it is difficult to select from the many shipments from
Mexico

t h e one cargo most valuable to the common war

against England, it is probably that this cargo was sent
in response to the following order from Jos6 de Galvez:

By an order of this date I give notice to the
Intendant of Havana that in the months of July and
September of this year he must deliver by halves
from that Treasury one million pesos to the French
commanders who will present themselves to collect
it. And to the end that there be neither default
nor delay in this matter, the King orders that Your
Excellency send the million pesos immediately to
the Intendant, who will take care to obtain receipts
in quadriplicate and send them to me with all possi
ble speed, in order that the Court of France may pay
the same sum in C e id iz .17

Mayorga received the order on July 11, 1761, and
on the same day he sent the million pesos by forced

l7Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga, March 1 7 , 1781, AGN,
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 8 2 , fol. 1 2 4 .
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marches to Veracruz to he carried to Havana by two
warships which were in port at that t i m e .18
By April, Jos6 de Galvez had at last learned of
the withdrawal of the English from Nicaragua five months
before.

Nevertheless, using the unfounded rumor of fresh

enemy aggression as justification, he persisted in his
attempt to force the Viceroy to send troops to Guatemala.
An order to that effect was coupled with a categorical
denial that Mayorga had ever aided Matias de Gllvez since
the war b e g a n .19

lsMayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, July 11, l j Q h AGN,
CV, Vol. 129, No. 1111, fols. 6l-6lv.
19Although this paper is not primarily concerned
with the personality clash between Jos£ de Galvez and.
Mayorga, the animosity between the Minister and the Vice
roy, from the spring of 1781 onward, colored nearly all
their communication. The factual shortage of New
Spain's participation in the war became distorted by the
heat of mutual recrimination, a contest in which the
viceroy was at a disadvantage. Although Mayorga did not
venture to attack Jos6 de Galvez directly, he fought back
by indirection. He repeatedly questioned the competence
of other royal officials and challenged their probity.
He alluded to New Spain's unprecedented expenditures of
money and supplies as prima facie evidence of his
efficient administration.
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Although the English regard their expedition to
the San Juan River as one of the most unfortunate
that English arms ever made, because of not achieving
its object which was to seize Lake Nicaragua. They
have lost 3#000 of their best troops, seventy
officers, many crewmen, four frigates, and more than
one and one-half million pounds sterling: neverthe
less, they have not yet abandoned their project. On
the contrary, they plan to return to the same enter
prise, and for it they have prepared seventy launches
mounted with cannon: they have strengthened their
alliance with the chiefs of the Mosquito Indians and
the zambos. who have offered to place 5 /0 0 0 men at
their orders, and they have sent recruiters to Europe.
To this should be added that they have accurate maps
of that Province, and find themselves with the intel
ligence necessary to arrange plans for their
operations with certainty.
Although until now the President of Guatemala has
thwarted their schemes without any more help than
that which he has been able to prepare for himself in
that exhausted Kingdom, and although he will have
taken the most effective means to render useless the
new attempts by the enemy: the King wishes that in
order that he may execute them with more security
Your Excellency must send him without the least
delay by way of Acapulco 300 veteran troops from that
Kingdom with the necessary arms, munitions, and what
ever else the Captain General should need and request.
It is the intention of His Majesty that he lack
nothing that could contribute to the security of the
Kingdom under his command . 20

This was the first of a series of four confidential
letters addressed to New Spain within a few days, all of

2°Josd de Gcilvez to Mayorga, April ±9, 1781, AGN,
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 197/ reservada No. 25/ fols. 262-

262v.
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them critical of the Viceroy.

Josd de G&lvez wrote to

Pedro Antonio de Cosio, Administrador General de la Real
Hacienda; and carefully explained that since Havana was a
great center of military and naval operations, it required
large and increasing amounts of supplies.

Its customary

sources of revenue had dwindled, for the war had paralyzed
commerce.

His Majesty demanded that the Intendant of the

Army in Havana he sent everything which he requested.
Galvez concluded that his purpose in writing to Cosio was
"the supposition that on this date and for your own
motives you will communicate His Majesty's resolution to
the Viceroy . " 21
On the same day, April 20, 1781/ the Minister
wrote to the Viceroy to inform him of the assistance which
New Spain had to give to forthcoming operations in the
West Indies.

Once the conquest of Pensacola had been
i

accomplished, the invasion of Jamaica must be undertaken.
The expedition would require more men than those currently

21Jos6 de Gdlvez to Cosio, April 20, 1781, AGN,
BC, Vol. 120, expediente 204, reservada No. 28,
fols. 270-270v.
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fit for duty in Havana, for the army had "suffered not a
little during its ocean voyage," a reference to the scurvy
and yellow fever that had ravaged Solano's convoy from
Spain the previous summer. Not even the most audacious of
the English planned an attack on the mainland of Spanish
America (a direct and unexplained contradiction of his
warning about a new attack on Nicaragua).

Therefore, the

Viceroy could have no reason for not releasing his veteran
troops for service elsewhere.

In any case, New Spain had

enough resources for its own defense.

Consequently, he

declared:

When Your Excellency receives this Royal Order you
must take the most effective measures to make ready
and to send with the least delay to the command of
that Army of Operations the troops which he may
request for the purpose of replacing those which may
be withdrawn from Pensacola, Mobile or New Orleans
for the execution of the enterprise under discussion.
Let it be well understood that His Majesty will
accept no excuse nor will he pay attention to any
reason or pretext which can act against or delay in
this matter compliance with His Sovereign Orders . 22

2aJos4 de Galvez to Mayorga, April 21, ±781, AGN,
R C , Vol. 120, expediente 20^, reservada No. 28,
Fols. 270-270v.
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The fourth in this sheaf of accusatory letters
was one written to Mayorga which paraphrased the one
written to Cosio, but ended in a rebuke:

His Majesty has seen with displeasure that in spite of
repeated remonstrances of the Intendant of the Army of
the Island of Cuba, support which is adequate to the
magnitude and importance of its operations has not
been given.23

By chance, the fault-finding letters from Madrid
had just been written when Mayorga wrote a selfcongratulatory account of New Spain's unexampled exports
of money and food since the beginning of the war.

He was

proud, the Viceroy declared, of having sent Matlas de
Galvez more aid than he had asked for.

Even after the

Captain General of Guatemala had advised Mexico City that
he required no further assistance, Mayorga had sent him
another shipment, and G&lvez had told the Viceroy that he
owed his triumph over the English to his support from New
Spain.

Similarly, the Intendant at New Orleans had

23 Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga, April 20, 1781, AGN,
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 202, reservada No. 27#
fols. 268 -268 v.
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recently written to Mexico and had praised the abundant
supplies sent to Louisiana and the promptness of their
delivery.

The same Intendant asserted that the army

before Pensacola was being well provisioned.

The Viceroy

regretted that the officials in Cuba were not satisfied.
There was no lack of food or money for Havana; the fault
lay with the Intendant of the Army in Cuba, whose esti
mates of the island's needs had been too low, a fault
which the Intendant had admitted before the Junta of
Generals.
Mayorga made a general statement of his services:

No one knows better than Your Excellency the
resources of this Kingdom and the state of its rev
enue, and thus I believe that I may do myself the
justice due me, declaring that never before have there
been such extractions of treasure and foodstuffs equal
to those which I have made in the time of my govern
ment, and they reach the sum of 1 6 ,9 7 8 /6 3 6 pesos. Of
this, 1 1 ,2 9 0 ,0 4 3 pesos have gone to Havana alone, and
this includes 1 8 ,3 9 3 pesos for flour and l6 ,3 $i pesos
for dried vegetables.
I received on the tenth of this month [April] an
official notice from the Intendant and others of the
Government of Havana announcing to me the coming of a
warship for supplies, and by the fourteenth 2 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0
pesos were already en route to Veracruz destined for
the ship, besides 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 pesos more, the annual sum
for the tobacco factories. In Veracruz there are
rations enough to load not only the warship which is
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coming, but even two more, if they should come, and
the supply never ceases flowing from the Capital and
from Puebla.
I tell Your Excellency all this as proof of the
effectiveness with which I have dedicated myself to
the service of supply, and in order that Your Excel
lency may judge for yourself the worth of the
Intendant's complaint about the scarcity of supplies.

Here there occurs a marginal note written in a different
hand:

For I shall never be able to persuade myself that the
squadron and army could have been capable of consuming
the amount of rations sent from here.

The letter resumes:

What I have given is clearly set forth in this
statement, and until now I have asked neither for
loans nor donations, to the pleasure of these
subjects.
This, in addition to there never having been a
shortage of food in the Kingdom in spite of such
great exports of it and the numerous purchases which
I have made. Now Your Excellency will see the proof
of the manner in which I have managed- these increased
burdens, and I hope that Your Excellency will call it
to the attention of His Majesty . 24

24Mayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, April 23, 1781, AGN,
CV, Vol. 128, No. 1019, fols. 215-217.
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Complaints from Madrid, which echoed the charges
of Juan Ignacio de Urriza, Intendant of the Army at Havana,
continued.

In some cases, changing circumstances and the

slow passage of mail had made the accusations completely
irrelevant to current reality, if they ever had a basis of
fact.

In June, more than one month after Pensacola had

surrendered, Jos6 de Galvez wrote to allege that the lack
of food in Havana was delaying the attack on that port.
It was said that New Spain had sent only a small quantity
of flour, vegetables, and meat, that the army's treasury
was empty, and that the warehouses contained nothing for
the maintenance of the troops.

For this reason, according

to the Minister of the Indies, Bernardo de G&lvez was
unable to begin his attack on Pensacola.

He warned that

unless immediate aid came from Mexico, the Viceroy must be
blamed for negating "the most important operation in the
hemi spher e ."2 5

de G&lvez to Mayorga, June 11, 1781, AGN,
RC, Vol. 121, expediente 13, reservada No. 32,
fols. 36-37. Pensacola had been taken on May 8th. The
Diario of the expedition against Pensacola, previously
cited, contains no reference to a food shortage. Food is
mentioned only rarely: the troops went ashore with three
2 5 Jos6
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To the stream of intemperate imperatives that
issued almost daily from Spain in the spring and summer of
1781, Mayorga responded at first with variations on a
simple themes

Havana could not be supplied unless ships

came ro Veracruz:

I make use of all seaworthy vessels that arrive at
Veracruz, although His Majesty has resolved that money
and food be carried only in warships, having in that
port more than three million pesos which are only
waiting the arrival of the two warships which the
Chiefs of Havana advised me would come in March.
In them will be loaded as much food as they can
receive, sixteen thousand tercios having been col
lected at Veracruz, as I have relat ed, and I have
suggested to the Intendant of the Army that he send
whatever ships there may be to transport them before
the burning climate rots them, and in my judgment this
is proof of the scrupulous care with which I watch the
needs of Havana . 26

Until July 3 , I 78 I , the Viceroy responded to the
charges made against him in moderate tones.

On that date

days' rations; they were issued aguardiente on several
occasions after having been drenched by rains; the Spanish
conquerors issued army rations to the rouen and children
of Pensacola after the city was taken. Th '2 lack of comment
on food seems to indicate that provisions were not a
problem during the siege.
28Mayorga to Jos6 de Gdlvez, July 3/ 17^1, AGN, CV,
Vol. 129, No. 1094, fols. 44-44v.
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he received and answered the letter from Josd de G&lvez
in which the minister charged that his brother had fought
alone and unaided against the English invaders ascending
the San Juan River.

The copy of Mayorga’s answer as it

appears in Volume 129 °f the Correspondencia de Virreves
is a singular and revealing document.

It is obvious in

this much-edited letter that axiger and resentment strug
gled with caution and rendered it partially illegible and
somewhat incoherent:

Although the troops of this Kingdom are reduced to
only three Regiments of Infantry and two of Veteran
Cavalry, with very little strength when I sent the
aids of money and gunpowder to the President of Guate
mala, although afterwards the expenses of the Provin
cial Militia have increased without their ranks having
yet been filled: with all this, I could have sent at
the same time some troops (as I did to Manila) if he
had asked me, but he did not, and since then with
reflection about the long distance by land. . . .

Here there is a scribbled interpolation in the margin:

and, nevertheless, I could
pulco, repeating my grants
April 20 of this year, and
that he found himself free
Excellency will see. . . .

have sent troops from Aca
of aid, he answered me on
a copy of it is included,
of every harassment. Your
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The last three lines of the interpolation are completely
illegible, and the letter resumed with a paragraph which
has been struck through:

The President, as Your Excellency will be informed,
succeeded in dislodging the enemy from that Province,
yes, but the unseasonable weather and the difficult
nature of that country contributed greatly, so that
now he finds himself free of such danger.

The last paragraph of the letter followed:

This is what occurs to me to explain the objection
of His Majesty to the alleged lack of troops, which
Your Excellency indicated to me in the Royal Order
dated February 15, and I hope that Your Excellency will
forward this vindication to the attention of the
Sovereign. 27

With this letter Mayorga sent a copy of the letter
from Matfas de Galvez which appeared to prove that the
complaints of his being laggard in aiding Guatemala were
untrue:

27Mayorga to Jose de G&ivez, July 3* 1781/ AGN,
CV, Vol. 129, No. 1095/ fols. 45~45v. The Provincial
Militia mentioned in this letter had been organized by
Villalba. It was undermanned and underequipped and of
dubious value. Viceroy Bucareli had attempted to reform
it, and the effort had cost him 2,789/844 pesos by 1 7 8 0 .
In 1784 Inspector General Crespo estimated the annual cost
of the Provincial Militia at 449/420 pesos. McAlister,
Fuero Militar. p. 5*
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The successive notices which I have given Your
Excellency from time to time of the enemy who invaded
by way of the San Juan River, and in particular of
their having abandoned the Castle [of San Juan], its
vicinity, and the Atlantic coast, and of their not
having captured any port of those threatened on the
coast of the South Sea, seem to me to be sufficient
for Your Excellency to understand that at the present
the aid which Your Excellency offers me by confidential
letter is not needed.
I cannot express to Your Excellency my obligation
and gratitude for your continual offers to assist me:
for a post has not arrived in which Your Excellency
has not reminded me of his great wish to aid me, and
this I have called to the attention of the King.
It is impossible for me to conceal from Your
Excellency that I lack funds, but in view of the many
obligations with which that Kingdom [New Spain] is
burdened, I do not venture to ask anything while I do
not expect an enemy attack . 28

Although Mayorga found the testimony of Mat!as de
Galvez useful in affirming the value of support from Mex
ico, another report from the Captain-General provoked his
anger.

Matias de Galvez had written Mayorga that upon

his request the Viceroyalty of Peru had sent him 200,000

28 Mat£as de G&lvez to Mayorga, April 20, 1781,
AGN, Historia. Vol. 186, No. 7/ no pagination. The Min
ister of the Indies acknowledged receipt of his brother's
letter to Mayorga, but made no comment on it. Jos6 de
Gcilvez to Mayorga, January 20, I7 8 2 , AGN, RC, Vol. 122,
expediente 5 / fol. 8 .
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pesos .

The Viceroy of New Spain regarded this action an

affront to his Kingdom and to himself, because, as he
wrote to Jos6 de G&lvez, he would have promptly sent the
same sum to Guatemala if the Captain General had requested
it . 29

The Minister of the Indies denied that his brother

had received that sum.

Matlas had asked for, and had

received, 100,000 pesos and 400 swords, and Jos6 Antonio
de Areche had sent the money and weapons to Realejo . 30
While charges and counter-charges crossed the
Atlantic and the Gulf, the resources of New Spain continued
to move to the theatre of war as swiftly as ship movements
permitted.

On July 11 the million pesos to be given to che

French moved from the capital to Veracruz by forced marches
to be loaded on board two warships from Havana which had
been promised in March and had finally arrived . 31

The

29Mayorga to Jos& de G&lvez, July 3/ 1781, AGN,
cv, Vol. 129, No. 1098, fols. 48-48v.
3°Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, January 20 , 1782,
AGN, RC, Vol. 122, expediente 6 , fol. 9* Jos& Antonio de
Areche, who had served Viceroy Bucareli as fiscal. had
been sent to the viceroyalty of Peru as Visitador General,
Bobb, Bucareli, p. 248.

31Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, July 11, 1781, AGN,
CV, Vol. 129, No. 1111, fols. 6 l-6 lv.
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ships left Veracruz loaded with a total of 4,515/000
pesos, 15,000 quintales of gunpowder, 200 quintales of
slow-match, and as much food as they could carry.

There

was no prospect of an increase in the number of ships
from Havana, and the Viceroy canceled further movement
of provisions to the coast.

The warehouses of Veracruz

were filled, and there was a shortage of mules in the capi
tal and Puebla.

He also ordered that the foodstuffs which

had been longest in storage in Veracruz be withdrawn and
sold for whatever they would bring.

In Mayorga's judg

ment the sale of the food, even at reduced prices, was
preferable to its total loss through rot and insect dam
age .

Ships from the Peninsula were at this time apparently

as scarce as ships from Havana, and the all-important
refinement of silver had suffered.

The Viceroy expressed

his concern to Madrid:

I live in the greatest affliction because of the
lack of mercury, because of which work in the mines
has slowed, and consequently work in the Mint, and
Your Excellency knows our commerce and agriculture
depend on it.32

32Mayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, July 23, 1781, AGN,
CV, Vol. 129, N o - 1177/ fols. 129-130v. At that time the
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Beset by quarrels with the Minister of the Indies
and harassed by the enmity of the Intendant of the Army
in Havana, the Viceroy could not know that the million
pesos sent to Havana on July 11th for the use of the French
would prove to be a contributing factor to the survival of
the infant republic of the north.

The arrival of Count

de Grasse in the West Indies had set in motion a sequence
of events which was to insure the military victory of the
American and French forces over the British on the North
American continent.

General Washington saw in the French

fleet and the troops it carried an instrument by which he
could score a decisive victory either in New York over
Clinton or in Virginia over Cornwallis.

A reconnaissance

of the British land defenses of New York City discouraged
Washington and his French associate, Count Rochambeau,
from an attempt on the city.

They decided to move the

combined American and French army southward and to

mercury used in the refining of Mexican silver came from
Spain. Production at the once-rich deposit at Huancav^lica
in the Viceroyalty of Peru had declined to a point that
made its mercury more expensive than that brought from the
mines of Almaddn, in Spain. A crew of experts from Almad£n
had searched for mercury in New Spain from 1778 to 1780 and
had spent 160,000 pesos, but had found nothing. Bobb,
Bucareli. pp. 193 - 1 9 4 .
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concentrate on Cornwallis, an easier target who had no
fortress to which he could retreat..
Two dispatches important to the outcome of the
war were written almost simultaneously by Sir Henry Clinton
and Count Rochambeau.

Clinton knew from intercepted enemy

letters that de Grasse was coming to North America

to

support a land action by Washington and Rochambeau,
although the exact destination was unknown.

Therefore, on

May 26, 1781, Clinton sent an order to Cornwallis to occupy
and fortify a position either at Williamsburg or at Yorktown.

After the inevitable criticism from British officers

that followed Cornwallis' surrender, Clinton explained his
order as follows:

And 1 was encouraged to run that risk [occupying
the Williamsburg peninsula] from Lord Germain's
having, in his letters of the 4th of April and 2nd
of May, assured me that Sir George Rodney would be
watchful of the Count de Grasse and not give him time
to do me any material injury before he came to my
succour, the more especially, too, as we still had
six weeks before we might expect his arrival?3

33Willcox, American Rebellion, p. 317-
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On May 28th, Count Rochambeau wrote to Count
de Grasse at Cap Francois, and asked him to come north to
Chesapeake Bay with at least twenty-five warships and
three thousand troops.

He must also bring with him

1,200,000 livres or their equivalent, for the French forces
with Washington had only enough funds to support them until
August 20th.
condition.

The American army was in a wbrse financial
Most of the troops had not been paid in cash
t

since enlistment, and there were disturbinig signs of mutiny
when orders were given for them to begin the long march
from New York to Virginia.

As Rochambeau expressed it:

"These people are at the end of their means . " 34
When de Grasse received this letter, he decided to
cancel the scheduled sailing of a large convoy of merchant
men from the French West Indies to Europe and to take his
entire fleet to the Chesapeake instead of employing it to
protect French commerce.

To subordinate commercial traffic

to naval action was unthinkable to the English command.

34Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la
France ji 1 'establigsment des Etats-Unis d 'Amerique. 5 Vols.
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1884-1892), Vol. 4, p. 647
[hereafter referred to as participation de la France].
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The abrupt and uncharacteristic cancellation of the French
convoy for Europe took the enemy by surprise and enabled
the French to execute a departure from the West Indies
without English challenge . 35

De Grasse had communicated

the substance of Rochanibeau's request to Josef Solano, and
the Commandant of Marine had approved the plan to move
against Cornwallis, for de Grasse had promised to return
to the West Indies in October to cooperate with the Spanish
in the invasion of Jamaica . 36
Rochambeau wanted 1,200,000 livres. but it proved
impossible for de Grasse to raise money in the French West

35Captain Thomas White, an English naval officer,
commented on de Grasse's interdiction on merchant shipping
thus :
"If the British government had sanctioned or a
British admiral had adopted such a measure, however neces
sary to carry a political operation, the one would have
been turned out and the other would have been hung. No
wonder they succeeded and we failed."
Quoted in Mackesy, The War for America, p. 419.
36 Boniol, Participation de la France, Vol. 4,

p. 656.
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Indies.

He offered to pledge his own extensive holdings

in French Santo Domingo as security for a loan to the
French crown, but his offer was not accepted even though
the value of his properties far exceeded the sum needed.
He conferred again with Solano, and then wrote to
Rochanibeau on July 6ths

I have likewise done all in my power to procure
for you the sum of 1,200,000 livres which you say is
absolutely necessary. This colony is not in a con
dition to afford you such a supply, but I shall obtain
it from Havana, whither a frigate will be sent for
that purpose, and you may depend on receiving that
amount.37

On July 23rd, when de Grasse was ready to sail,
two ships caught fire through carelessness.

Several other

ships were damaged while attempting to escape from the
vicinity of the burning and exploding vessels, and the
departure was delayed.

Finally, the French fleet of

twenty-eight ships of the line and auxiliary vessels sailed
from Cap Francois on August 5th.

De Grasse took his fleet

37Jared Sparks, compiler and editor, The Writings
of George Washington. 12 Vols. (Boston: John B. Russell,
1834-1837)/ Vol. 8, pp. 522-523.
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westward through the narrow and difficult Old Bahama
Channel.

There were two reasons for choosing the dangers

of this unfrequented passage.

It was unlikely that any

British ship would sight him, and its waters were a secure
rendezvous point for the fleet and the frigate which would
return from Havana.

On August 17 th the treasure ship

joined de Grasse thirty leagues off Matanzas; it had
received the needed money within five hours of its arrival
at Havana.
The Cuban coastal pilots who had been guiding the
ships were dropped on the 19th, and the French turned
northward into the channel between the Bahama Islands and
Florida.

On his way de Grasse gave chase and captured all

the ships he encountered.

Four British vessels were taken,

one of them a frigate which had been detached from Rodney's
fleet and sent to Charleston.
Interrogation of the frigate's officers revealed
that Rodney had gone to England and that the British in
the West Indies were ignorant of de Grasse's departure.
The French were thus assured of not being taken in the
rear.

Since de Grasse succeeded in capturing all the

British ships he sighted on the way northward, it was
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certain that Cornwallis and Clinton would have no precise
warning of his time of arrival or his destination.
De Grasse scored a complete surprise.

On

August 31st an English naval lieutenant and a party of
dragoons left Cornwallis to make a reconnaissance to Old
Point Comfort.

There the startled officer made a hasty

count of "some thirty to forty" French ships in the bay,
and he hastened back to Yorktown.
7/000 men were trapped . 38

Cornwallis and his

The opportune arrival of

de Grasse was one of the most decisive employments of
naval power in history, according to a prominent British
naval historian, for "before it, the creation of the
United States was possible; after it, it was certain. " 39
It is doubtful that the French-American victory
over Cornwallis pleased Mayorga as much as a personal

38Charles Lee Lewis, Admiral deGrasse and American
Independence (Annapolis: United States Naval Academy,

19^5) / P • 140.
39Michael Lewis, The History of the British Navy
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962 ), p. 164.
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victory which he won i n ■September.

The Viceroy scored a

belated vindication of his conduct during the invasion of
Nicaragua by the English.

The King finally approved the

measures taken to assist Matias de GcLlvez.

However,

Mayorga was cautioned to continue his shipments of money,
munitions, and food "with the same zeal and energy that
Your Excellency has shown until now. 1,4°
At this time, for some unstated reason, the Viceroy
chose to call to the attention of Josd de GcLlvez a project
which had occupied his predecessor, Bucareli, for two and
one-half fruitless years:

the proposal by the Crown to

establish a foundry for bronze cannon near Veracruz.
Exhaustive and expensive surveys had been made and the
reports had been forwarded to Spain, where they had been
received in silence.

Mayorga sent the mass of correspon

dence on the subject to Miguel Puchalt, the Commandant of
Artillery at Veracruz, so that this officer could review
the surveys and recommendations made by engineers between
April, 1776, and November, 1779*

He did this "in case His

4°Josd de GcLlvez to Mayorga, September 23, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 77, fol. 177*
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Majesty should decide to found this establishment.1,41
Apparently no one cared to reopen consideration of an
artillery foundry in New Spain, for Jos6 de G&lvez made
no reply to Mayorga's letter.
At the moment the Minister of the Indies was more
concerned with the projected invasion of Jamaica, prepara
tions for which were to begin when Count de Grasse should
return from North America to the West Indies, as he had
promised to do in October.

When the expedition against

Pensacola had been planned, Mayorga had objected to sending
regular troops from New Spain to join the siege because he
had feared that a sudden English invasion would have found
his kingdom defenseless.

In the autumn of I7 8 I Josd de

Galvez acted to anticipate possible arguments by the
Viceroy against releasing troops when the invasion of
Jamaica occurred.

41Mayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, August 23/ 1781/ AGN,
CV, Vol. 129 , No. 1357/ fols. 340-3 40 v. The Viceroy's
letter concluded with a curiously naive statement:
"The
smelter don Francisco Orttirzar, who was here, and whom
Your Excellency knew, is dead: therefore he can not be
considered in this matter." The unsuccessful attempts to
locate an artillery foundry in New Spain is treated in
Bobb, Bucareli, pp. 1 1 0-1 12 .
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The Minister stated that the combined forces of
Spain and France would move against the island in January
1782.

Because of the strength of the expedition and

because the English were aware of it, all threats of an
English offensive against any Spanish possession had been
eliminated.

The enemy had lost West Florida, and he no

longer had anything to protect in the Gulf of Mexico.
The only possible English response to allied naval hegemony
would be to fall back and defend Jamaica, their most valu
able colony in the West Indies.

There was no possible

threat to New Spain; consequently the Viceroy could have
reason for not sending troops from Mexico to Cuba.

As many

troops as possible would be withdrawn from the garrisons of
Cuba, and the soldiers from Mexico would replace them.

The

Viceroy was to prepare one of his three veteran regiments
for service abroad, and the Governor of Havana would send
ships for the regiment as soon as possible.

Mayorga was

to insure that the regiment was completely equipped and
ready for immediate embarkation, yet not even an approxi
mate date was given for the arrival of its transport.

The

instructions included the threat of royal displeasure which
by now had become routine;
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It is well understood that the King will hold
Your Excellency strictly responsible for any failure
or omission noted in the swift and punctual observance
of this Royal Order , 42

With the invasion of Jamaica scheduled for January
1782 the question of the service of supply to Cuba became
of paramount importance.

The controversy over aid sent

and aid required rose to a new pitch of acrimony.

Mexico

City and Havana exchanged accusations, and both parties
appealed to Spain.

Jos6 de Galvez lost no opportunity to

express support for the Havana officials.

Prom Spain the

Viceroy heard once again that the statements of money and
food sent to maintain the army and squadron had been
received and noted, but that his remittances had been
inadequate.

The Minister of the Indies added a new alle

gation, one which Mayorga, with his limited sources of
information, was unable to refute:

only assistance from

other sources had enabled the armed forces of Cuba to
operate:

42Jos6 de GcLlvez to Mayorga, September 28, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 102, reservada No. 35/
fols. 210-21iv.
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The Army, the Marine and the expeditions have
consumed much more than the amount Your Excellency
has sent from tha’t Kingdom: if recristros had not
come from Spain With supplies, and shjLps from the
colonies [unnamed], it would have been impossible
for Havana to attend to its many obligations.43

Only two days before this complaint was written,
the Viceroy had compiled what he regarded as documentary
proof of his generous aid to Cuba.

On October 24th he had

received an account from the Ministry of the Real Hacienda
in Veracruz of all that had been shipped from that port to
Havana since he had assumed office.

He forwarded the

detailed statement to Jos6 de G&lvez with strong comments
on the veracity of Havana's Intendant of the Army:

This copy is passed to the hands of Your Excel
lency in order that you may be able with this document
to cause His Majesty to judge correctly the erroneous
concept created by the vicious account [ "siniestro
informe"] of the Intendant of the Army of Havana about
the scant aid I have sent there. As of the 17th
this month [October] it amounted to:
1 1 ,9 8 6 ,7 7 9 pesos in silver
51/143 tercios of flour
1 6 ,8 0 1 tercios of various dried vegetables

43 Jos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, October 26, I7 8 I,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 143/ fols. 249”249v.
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2 ,7 6 0 auintales of lead
672 tons of cut stone as ballast
1 /3^5 sheets of copper
100 tercios of ochre
101 tercios of bacon
216 tercios of lard
20 tercios of sheepskins
236 tercios of slow-match
50 tercios of wool
43 tercios of coarse cloth
2 ,5 6 6 boxes of one quintal of gunpowder each
3 ,6 7 3 barrels of salt meat
8,016 barrels of ham

whose total value amounts to 13,482,218 pesos,
7 tomines, 3 2/3 granos.44

Although the Intendant at Havana had been told
that there was a great quantity of food in the royal ware
houses of Veracruz waiting shipment to Cuba, ships seldom
came; and the food was rotting.

The Viceroy had rounded

up 1 ,9 1 3 criminals and vagabonds and had shipped them to
Havana to serve aboard the warships of the squadron.

In

obedience to orders, the Regiment of the Crown was being
prepared for service in Cuba, but the ships to transport
them had not come, nor had there been word of their coming.
With the tone of one who has proved a point, Mayorga

44Mayorga to Jcs£ de Galvez, October 24, I7 8 I,
AGN, CV, Vol. 129, No. 1317, fols. 28l-282v.
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concluded:

"Let Your Excellency, who knows how to do

justice, judge if my assistance has been scant."45
In October nine warships and fifty-eight merchant
men arrived safely at CcLdiz after a voyage from Veracruz
and Havana.

Included in their cargoes were 3/000,000

pesos which were the property of the crown, the profit of
the royal tobacco monopoly of New Spain.46

Jose" de G&lvez'

account of the king's delight at the safe transit of the
treasure was undoubtedly accurate, for the motherland's
need for money was great. War spending had soon exhausted
the royal treasury in Spain, although 2,000,000 florins
had been borrowed in Amsterdam between 1778 anc* 1780.

An

appeal to the Five Great Guilds of Madrid for money had
been denied, and the government had feared to levy ade
quate taxes because of the possible effect on the public.

45Ibid., fol. 282v. Jos6 de GcLlvez eventually
ordered the Intendant of the Army at Havana to send more
ships to Veracruz, and to send them at more frequent inter
vals, but little improvement is reflected in the Viceroy's
correspondence. Jos6 de GcLlvez to Mayorga, April 12, 1782,
AGN, RC, Vol. 122, expediente 100, fol. 186.
46Josd de GcLlvez to Mayorga, November 1 7 , 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 175/ fols. 35^-35^-v.
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Frequent and regular shipments of Mexican silver to the
Peninsula were impossible under war conditions.

The issue

of some sort of paper money had become necessary, other
wise domestic commitments could not have been met, and
the purpose of war materials abroad could not have been
made.
Therefore, in the summer of 1780 the government
had accepted the proposal of a merchant syndicate headed
by a Frenchman, Francisco Cabarrus, to advance money
against an issue of interest-bearing treasury warrants
known as vales reales. which functioned as money.

Sixteen

thousand five hundred vales, each with a face value of 600
pesos, had been issued:

a total of 9/900,000 pesos.

They

bore four percent interest and passed at face value plus
the accumulated interest in the payment of obligations owed
to the Crown or to private individuals.

The vales were not

legal tender for less than 600 pesos nor in retail
transactions, and they did not circulate in the Indies.
A second issue of vales was made on March 20, 1 7 8 1 ,
to the amount of 5,303,100 pesos.

Through this means Spain
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successfully overcame its temporary lack of specie.47
There was only one possible source of silver to redeem
the vales: New Spain.

On November 16, ±781, there came

the inevitable order to Mexico City to send 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
pesos for a payment to the Cabarrus syndicate.48

The

Viceroy complied as soon as he received the order on
March 26, 1782 .40
Shortly after the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown on October 19, 1781, de Grasse disappointed his
American allies by announcing that he must return promptly
to the West Indies, as he had promised Commandant Josef
Solano.

In any case, established custom forbade large-

scale naval operations in North American waters during the

47Earl J. Hamilton, "Monetary Problems in Spain
and Spanish America, 1 7 5 1 -1 8 0 0 ," The Journal of Economic
History. Vol,. IV, No. 1 (May 1 9 4 4 ), pp. 4 1 -4 4 . A third
issue to meet the emergencies of the war was made in 1782
to the amount of 1 4 ,7 9 9 /9 0 0 pesos. Although interest was
not always paid promptly, all the vales were eventually
redeemed and all interest paid.
48Josd de G&lvez to Mayorga, November 16, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 173, fols. 347”348v.
49Mayorga to Josd de Galvez, March 26 , 1782, AGN,
CV, Vol. 130, No. 1598, fols. 230-230V.
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winter.

In September, Jos6 de Galvez had notified Mayorga

that the invasion of Jamaica was to take place in January
1782.

By November of I7 8 I it appeared that the attack

could not be made on schedule, and several factors
combined to delay the expedition.
Spanish troops had been drawn off to put down a
rebellion in the Natchez area where the English commander
of Pensacola had incited revolt among the settlers in an
attempt to relieve the Spanish pressure on West Florida . 50
A rebellion caused by the imposition of hew and unpopular
taxes had occurred in the viceroyalty of New Granada.
Seven warships and a regiment of troops had to be sent
from Cuba to put down the rebels . 51

The French fleet had

encountered heavy weather on its return voyage from North
America to the West Indies; and in December I7 8 I the
British Admiralty was relieved to receive information
relayed by an observer that de Grasse's fleet was lying in
harbor at Martinique and that some of the ships were

5 °Caughey, Galvez, pp. 214-220.

5 ■‘•Salvador de Madariaga, The Fall of the Spanish
American Empire (revised ed.; New York: Collier Books,
1963), PP. 197-198.
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partially dismasted.

There were no signs of an early

movement against Jamaica.52
Viceroy Mayorga was informed of the delay,
although he was not told all of the reasons for the post
ponement.

An invasion force of 20,000 Spanish and French

troops would attack in March 1782 under the command of
Bernardo de Galvez, who had been raised to the rank of
Lieutenant-General since the conquest of Pensacola.

The

naval squadron which would transport and supply this army
would be a combined force of Spanish and French warships.
The Minister of the Indies conveyed the King's
confidence that the Viceroy would "continue as until now
making frequent and abundant remissions of money and pro
visions to Havana," a confidence which was somewhat mys
tifying in light of the torrent of charges which had been
directed at Mayprga in the past.

The dispatch left no

doubt that the interests of the viceroyalty would be
completely subordinated to the needs of the expedition:

52Mackesy, The War for America, p. 449-
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His Majesty hopes that you will drain, if
necessary, all the resources of that Kingdom to
expedite the means by which the aforementioned
enterprise of Jamaica may be accomplished.53

Draining the resources of New Spain was less dif
ficult than the transmission of the resources to Cuba.

In

November there occurred an incident which well exemplified
the difficulties which the Viceroy had to overcome because
of the shortage of shipping and the generally poor condi
tion of Spanish ships.

In this instance, the only possible

way to comply with the repeated orders to speed money and
supplies to Havana was to violate long-standing prohibi
tions against commerce with aliens.
On November 1st a warship from Havana, The San
Francisco de Asis, and a French frigate from Santo Domingo,
anchored at Veracruz with eight lesser vessels.
had come for money and food.

The convoy

The Viceroy at once ordered

two and one-half million pesos sent to the port, and three
days later he sent another half million.

As for food,

53Jos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, November 18, I7 8 I,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente I7 8 , fols. 358~359v *
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there was more in storage at Veracruz than the whole convoy
could carry.
Since the Regiment of the Crown had completed its
preparation to move to Havana as ordered , the Viceroy
directed its Colonel, Juan Cambiazo, to inquire when the
necessary transports would come from Havana.

The convoy

commander reported that not enough ships were available at
Havana to call for the regiment at any time in the near
future.

Consequently, Mayorga ordered the San Francisco

de Asis and the eight merchant ships to receive the troops
for their return voyage to Cuba, and he ordered the regi
ment to prepare for embarkation.

Francisco de Saavedra,

the convoy commander, countered with the plea that his
ships could not carry both the regiment and the supplies
which Havana needed.

There was space for one battalion,

no more . 54

54The standard Spanish infantry regiment, which
was the model followed by Villalba in organizing the fiijo
regiments of New Spain, consisted of two battalions, each
composed of two grenadier companies and eight fusilier
companies. Its total strength, which included its com
mand and staff group, was 1,446 officers and men.
McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain,"
p p . 10- 1 1 .
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Furthermore, the San Francisco de Asis was in such
poor condition that she would be unable to sail when the
other ships had been loaded.

Since most of the convoy

officers, including the commander of the French frigate,
were in the capital, Mayorga held a conference with them.
The Spanish officers agreed that the need for funds in
Havana was great, and that it would be best to send one
million pesos and two companies of the Regiment of the
Crown on the French ship, which was a swift sailer and
ready for sea.

The frigate was to be given rations to feed

the extra men and any other help needed.

The other two

million pesos would follow on the San Francisco de Asis
whenever that warship might be in condition to return to
Havana.

The eight merchant ships which had come to Vera

cruz with her would have to await her repairs.

The French

commander of the frigate saw in the circumstances an
opportunity to make a personal profit by trading in a
product whose exportation the Spaniards had always reserved
for themselves:

The French Commander having agreed to this, he
asked of me the concession of buying and carrying on
board 1 0 ,0 0 0 pesos invested in cochineal (qrana fina) ,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

210

which I have granted him because of the service he is
rendering by carrying a million pesos and two companies
of the mentioned Regiment . 55

Mayorga requested the Commandant of Marine at
Havana, Josef Solano, not to send warships to Veracruz in
such bad condition that repairs would be necessary once
they had reached that port.

Even minor refitting at Vera

cruz was difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, for
neither materials nor shipwrights were readily available
there. When Jos£ de G&lvez learned of the poor condition
of the warship and the delay of the convoy, he approved
the Viceroy's request of Solano; and he added a similar
admonition of his own.

But he strongly disapproved of

the sale of cochineal to the Frenchman, and forbade a
repetition of the transaction:

Although His Majesty recognizes the good intention
of Your Excellency in granting the petition of the
French Captain in respect to carrying on board those
marketable goods, he orders me to warn Your Excellency

55Mayorga to Josd de G&lvez, November 27# 1781,
AGN, CV, Vol. 129, No. 1410, fols. 409-410V .
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that you cannot, and must not, concede such permission
under any pretext, much less t h l+- of exporation of
cochineal.56

The focus of Spanish military attention had shifted
from West Florida to the West Indies, where Jamaica was its
primary objective and the Bahamas a secondary one.

Financ

ing and provisioning the projected attack on Jamaica was to
be the principal duty of New Spain during the coming
months.

Although after the surrender of Cornwallis there

were still 30,000 British troops in North America, they
remained immobile in Halifax, and in the fortified enclaves
of New York, Charleston, Savannah, and St. Augustine.
There was no threat to the Spanish gains in West Florida.
Yet in December I7 8 I the Province of Louisiana
asked for more financial aid.

The colony had never been

economically self-sufficient, and it had exceeded its
resources in supporting operations in West Florida and in
suppressing rebellion in the Natchez area.

Cn June 30,

*

1 7 8 0 , Intendant Martin Navarro had received a royal order

which empowered him to ask New Spain for any funds he

ssTos6 de Gcilvez to Mayorga, May 23, 178?,
Vol. 122, expediente 17^, fols. 3Q9"309v.
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might need.

On December 10, 1781, Navarro requested that

the situado of Louisiana, 315/000 pesos, be doubled for
the duration of the war.

The Viceroy notified Jos£ de

Gcilvez of his compliance with the request, although he
added that Navarro had testified that Louisiana had never
in the past suffered a food shortage or a scarcity of
money, because New Spain had always promptly fulfilled
its obligations to the province . 57
The letter from Navarro was a portent of things to
come.

Spanish military and naval activity steadily dimin

ished during 1J82, and after the defeat of de Grasse by
Rodney in April, there could be no question of invading
Jamaica.

In England, Lord North's ministry fell in March,

and its successor, the Rockingham ministry, began a grad
ual withdrawal from the war in America.

Yet; paradoxi

cally, the year 1782 would find the treasuries of New
Spain, for the first time since the war began, unable to
meet the demands made from Havana.

57Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, March 13, 1782, AGN,
CV, Vol. 130, No. 1556, fols. 183 - 183v.
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C H A P T E R

V

THE FINANCIAL STRAIN OF WAR

In the year 1732 the correspondence between Spain
and Mexico City concerning the progress of the war began
on a familiar note:

the supplies sent to Havana were

insufficient for its needs.

The complaints of the Minis

ter of the Indies were based on information which he had
received from Cuba the previous July, so slow was the
transmission of letters across the Atlantic in wartime.
The officials of Havana had reported that the needs of the
armed forces were so desperate that all shipments of food
and money from Veracruz were consumed or spent immediately
upon their arrival, and that all the warehouses v/ere
empty.

All treasuries were exhausted, and all branches of

the royal service had incurred extraordinary debts.

Jos6

de G&lvez wrote that this deplorable situation had been
called to the attention of the king, who had ordered that
New Spain redouble its efforts regardless of the means

213
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used.

The Viceroy's failure to increase the support given

Havana would prevent Bernardo de Gcilvez from the accom
plishment of the great objective with which he had been
entrusted:

the invasion of Jamaica.1

Since this rebuke was not received in tyexico City
until July 6th, it must have crossed in its passage a
letter from the Viceroy in which Mayorga made it clear
that the financial resources of New Spain had at last been
exhausted, at least for the time being.
On January 12, 1782, the warship San Francisco de
Asis had sailed from Veracruz for Havana with two million
pesos, and Mayorga had been notified that another ship
from Havana would arrive in February for more money, and
that it would convoy a number of merchantment which would
transport food.

Although the advice from Havana had not

stated how many food ships would arrive, their number did
not matter. There were enough provisions in the ware
houses of Veracruz to fill all the vessels which Havana
was likely to send at one time.

AJos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, January 21, 1782,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 122. expediente 7# fol. 10.
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Regardless of the number of ships that came for
money and food, the utility of their cargoes would be
greatly lessened unless they sailed promptly for Havana
after loading.

Their turn-around time was inexcusably

long, Mayorga stated, and it was not the merchant ships
that caused the delays.

Their armed escorts, the warships

of the Real Armada, were seldom ready for sea when the
storeships were prepared to sail.
Although he had been notified to expect a warship
and its convoy of merchantmen in February, at the date of
writing, March 6, they had not made port, nor had any
officer in Veracruz had word of them.

No matter how he

exerted himself to accumulate money and food at Veracruz,
Havana could not fully benefit from his diligence unless
the supplies moved promptly.

Therefore, the Viceroy stated,

he had on that date sent orders to the officials of the
Real Hacienda in Veracruz not to allow any warship from
Havana to remain in the port longer than eight days.
As for the money which the tardy warhips would
carry to Havana, there were waiting in Veracruz 4,000,000
pesos.

One million of this sum was a payment due the

‘

House of Cabarrus, and the remainder was for the needs of
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military and naval installations of Havana.

Mayorga

expressed the hope that a portion of this money would be
given to the Viceroy at Santa F£ de Bogota, who had
written both to him and to the

Intendant at Havana to

ask for 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 pesos.

time Mayorga received the

By the

request from Santa Fd, the San
ready to sail.

Francisco de Asis had been

All that he could collect on short notice

was 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 pesos, but he had rushed them to Veracruz.
The custodians of this emergency shipment had found the
warship in the act of making sail, and although they had
asked the master to receive the money, he had refused,
alleging that his ship was already behind schedule.
It was Mayorga's belief that at the moment the
needs of the Viceroyalty of New Granada were greater than
those of Havana.-2

He had written to the Cuban officials

urging them to aid Santa F6 de Bogota, but neither Cuba
nor New Granada could be helped until the overdue warship
arrived at Veracruz to load ths four million pesos.

By

this shipment of money, the Viceroy affirmed, "the

2In 1781 a revolt had occurred in New Granada which
had required military aid from Cuba (see p. 2 1 5 ).
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treasuries are exhausted, as are the means that have
availed me until now not to ask loans of the merchants,
but now I must do so."3
In ignorance of the exhaustion of New Spain's
treasuries, Jose de Galvez imposed yet another obligation
on the Viceroy.

At some time in the near future a repre

sentative of Colonel Gilberto Antonio de Maxent, the
lieutenant of Bernardo de Galvez in West Florida, would
present himself in Mexico City with written authorization
from Martin de Navarro, the Intendant of Louisiana.

Upon

presentation of this order the Viceroy was to pay 300,000
pesos to the bearer for an unspecified purpose.

The direc

tive to make this extraordinary disbursement was concluded
with the warning which had become routine in Jose de Galvez'
to Mayorga:

"the king orders that this order be executed

without excuse or delay."4

3Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, March 6, 1782, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 130, No. 1542, fols. 167-168 v . In spite of the
exhausted treasuries the Viceroy expressed confidence that
New Spain would be able to meet an obligation to pay
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 pesos to the House of Cabarrus before the end of
1782. Same to same, March 26, 1782, ibid.. No. 1598,
fols. 230r230v.
4Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, March 18, 1782, AGNM,
RC Vol. 122, expediente 72, fols. 132-132v.
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The shortage of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico,
which had hampered the movement of supplies from Veracruz
to Havana since the outbreak of war, was beyond the power
of the Viceroy to solve without the cooperation of the
officials in Cuba.

There was on the east coast of New

Spain no shipyard capable of building ocean-going vessels.
A shipyard had once been in operation at the mouth of the
Coatzacoalcos River on the coast south of Veracruz, but
construction had proved too cosely, and the yard had been
abandoned in 173^-

During the viceregency of Bucareli

the crown had proposed to reestablish the yard, but no
action had been taken . 5
The Pacific coast of New Spain also lacked ships
for the royal service, and in this area Havana could be of
no assistance.

On this coast the Viceroy had the responsi

bility of supplying the missions and pueblos of California,
as well as sending aid to Captain General Matias de Galvez
in Guatemala.

Although the lack of serviceable royal ships

sBobb, Bucareli. pp. 112-11^. More than two years
were spent in making surveys for the proposed shipyard,
but work was never begun.
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had forced Mayorga to charter a Peruvian merchantman in
1 7 8 0 ,6 several ships had been constructed at the port

of San Bias on the coast of Nueva Galicia since 1767 .
In the summer of 1781 before the demands of Havana drained
the treasuries, the Viceroy proposed to Spain that a
frigate be built there; and he proposed also that an ample
supply of tools and naval stores be kept in the warehouses
of San Bias for future emergencies.

After consultation

with the San Bias officials he made a list of the equip
ment needed for the construction of the new ship and for
a stockpile of replacement gear.
On March 20, 1782, after an eight-month interval,
Jose de Galvez forbade the construction of the ship at
San Bias.

Instead, he had ordered that it be built at

Cavite, in the Philippines, where he had forwarded the
specifications drawn up by the San Bias officials.

Con

struction costs would be lower in the islands, and the
excellent woods available locally would be more durable

6See p. 118.
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than those of San Bias . 7

The Minister of the Indies

realized the necessity of maintaining extra stores at
San Bias.

Therefore he had sent orders to Cadiz to ship

the supplies specified in Mayorga's list by the next
reqistro bound for Veracruz.
stores were in short supply,

However, because such
"there will be sent one-half

of the equipment listed in your letter. " 8
matter apparently ended.

There the

There are no references in the

correspondence of Mayorga to the delivery of naval stores
from Cadiz to Veracruz nor of the delivery of a new,
island-built ship from Cavite to the Pacific coast of
New Spain.

7Ships were built in the yards of Cavite on
Manila Bay by Chinese and Malayan workmen. The ships'
frames were often made of teak, and the sheathing was
usually of lananq. an island wood which had the peculiar
quality of absorbing small shot yet causing large shot
to rebound harmlessly. When the Manila-built galleon
Santisima Trinidad was attacked by the British during
the Seven Years' War, they scored 1,080 hits with solid
shot on the hull of the great ship, but none of them pene
trated the lananq sheathing. Schurz, The Manila Galleon,
pp. 196-197.
8Jose de Galvez to Mayorga;-March 20, 1782, AGNM,
RC, Vol. 122, expediente Jk, fols. I 36 -I 36 V.
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The efforts of the Viceroy to expedite maritime
traffic on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts were thwarted
by the order cancelling his plans to build a much-needed
ship at San Bias and by disregard for his orders to limit
the time spent at Verzcruz by a Havana ship to eight days.
On March 6 the warship which Havana had promised in
February arrived.

Its Commandant was informed that he

was to sail within eight days and that there was no excuse
for delay; the treasure was ready for shipment.

The port

officials of Veracruz had been given strict orders to
speed the departure of the ship and to assist its loading
in any way possible.

On March 26 Mayorga received word

that the warship and the 4 ,0 0 0 ,J00 pesos were still in
Veracruz and that it would not leave until April 1, carry
ing the money and whatever food it could take.

The

Viceroy had believed that it had gone long before.

Not

only had his orders been ignored, Mayorga complained to
*
*
Jose de Galvez, but the fact that no storeships had
accompanied the treasure ship meant that the warehouses
of Verzcruz would remain full of food which was slowly
rotting in the heat.

The problem seemed to have no
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solution.

If he ceased delivery of food to the port,

there would be none ready if ships came for it.

Yet if

ships from Havana did not come more frequently and in
greater numbers, the stored food would be wasted.
Mayorga apparently believed that the Minister of
the Indies was representing his actions to the king in
the worst possible light, for he concluded the account of
his difficulties with Havana by this admonition:

That I have
not sent
greater quantities offood
than I have
has been
because of the ships,which
failing has
not been
of my doing, and thuslet
Your Excellency present it to the King without any
disparagement of my conduct. 9

The primary concern of both Jose de Galvez and
Mayorga during the first three months of 1782 was the out
fitting and provisioning of the fleet and army gathering
to attack Jamaica, an operation which had been scheduled
for March.

In spite of the repeated warnings from the

Minister of the Indies to Mayorga and to other American
officials that the preparations for the invasion be kept

9Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, March 26, 1782, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 130, no. 1571/ fols. I98 -I98 V.
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secret, both London and the British West Indies had been
aware of the threat to the island as early as October,
1781.

Although the ministry of Lord North had been

shaken by the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown and
would in fact fall in March, 1 7 8 2 , the decision was taken
to make an all-out effort to defeat the enemy in the West
Indies.

It was known that reinforcements for the forces

threatening Jamaica were being readied in Cadiz and Brest.
The only hope of salvaging anything from the war in
America lay in mustering all the warships which could be
fitted out in England and outdistancing the French and
Spanish reinforcements across the Atlantic.

The task

was entrusted to Admiral George Rodney, whose unwise
absence from his West Indian command in the summer of
1781 had facilitated de Grasse's skilful move to Chesa
peake Bay to entrap Cornwallis. 10

Rodney was equal to

the task, for in spite of supply shortages, dockyard
inefficiency and violent weather he sailed for the West

10"While the effects of his great miscalculation
were unfolding in America he had been rewarded with the
Vice-Admiralty of Great Britain." Mackesy, The War for
America, pp. 444-445-
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Indies On January 14, 1782 with fifteen ships of the
line and a promise of more to follow as they were fitted
out.

The French ships at Brest, without whose reinforce

ment de Grasse would not attack Jamaica, were kept in
port by the same westerly gale which Rodney was able to
weather.

Rodney's daring meant the difference between

defeat and victory.

On February 25 he joined Admiral

Samuel Hood's twelve ships of the line at St, Lucia.
For the first time since 1779 superiority at sea had
passed to the English.
On the island of Jamaica preparations for defense
were underway.

Governor Dalling, who had ordered the

costly and futile expedition against Nicaragua, had been
cordially hated by every sector of the island population.
He had surrendered his post and returned to England,
leaving the government in the hands of the LieutenantGovernor, Brigadier General Archibald Campbell.

This

competent and well-liked officer reorganized the militia,
strengthened the fortifications and sent out small craft
to gather intelligence of the enemy's moves . 11

13-Ibid.. p. 444.
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Two days after Rodney's arrival in the West Indies
he received a letter from Campbell giving full details of
the enemy's preparations.

A Jamaica ship had just

captured a Spanish schooner bound from Cap Francois to
Santiago de Cuba.

On board the captured ship there were

some English seamen who had been taken prisoner some time
before.

By interrogation of both the Spaniards and the

Englishmen the. Jamaica authorities had been ablQ. to piece
together an accurate account of enemy strength and
intentions.
Campbell informed Rodney that "Don Galvez" [Ber
nardo de Galvez] had just arrived at Cap Franqois with
eight warships and 5,000 troops from Cuba.

"Don Solano"

[Josef Solano, Commandant of Marine] was underway from
Havana to Cap Franqois with more ships and men.

Cuban

militia were assembling at Santiago de Cuba to be trans
ported to Jamaica.

The Spaniards were collecting provi

sions at Santiago de Cuba for the expeditionary force.
Most important of all, the invasion would not begin until
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reinforcements of ships and men arrived from Cadiz and
Brest.12
More ships continued to join Rodney's fleet from
North America and England.

Even after four ships of the

line from Brest joined de Grasse at Martinique, the British
outnumbered their foes thirty-six ships to thirty-three.
At St. Lucia Rodney waited for de Grasse to move toward a
junction with the Spanish at Santo Domingo.

On April J,

1782, word came from English picket ships that the French
had left Martinique and had steered northward.

Battle was

joined near the lies des Saintes and by April 11 the French
had been defeated and de Grasse was Rodney's prisoner.
Some units of the French fleet escaped to Santo Domingo,

Rodney was on their heels, and the great attack
on Jamaica, to which all the enemy's movements
since Yorktown had been directed, was abandoned.13

Apparently the Minister of the Indies never sent
the Viceroy of New Spain a formal admission that plans to

12General Campbell to Admiral Rodney, February 27/
1782, Rodney, Letter-Book, Vol. 1, p. 312.
13Mackesy, The War for America, p. 3^8 .
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invade Jamaica had been abandoned after the defeat of
de Grasse's fleet.

Nor does a reading of Mayorga1s cor

respondence reveal comment on the Battle of the Saints,
Reference to an expedition against the island simply
ceased after April, 1782, as if by a tacit acknowledge
ment of its impossibility.
*

Bernardo de Galvez had become impatient of the
delays in attacking Jamaica long before the French defeat
made it impracticable, and had turned his attention
temporarily to a lesser offensive move against the
English.

In February, 1781, the Minister of the Indies

had directed that "when the circumstances permit, an
expedition should be formed against the Island of Provi
dence . " 14

British privateers based on Nassau on the

island of New Providence in the Bahamas had by the begin
ning of 1782 captured fourteen Spanish, twenty-four French,
one Dutch, and 137 American vessels.
From January to April 1782, Bernardo struggled
with the naval authorities of Havana to obtain warships

l4See pp. 179-180.
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to convoy troop transports to New Providence.

General

Juan Manuel Cajigal, who had been entrusted with the com
mand of the expedition, finally accepted the aid of an
American privateer to guard his flotilla on the way to
the Bahamas. 15

Cajigal's force sailed from Havana on

April 22 and reached Nassau on May 6 .

When called upon

to surrender, Governor Maxwell complied at once.

In view

of the condition of the garrison under his command, his
decision not to contest the Spanish invasion was
unavoidable. 16

15 Caughey, de Galvez, pp. 244-245.

16Since Nassau was a valuable base for privateers,
it is difficult to understand why it had not been better
garrisoned. Apparently Sir Henry Clinton had sent to the
Bahamas only men who were incapable of serving anywhere
else. The men sent to the islands were only serving time
to make them eligible for disability benefits:
"Observing that there were several hundred invalids in the
regular corps of the line, whose time of service had not
yet entitled them to the benefits of Chelsea Ca pensioners'
hospital in London] and who, though unfit for the more
arduous services of the field, were capable of being very
useful in garrisons . . . I formed them [17783 into a gar
rison for the defense of the Bernudas and Bahama Islands,
where tjiey might have an opportunity of benefiting them
selves as well as the public by completing the time they
wanted to entitle them to become Chelsea pensioners. This
battalion was rendered still more respectable by being
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The 274 English regulars and 338 militiamen taken
prisoner were freed on parole and permitted to go to any
English possession except Jamaica.

One hundred and fifty-

five pieces of artillery were captured, but the most impor
tant gain was the seizure of twelve privateers and sixtyfive merchant vessels which had been trapped in port when
Cajigal's force arrived . 17
While the operation against New Providence was
being planned and executed with little difficulty, Matias
✓

de Galvez began an attack upon the English settlements in
the Bay of Honduras.

With more than 1,000 men he invaded

the English-held island of Roatan on March 16 and after a
short but fierce battle forced the two forts on the island

officered either by gentlemen from the half-pay list who
solicited employment, or by worthy old officers whose
wounds and infirmities had obliged them to retire from
more active service."
Willcox, American Rebellion, p. 111.
17Fernandez-Duro, Armada. Vol.. 7 , p. 291. The cap
ture of New Providence alarmed the English in East Florida,
who had lived in fear of a Spanish attack ever since the
outbreak of war. St. Augustine was not well-garrisoned, but
it was not attacked. Apparently East Florida owed its immun
ity to the unexpected length of Spanish operations in West
Florida, the Natchez rebellion, plans for an attack on Jamai
ca, and the capture of New Providence. Mowat, East Florida.
P. 123.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230
to capitulate.

Within a few days he passed on to the

mainland with his amphibious force and began systematically
to take and put to the torch all the establishments .occu
pied by the logwood cutters . 18

In contrast to the blood

less conquest of Nassau, the battles for the Bay settle
ments were marked by acts of savagery committed by both
the Spaniards and their enemies.

The king had several

times ordered that the Mosquito Indians and their allies
be exterminated if possible.

The Indians, zambos and

fugitive slaves were well aware that they could expect
little mercy if they were captured.

Consequently, they

gave no quarter to Spanish captives.
Although Captain General Galvez made a clean sweep
of the coastal settlements, his temporary hold on the area
could not be long maintained,., because of the. limited forces,
at his disposal and the difficulties of supplying permanent
garrisons.

When hard-pressed, the Baymen and their allies

fled into the forbidding interior or retreated to other
points along the coast.

How the Bay settlers were able to

leFernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. J, pp. 291-292.
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disperse, to obtain food and to regroup is shown by a
letter from the Governor of Jamaica to Admiral Rodney
written June 4, 1782:

By an express just arrived fron the Superinten
dent on the Mosquito Shore, I am informed that the
Spanish Armament which destroyed the Works and
Buildings at Rattan feoatanl, proceeded to Black
River on the 3°th March and in co-operation with a
large Body of Militia from the Back Country, drove
the British Settlers from that Quarter: one Line of
Battle Ship, a Frigate, three Schooners, one Sloop,
two half Gallies, and five large Craft composed this
Squadron, which I understand was chiefly fitted out
at the Havannah; and from everything I can learn
these Vessels are still upon that Coast, and mean
to prosecute their intentions of extirpating the
Settlers from the Shore.
Having had reason to apprehend by Intelligence
received from the Havannah early in March, that the
Spaniards had such an object in view, I gave direc
tions to the Settlers at Black River in case they
were drove from that Post, to retreat to Cape Gracias
a Dios [150 miles to the east]; to which place a
quantity of Indian presents Medicines and Provisions
were sent for their relief. I am happy to find that
those Provisions, etc. reached Cape Gracias a Dios
on the 7 th of April, and that the Settlers of Black
River by following my advice have in a great measure
been preserved from the distress arising from much
fatigue, Sickness and Want.
In the present State of matters I think it my duty
to apply to you for the aid of such Ships or Vessels,
as you may deem necessary to drive the Enemy from the
Coast; without which I have reason to apprehend, that
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this valuable body of Men will fall a Sacrifice to
the Spaniards, who seem determined to pursue the
advantage already obtained in that Quarter with
every possible exertion.19

Rodney did not respond to this letter,' and on
June 24 Campbell wrote again in more urgent terms, repeat
ing that the Bay settlers must be given aid and that the
Spaniards must be driven from their newly-won positions.20
The Admiral answered Campbell's second appeal thus:

I wish it was in my Power, to send a Man of
War immediately for the protection of the Musquito
Shore, but the blowing weather has crippled so
many of the ships, turning to Windward, and the
Protection of the Trade of this Island, and bring
ing it round to proceed with the Convoy takes up
so many of the smaller Kind, that at present it is
not; as soon as it is, a Man of War, and a Trans
port, if one is to be got shall be appropriated
for that Service.21

The "blowing weather" which had crippled Rodney's
ships had completely cut supply lines between Yucatan,
Galvez' base in Honduras, and the positions recently taken

l9Campbell to Rodney, June 4, ±782, Rodney's
Letter-Books, Vol. 1, pp. 440-441.
2°Same to same, June 24, 1782, ibid.. pp. 461-462.
2lRodney to Campbell, June 26, 1782, ibid., pp. 454466.
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by his army.

Communication between the ports was possible

only by sea; protracted onshore winds and the chronic
shortage of shipping meant disaster for the Spaniards.
The small and isolated garrisons which the Captain General
had left scattered along the Bay of Honduras were swiftly
riddled by hunger and disease.

In some cases the men

were reduced to eating bananas exclusively. 22
As soon as the gales abated, the English on
Jamaica, freed by the Battle of the Saints of the French
menace which for months had restricted their naval opera
tions, struck again at the Bay settlements,

On August 1J,

an expedition arrived at Cape Gracias a Dios to unite
with the Baymen who had taken refuge at this most easterly
point of Nicaragua.

In the next two weeks the English

recovered all the posts which Matias de Galvez had taken.

22Menos Franco, Estudios histdricos, pp. 9^~95*
An interesting sidelight of the struggle for the Bay
settlements was the activity of a North American adventurer
named Jeremias Terry (sic) who for some time had been
urging Galvez to allow him to attempt to persuade the
Indians and the negroes to abandon their British allies
and sign treaties with the Spaniards. Yielding to his
pleas, Galvez gave him a ship and crew and allowed him to
seek out the chieftains. Terry sailed south and landed .at
the mouth of the Rio Negro, where he and all his crew were
at once put to the knife ( pasados ja cuchillo) by the
implacable natives. Ibid., pp. 92~93» 9^~97*
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By August 31 the invaders had reached the mouth of the
Rio Negro, where the Spanish garrison surrendered the
settlement of Criva.

In reporting this latest reverse

to Spain Viceroy Mayorga asserted that the officer com
manding at Criva had no alternative to capitulation, for
the English had come in overwhelming force:

two ships of

the line, six frigates, two brigantines and a galley.
The English crewmen of the squadron were aided by 1,000
Indians and Z-ambos and 500 Negroes.

Many of the Spanish

garrison were disabled by illness, and there were neither
munitions nor provisions . 23
When Mayarga_received notice of.the loss of
*
*
Matias de Galvez' recent conquests, he offered the Captain
General whatever aid he needed to recover the lost terri
tory.

As it happened, no other attempt was made to retake

the Bay settlements.

No further offensive action was

undertaken by any of the powers in the Gulf of Mexico or
the Caribbean theatre from mid-summer, 1782, until the
formal cessation of hostilities.

23Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, December 14, 1782,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1897, fols. 255-256.
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In Europe the first tentative moves toward ending
the war had begun.

After Yorktown the Americas, France,

and England were all anxious to begin preliminary talks.
The North ministry had no sooner fallen in England than
Benjamin Franklin, American Commissioner in Paris, hinted
by a note to Lord Shelburne, Secretary for Home Affairs,
that he would talk with an envoy from London.

Richard

Oswald, appointed as the agent of Shelburne, had his
first meeting with Franklin on April 12, 1782.

Franklin

then introduced Oswald to Count Vergenhes, the Frendh
Minister of Foreign Affairs.24
Count Floridablanca, the principal minister of
Carolos III, felt that the time had come to define the
claims of Spain to be presented in the near future.

On

May 24, 1782, he drew up an apuntamiento (abstract) to be
presented to the Council of Castile, outlining the general
terms which the government of Spain must bear in mind
during the negotiations among the belligerent powers.
Comparing a treaty to the settlement of a suit at law

24Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
pp. 194-195.
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which had been pending for a long time without having
been judged, he began by.asserting that Spain found itself
in a very strong position and that the nation should be
able to gain all that it had sought when it declared war.
In the Mer.i^an Gulf all foreigners had been successfully
expelled; Mobile, Pensacola and all the forts on the
Mississippi River had been taken.

Spain needed only to

assure her claim ^.n perpetuity to these settlements and
their dependencies as far as the mouth of the Bahama
Strait.
In the Gulf and Bay of Honduras and on the coast
of the peninsula of Yucatan the settlements, English for
the most part, had been totally destroyed, and according
to the latest news, the coast would soon be taken in its
entirety.

In Europe Spain still hoped for the acquisition

of Gibraltar and Minorca.

Minorca had been taken by a

joint French and Spanish expedition in February, 1792/
and a supreme effort would be made to seize Gibraltar
within four months.

All preparations had been made for

an overwhelming assault on the fortress, and success
could be expected.

Floridablanca called these objectives,
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with those in the Gulf of Mexico "los puntos cardenales
de la guerra ,0 ,de ,1a paz" (the cardinal points of war or
peace).

Or, alternatively, if Spain could seize Jamaica,

a 11superabundante recompensa" (ample compensation) could
be arranged by which Spain would return Jamaica to
England, retain Minorca, and acquire Gibraltar bloodlessly.

If the war went well, it might even be possible

to ask for restitution of fishing rights in Newfoundland . 25
But if the war went badly, Spain could ask for the neutral
ization of the Mediterranean and the establishment of a
free port in Minorca.

Gibraltar might be acquired by

ceding to England some of the African possessions of
Spain.

However, if Spain received Gibraltar, it must

retain Ceuta, which because of its location on the Moroccan
coast directly across from the fortress, was indispensable
to its defense . 26

25Silas Deane, the first American agent sent to
France by the Continental Congress, had drawn up, without
authorization from Congress, a treaty with France and
Spain which guaranteed their possessions in America, gave
them access to the Newfoundland fisheries and excluded
British ships from American waters. Ibid., p. 52.
26Quoted in Danvila, Carlos III. Vol. 5, pp. 362 - 3 6 3 .
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At the time Count Floridablanca wrote this paper
he had not learned of the decisive defeat of de Grasse's
fleet the previous month, and the English counter-attack
in the Bay of Hondura

was two months in the future.

Rodney's victory at the Battle of the Saints restored
English naval supremacy in American waters and made the
invasion of Jamaica impossible for the time being.
Spain attempted no more adventures in America in
1 7 8 2 , because its energies were directed toward another

attack on Gibraltar.

Count Floridablanca's prediction

of another effort within four months was accurate, for
on September 13 combined forces of Spain and France began
their most ambitious attempt to overwhelm the British
defenses.

The attack was a total failure.

It still

might have been possible to starve Gibraltar into sub
mission if the Spanish and French could have blocked the
entry of supplies into the fortrees, but a fortuitous
combination of circumstances deprived the besiegers of
this last weapon.

The energy of twenty-three year old

William Pitt, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who contended
almost single-handedly with general war-weariness and
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inertia, was responsible for forming a relief expedition
which sailed for Gibraltar two days after the Spanish
and French began their great attack.

The supply squadron

arrived at a moment when the futile assault had been sus
pended and the blockading fleet which lay at Algeciras
had been scattered by a violent gale.

The English

accomplished the final relief of Gibraltar without
opposition. 27
"Little remains but to relate how the American
war ebbed away and Jamaica remained secure against the
last efforts of the Bourbonse"

With this sentence a

British historian disposes of all military and naval
action from mid-1 7 8 2 until the signing of the preliminary
terms of peace in Paris on January 20, 1783-28

Yet

"ebbing away" of hostilities in America brought no cor
responding diminution of the obligations of New Spain to
support armed establishments of Spanish North America.
Ships and fortifications had to be maintained; crews and

27Wackesy, The War for America, pp. 483-484.
2SIbid., p. 489-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

240
garrisons had to be paid and fed.

The same problems of

supply which had persisted since 1779 continued without
satisfactory solutions during the rest of the year 1 7 8 2 .
Jose de Galvez continued his familiar exhortations
to speed cargoes to Cuba, and the Havana officials received
yet another rebuke for sending unseaworthy vessels to
Verzcruz . 29

New Spain continued to support its dependen

cies, but only by a great effort.
In July, 1782, the Viceroy made it clear to the
Minister of the Indies that the income of the Real
Hacienda no longer sufficed to meet the needs of the
internal economy of New Spain and at the same time to
satisfy the incessant demands of Havana.

Yet, para

doxically, in spite of the unprecedented sums sent to
Cuba the members of the armed forces and the island's
civilian population were ill-fed.

In response to the

most recent complaint from Jose de Galvez that the viceroyalty's support of Cuba had been "scant," Mayorga wrote

29Tose de Galvez to Mayorga, April 26, 1782,
AGNM, RC,- Vol. 122, expediente 122, fols. 217-217^.
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a long expository letter in which he described the fiscal
plight of his kingdom.
He began by noting the recent departure from
Veracruz of the warship San Francisco de Asis with
2,000,000 pesos destined for Havana.

This shipment of

cash raised the amount sent to Havana since January, 1782,
to 9,000,000 pesos.

In fact, money was being shipped to

Cuba more frequently than provisions, because those who
commanded at Havana sent too few food ships.

The Viceroy

had attempted to augment the flow of food to the island
by commandeering ships that came from Campeche to Vera
cruz and despatching them to Cuba, but this irregular
source of transport could not be relied upon.

The lack

of shipping space had resulted in the spoilage of thousands
of pounds of flour.

The flour had been dumped into the

sea, because it was unfit for consumption and could not
be sold even at reduced prices.
The Fiscal, Ramon de Posada, had told the Viceroy
that the lack of food in Havana was due to the fact that
all available merchant ships of that port had been com
mandeered by the officials of the Marine for employment
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in the royal service.

The merchants of the island found

themselves without means to carry provisions from Vera
cruz to satisfy the normal demands of their trade.

Mayorga

stated that he had sent copies of the Fiscal1s allegation
to Havana, and that he had asked those in command how they
proposed to solve the difficulty.

If ships belonging to

or chartered by the Real Armada did not call at Veracruz
for food, and if at the same time the merchants were
denied use of cargo space, how was the island to be fed?
At the time of writing, July 6, the Viceroy had received
no response to his queries from Havana.
In view of the distress of the Havana merchants
and the needs of the civilian population, the Viceroy had .
taken an unprecedented step to relieve the scarcity of
food.

He had ordered that flour consigned to private

merchants be embarked at Veracruz on warships bound for
Havana.

Mayorga hoped that the resort to this extra

ordinary expedient would make it clear to the Minister of
the Indies that the food shortage in Cuba was not his
fault.

The Viceroy added, parenthetically, that he hoped

Jose de Galvez would present the situation in its true
light to the king.
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The 9,000,000 pesos which had been sent to Havana
had been accumulated by great effort, and it would have
not been possible to send this amount if the Viceroy had
not borrowed 1,500,000 from private individuals.
The Viceroy had at last been forced to ask loans
from the Consulado de Comercio and the Real Cuerpo de
Mineria.30

Each of these bodies had offered to lend the

crown 1,000,000 pesos, and each had demanded special
privileges for doing so.

The Consulado de Comercio

received for its maintenance six-tenths of one percent of
the value of all merchandise imported from Europe.

This

maintenance tax (derecho de averia para su Subsistencia)
was to be increased to a flat one percent until the Crown

30The Consulados de Comercio have been described
as "perhaps the most powerful nonpolitical corporations in
New Spain and Peru." These merchant importers, through
their guild, acted as an authoritities in matters of trade
communication, served as a tribunal in contractual dis
putes and questions of bankruptcy and freight charges.
They constructed canals and roads and maintained hospitals.
The Consulado de Comercio of Mexico had been founded in
1594. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America. pp. 253”254,
300. The Real Cuerpo de Mineria. whose functions were
analogous to those of the Consulado de Comerico, had been
formally constituted in 1777 in an effort to stimulate the
production of precious metals in New Spain. The creation
of this body and its work are thoroughly treated in Bobb,
Bucareli. Ch. J, "The Mexican Mining Industry," pp. 172-204.
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repaid its debt to the Consulado.

The Real Cuerpo .de

Mineria was to be permitted to collect from the Casa de
Moneda twenty grains for each ounce of twenty-two carat
gold and ten grains for each silver mark that the mint
received.31

The movement of private and crown cargoes, between
New Spain and Havana and between Havana and Spain, con
tinued to be irregular and infrequent.

On May 5 , 1782, a

fleet of mercury ships from Spain made port at Veracruz,
and the Viceroy took advantage of their presence to
✓

embark goods of private merchants for shipment to Cadiz.
Jose de Galvez, mindful of the disruption of commerce
caused by the war, instructed Mayorga to make preparations

31Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, July 6 , 1782, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 131, No. I6 9 I, fols. l-2v. It is difficult to
reduce these weights to their modern equivalents. One gram
is the metric equivalent of 15.43 grains. Escudos, often
called doblones because of the prevalence of multiple units
(2 , 4 , 8 — escudo pieces) were coined from 22 -carat gold and
weighed 230.246 grams, or 1/68 of a mark. The marco de
Plata de 11 dineros, as the silver mark is described in
the letter, was the amount of nearly pure (9 1 .7 percent)
silver from which 68 of the famous "pieces of eight" ( reales
de ei 8 ) could be struck. The problem of identifying the
various types of money in simultaneous circulation during
the eighteenth century is explained in Hamilton, "Monetary
Problems in Spain and Spanish America," pp. 22-23*
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for the departure of a convoy from Veracruz in November.
The Viceroy was to "hint, exhort and demand" (intime,
exhorte

y

estreche) that all merchants collect as much

money as possible for the purchase: of Peninsular merchan
dise.

These funds, together with all products destined

for Spain, were to be sent to Veracruz before November 3 0 ,
1782.

Jose de Galvez had ordered the Commandant of

Marine at Havana to send warships to Veracruz by the end
of November to escort "whatever reqistros might be in
condition to sail."

The merchant ships and their escorts

were to proceed to Havana by January, 1783-

There they

would be joined by the merchant ships in that port that
were "fit to make it" (_en aptitud de harcerlo) .

The com

bined ships were to sail for Spain in February.

For the

merchants of New Spain who were unable to meet the Novem
ber 30 deadline for shipment another convoy might be
arranged at a later date, "if the circumstances of the
war should permit it."32

32Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, August 27/ 1782, AGNM,
RC, Vol. 123/ expedients 68, reservada No. 42, fols. 164175. In contrast to the vigorous and urgent style of
Galvez' letters, this one is pessimistic in tone. In spite
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Although the war had all b:;t halted the flow of
traffic between New Spain and Cuba, the officials of
Havana were unfailingly prompt in the delivery of requests
for assistance needed by the military and naval establish
ments.

Another such request reached Mexico City on

August 28.
It was beyond the capacity of New Spain to produce
what Havana asked.

The Viceroy, in explanation of his

inability to comply, wrote for the Minister of the Indies
a kind of abstract which listed the contributions of the
viceroyalty to that date and reviewed the many obligations
of its treasuries.

The Governor of Havana had begun his

statement of needs by asking for two battalions of troops
for garrison duty in Cuba.

The soldiers from New Spain

would serve as replacements in units whose ranks were
thinned by sickness.

The Viceroy referred to the request

to his Inspector General, Pascual de Cisneros.

The

of the emphatic orders issued to Havana, the reader
receives the impression that the Minister doubts the war
ships will meet the appointed deadline.
In three refer
ences Galvez speculates about the number of vessels which
are seaworthy and capable of making the voyage to Spain.
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Inspector responded, with many plausible arguments, that
the transfer of any tropes from New Spain was inadvisable. 33
Josef Solano, Commandant of Marine at Havana, had
asked for more seamen, but the Viceroy maintained that
there were hardly enough sailors at Veracruz and other
ports to serve the necessary coastal traffic.

Between

33The Inspector had never willingly relinquished
men from the area of his command. In every instance
that a transfer of troops from New Spain was proposed,
Cisneros was able to muster urgent reasons for retaining
them in New Spain. The Inspector General was apparently
a belligerent character who seized every opportunity to
quarrel with his superiors about every encroachment on his
prerogatives. In I7 8 I Jose de Galvez had asked Mayorga
and Cisneros to resolve their continual guarirels^in the
interest of efficient administration. Jose de Galvez to
Mayorga, May 30, 1781/ AGNM, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 305>
fols. 4l4-4l4v. In 1782 the arrest of a single soldier
in Mexico City precipitated a jurisdictional quarrel between
the civil and military authorities of the capital. Cis
neros demanded the intervention of the Viceroy. Mayorga
refused, and "for the next two years, two Viceroys,
Mayorga and Matias de Galvez, were harassed by representa
tions growing increasingly acrimonious." McAlister, Fuero
Militar, p. 34. Viceroy Bucareli had written a scathing
description of Cisneros' character in a private letter to
Alejandro O'Reilly:
"You knew that no one exceeds the limit prescribed by his
talents, and you know what fell to this individual is not
of great extent. Otherwise, he is a good man, although
with the misfortune of always disgusting those who must
obey him and serving little^those who command him."
Quoted in Bobb, Bucareli, p. 94.
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August, 1779/ anc^ July, 1782, 2,003 criminals and vagabonds
had been condemned by the courts of New Spain to serve in
the Havana squadron, and more would be pressed into service
as soon as enough able-bodied man could be collected to
warrant sending a ship from Havana to transport them.
Mayorga had informed Francisco de Saavedra that it was
impossible to send more troops and seamen to Havana, and
Saavedra had understood. 34
In the view of the Viceroy the demand of Havana
exceeded reason, and he made a brief recapitulation of

34The exact identity of Francisco Saavedra and
his mission to New Spain remain a mystery. Mayorga speaks
of him in his letter as having been "sent by those
Generals" [of Havana]. Bancroft describes him as a
mysterious stranger who had no specific duties but who
had access to the highest official circles^. Hubert H.
Bancroft, The History of Mexico. 6 volumes (San Francisco:
A. L. Bancroft Co., 1883-1888), Vol. 3 , pp. 38 I-3 8 2 .
Bustamante, a partisan of Mayorga, has written, without
citing sources, that Saavedra was an agent of the Minister
of the Indies sent to criticize of censure (fiscalizar) the
unfortunate Viceroy who had unwittingly frustrated the
designs of the Galvez family. Andres Cavo, Los tres siglos
de Mexico durante el gobierno espanol hasta la entrada del
eiercito triqarante con notas v supplemento por el Licienciado Carlos Maria de Bustamente. 4 vols. Mexico: Imprenta
de Luis Abadiano y V&ldes, I8 36 -I8 3 8 / Vol. 3/ P* 42.
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the money already disbursed to that port in order to prove
that its officials were incapable of anticipating their
own needs.

In December, 1781, a French frigate had been

pressed into service to make an emergency remission of

1.000.000 pesos to Havana because the Spanish warhips sent
to Veracruz for that purpose had been incapable of making
sail.

When the warship, the San Francisco de Asis, had

finally been made seaworthy, it had carried more than

2.000.000 pesos.

Then had come the warship San Aqustin

to carry back 4,000,000 pesos to Havana.

The San

Francisco de Asis soon returned, and on its second voyage
it loaded 2,000,000 pesos for the same port.

At the time

that Mayorga wrote, September 25, 1782, the warship
Velasco was at Veracruz, and 3,000,000 pesos had already
been consigned to it.

More than 12,000,000 pesos had

been sent to Havana in nine months of the current year,

1782, and that sum was in excess of Havana's estimate
for the entire year.
Mayorga asserted that the crown income in New Spain
had never equalled the sum collected in 1781:

18,918,390
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pesos . 35

Even so, the treasuries could not meet their

heavy obligations.

Already more than 4,000,000 pesos had

35This sum does not agree with the figure given by
Humboldt, although his Ensayo politico seems to confirm
Mayorga's claim that the Rentas of the Real Hacienda had
risen to unprecedented heights during his administration.
Humboldt gave these figures for 1779# 1780, 1781, 1782:
15/544,574 pesos, 15,010,974 pesos, 1 8 ,0 9 1 ,6 3 9 pesos,
19/594,490 pesos. Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre Nueva
Espana, Vol. 4, p. 442. A recent and thorough monograph on
the Real Hacienda during the second half of the eighteenth
century stated that there remain unreconciled discrepancies
in the accounts of crown income and expenses during this
period. The most comprehensive account is Fabian de Fonseca
and Carlos de Urrutia, Historia General de la Real Hacienda
escrita por D. Fabian de Fonesca
JD. Carlos de Urrutia por
orden del Virev, conde da Revillaqiqedo, 6 volumes, (MexicO:
V. G. Torres, 1845-1853). Portions of this work, one of
which was cited on p. 2 , are scattered throughout the ramo
Historia (565 tomos) of the Archivo General de la Nacion.
Mexico City. One of the men who assisted Fonseca in the
compilation of his work later wrote a brief study of the
same subject: Joaquin Maniau Torquesmada, Compendio de la
Real Hacienda de Nueva Espana escrito en el ano d c 1794 por
D. Joaquin Maniau oficial mayor de la Direccion
Contaduria
general del tabaco de dicho reyno
contador del Montepio de
of icin ^ s por S..M. (Mexico: Imprenta y Fotocopia de la
Secret a jria de Indust ria y Comercio, 1914) . These works have
never beep, thoroughly analyzed and correlated with each
other, much less with all the documents that were used in
their compilation. On the whole, the figures given by Hum
boldt for income of the Real Hacienda can be accepted, accord
ing to the recent exhaustive monograph of Andres Lira Gon
zales, "Aspecto fiscal de la Nueva Espana en la segunda mitad
del siglo XVIII," Historia Mexicana. Vol. XVII, num. 3
(Enero-Marzo, 1 9 6 8 ), p. 3 8 9 . This monograph includes a foldout graphic representation of the forty-odd ramos which con
tributed to the crown income. *'tfhi's is in itself proof of the
great task that awaits futute investigators.
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been borrowed from private individuals, and the Consulados
of Comercio and Mineria were in the process of raising
another 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 pesos.
Although Jose de Galvez was well aware of the mani
fold nature of New Spain's financial commitments, the
Viceroy listed them for emphasis:

the funds sent to Spain,

the situados of Havana, Louisiana, Santo Domingo, Puerto
Rico, the Philippine Islands, the expenses of the Interior
Provinces and the Department of San Bias, salaries, chari
ties, special projects undertaken by order of the crown,
remissions to Guatemala, and the salaries of the troops.
,

i

On September 7 the treasury officials had given
him a statement which proved that the total disbursements
from the treasuries since the beginning of the war had
reached 40,197*036 pesos.

Even the unprecedented income
/

could not support such burdens.

Mayorga ^sked Jose de

Galvez to present these figures to the king, "who I do not
doubt will understand that it has been impossible to make
greater exertions. " 36

36Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, September 25* 1782,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 1 3 1 , no. ±824, fols. 155-157-
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In enumerating the various purposes for which the
wealth of New Spain was spent the Viceroy failed to men
tion that some items were subject to change without notice,
a practice which made it impossible for treasury officials
to predict disbursements for the coming year.

Such a

change was made less than one month after Mayorga had
written his summary of New Spain's fiscal difficulties.
On September 28 Jose de Galvez ordered that the Province
of Louisiana be paid 250,000 pesos to redeem an issue of
paper money printed by its Intendant, Martin Navarro.

No

allegation was made that New Spain had been tardy in its
payment of the situado; the shortage of money had resulted,
it was said, from unspecified "extraordinary expenses. " 37
On October 26 another cedula followed directing that the
situado of Louisiana 315,000 pesos, be doubled for the
duration of the war.

The 250,000 pesos for the redemption

of Navarro's bills had still to be paid . 38

37Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, September 28, 1782,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 123, expediente 119, fo l • 2 6 9 .
38Same to same, October 26, 1782, ibid.. expediente
153, fol. 333* This order to double the situado of Louisi
ana was not received until April J, lj83> long after the
preliminary peace treaty had been signed.
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Of more concern to the Viceroy than sudden demands
for money, like the increased Louisiana situado. was the
confusion resulting apparently from inaccurate bookkeeping
in Mexico City or Havana.

Two months after Mayorga had

protested to Jose de Galvez that the treasuries of New
Spain could not support present obligations, his Fiscal
informed him that it was impossible to reconcile Havana's
account of money received from Mexico with the sums which
the Mexican treasury officials claimed to have sent to
Havana.
On August 28, 1782, the Governor and the Commandant
of Marine at Havana had presented a financial statement
divided into two parts:

an accounting of all funds

received from New Spain during the past year, and an
estimate of the money required for the coming year.
According to its own records, Havana had received and
had spent 13/889,726 pesos.

It was alleged that this

sum had been insufficient, and the warship Velasco had
sailed from Veracruz with an emergency remission of

3/000,000 pesos, all that Mayorga could collect at the
time (Havana had asked for 5,000,000 pesos).

The puzzled
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Fiscal in Mexico City could not understand why Havana
needed money for current expenses.

The records in Mexico

City showed that 13/946,550 pesos had been sent to the
islano, while Havana acknowledged paying out 1 3 ,8 8 9 ,7 2 6
pesos for all purposes.

What had happened to the missing

56,824 pesos?
Even if the discrepancy between money sent to
Havana and money spent by Havana could be attributed to
errors in bookkeeping, there remained serious inconsis
tencies between the records kept in Havana and those in
Mexico City.

Mayorga charged that Havana's reckoning

would be incomplete even if the discovery of bookkeeping
errors could make it arithmetically correct, for there
were important items that did not appear in the recapitula
tion.

Where, the Viceroy asked rhetorically, were the

shipping charges which New Spain had to pay to merchant
ships because ships of the Real Armada had not been sent
from Havana when they had been needed?

The expenses of

Bernardo de Galvez' army had not been listed.

Mayorga
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could find no mention of the emergency shipment of 500,000
pesos in August, 1781, to give to de Grasse.39
After the financial statements from Havana arrived,
the conciliar machinery of the government went into opera
tion to determine how much money could be committed to
the expenses of Havana and its dependencies for the coming
year.

The ca~jas reales of New Spain were empty, and the

Tribunal de Cuentas was called into session to advise the
Viceroy and the Fiscal.40

However, the Tribunal declared

"Mayorga knew how the 500,000 pesos had been
spent. His letter cited the name of the French frigate
which called at Havana for the money, the name of its com
mander and where the treasure ship made rendezvous with
de Grasse's flfeet. He mentioned de Grasse's successful
operations in North America, and he was indignant because
his government's timely contribution to the common war
effort did not appear in Havana's account of money spent.
4°Until 1605 the Council of the Indies had been che
final court of audit for all financial matters. In that
year three tribunales de cuentas were established at Lima,
Mexico City, and Sante Fe de Bogata. These tribunals were
independent of the audiencia, and they were empowered to
audit all public accounts. Each year they inventoried the
principal cajas reales. Haring, The Spanish Empire in
America, pp. 282-283- The body had been described as a
"tribunal which scrutinized the administration of the
Hacienda and which was thoroughly informed on all fiscal
questions." Lira Gonzalez, "Aspecto fiscal de la Nueva
Espana," p. 3 6 5 *
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that it was unable to make an estimate of the crown income
for the coming year; consequently the body had no course
of action to recommend.

The Viceroy and the Fiscal then

decided to send all of New Spain's records of money paid
to Havana to the Intendant of the Army at that port in
the hope that the difference between the two accounts could
be explained.
Since the Tribunal de Cuentas had been unable to
arrive at an approximation of the next year's income,
Mayorga and the Fiscal called on a lower rank of the official
hierarchy for aid.

The Directors of all ramos of the Real

Hacienda were asked to inventory the contents of their
respective cajas and to calculate their next year's receipts.
When each branch had made its inventory and attempted to
fix the amount of its future collections, the Directors
would form a Junta to apportion the burden of fulfilling
Havana's demands,

"which are made every moment"

(que a

cada instanto se ofrezen) .
Mayorga declared that he was completely at a loss
to determine exactly how much Havana needed for the coming
year and when the "year" began.

The estimate from which
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he was working had been prepared in Havana in August, but
since then I-Iavana had called several times not for specific
sums but for all the Viceroy could deliver.

Mayorga felt

that Havana was already spending next year's subsidies.
Therefore, he adjusted Havana's figures to fit his own
interpretation.
Havana had asked for 1 3 ,9 1 8 ,6 6 8 pesos, and that sum
included 2,000,000 pesos which had to be paid in Havana as
another installment of the Cabarrus loan.

The warship

Velasco was at the moment en route to Havana with 3»000,000
pesos, all that could be collected from the reales cajas.
and Mayorga felt that this sum should be deducted from
Havana's estimate.

Here the Viceroy's uncertainty is

apparent in his phraseology:
the following"

"At least to me it means

(_a _lo menos me significa lo siquiente):

that he needed to send 10,918,668 pesos to Havana during
the coming year.
From that date forward all remissions to Havana
would be considered by a full junta of the Real Hacienda
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before being authorized and a full account of all the
proceedings would be sent to Spain in quadriplicate. 41
The question of the funds to maintain Havana and
its dependencies was the last significant war matter to
concern New Spain.

No formal statement from Spain

signalled the general reduction of activity.
/

On the

/

other hand, Jose de Galvez outlined no more plans for
future campaigns as he had done in past years.

The war

simply slowed to a stop, and as the year 1782 drew to a
close, the flood of royal cedulas relative to military
matters slowed to a trickle, and those few letters con
cerned only routine matters.
In spite of the Viceroy's protests that New Spain
could not meet what Havana considered to be its needs,
money continued to flow from Mexico to Cuba.

By December,

Mayorga had collected 2,000,000 pesos to send to Veracruz,
where the silver would await the next warship.

A brief

flurry of alarm occurred when Havana reported that an
English fleet had sailed from New York for an unknown

4lMayorga to Jose de Galvez, November 28, 1782,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1866, fols. 213-216.
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destination.

The Viceroy ordered that all treasure bound

for Veracruz be stored at Jalapa, twenty leagues distant,
until it should be definitely known that the enemy naval
force was not directed against either New Spain or Cuba.42
As it happened, the British fleet under Sir Samual Hood
was moving to Jamaica in response to the repeated requests
of its Governor, who feared that the French and Spanish
were planning an invasion.43
There was a last flare-up of the old animosity
between the Minister of the Indies and the Viceroy when
Jose de Galvez complained that the Governor of Yucatan
did not have enough artillery or troops to protect his
province against an enemy attack.

Mayorga answered on

December 14, 1782, with a curt letter notable for its
uncharacteristic bluntness.

The Viceroy declared that

he had always aided Yucatan promptly and effectively,
that its Governor was well-pleased with the support he

42Same to same, December 14, 1782, ibid., No. 1 8 9 8 ,
fols. 257-257v.
43Mackesy, The War for America, p. 493*
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had received from Mexico and that he had letters from
the Governor to prove it.44
It is possible that the Viceroy had learned from
private sources of information that a cedula had been
issued on October 14 relieving him of his position and
designating Matias de Galvez as his successor.45

The

44Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, December 14, 1782,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1892, fols. 247~247v.
ACT

*

'

*3Matias de Galvez must have been informed of his
appointment as Viceroy before Mayorga received notice of
it, for he began his journey northward from Guatemala on
March 8. Rivera Cambas, Los gobernantes de Mexico, Vol. 1,
PP. 448-449.

Mayorga had been requesting that the king name his suc
cessor ever since a courier from Mexico City had informed
him on April 24, 1779, that the Audiencia Gobierna of
Mexico City had named him Viceroy. He had declared that
he was surprised by the honor and he had been reluctant
to accept the post. On May 3 , 1779/ be wrote the first
of many letters to Spain asking to be relieved, but a real
cedula of August 27, 1779, had ordered him to continue
serving as interim viceroy. After he had been in office
only six months he wrote again to Spain to describe in
detail the hardships he had to endure. After recapitulat
ing his appeals for relief, he asserted that he would
serve, as ordered, but he pleaded for full salary instead
of the 2 0 ,0 0 0 pesos he received.
"I believe that I owe Your Excellency the thought that
having served the Government of Guatemala at a most criti
cal, calamitous and troublous time I could not produce
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removal of Mayorga and his replacement by the Captain
General of Guatemala may be interpreted as unofficial
admission by the Spanish government that the war had for
all practical purposes ended and that the talks then in
progress in Paris would result in a definite peace treaty.
The emergency which had caused Mayorga to be retained
against his will as an interim viceroy had passed, and
/

/

Matias de Galvez gained the post from which ..chance had
barred him four years previously.

enough profits to compensate for the necessary move to
America, for my decent subsistence here, and that of my
family in this Kingdom.
To this must be added the great
costs of the slow and painful journey which I made to this
Capital, to that end freeing the villages enroute from
the burden which such cases entail. The necessity of
maintaining the position of my wife in Madrid and my sons
in the service with distinction, and lastly the need of
great expenditures for the decoration and furnishings of
this palace, and to subsist in this Kingdom with all the
splendor and decorum which the rank of Viceroy demands:
these rise to an inst^pportable height, as Your Excellency
knows very well.
"These weighty motives, and the knowledge that the penetra
tion of Your Excellency can do no less than find them just,
are sufficient to compel me to ask for full salary."
Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, February 28, 1780, AGNM, CV,
Vol. 126, No. 377/ fols. 88 -8 9 . His salary was not
increased.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

262
Six months elapsed before the order by which
Mayorga was relieved reached New Spain, and the Viceroy
surrendered the baton of command to Galvez on April 28,
1783-

0n May 19 the new Viceroy received official word

from Madrid that Carlos III had acceded to the terms of
the preliminary peace which had been signed in Paris on
January 20# 1783 * 46

The war to which New Spain had con

tributed so much of its wealth had ended.

The nature and

extent of that aid will be examined in the conclusion
which follows.

46Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, January 20, 1783/
AGNM, RC, expediente 18, fols. 3^“3^v *
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C H A P T E R

VI

CONCLUSION

The interval between the declaration of war by
Spain and the cessation of hostilities corresponds
roughly to the viceregency of Martin de Mayorga.

News of

the declaration of war reached Mexico City on August 13,
1779; Mayorga entered the capital to begin his duties on
August 23, 1779»

The order to cease hostilities arrived

at Mexico City on May 1 9 , 17^3; Mayorga surrendered his
office to Matias de G&lvez on April 28, 1 7 8 3 .
A real c6 dula ordering the residencia of Mayorga's
administration was issued on September 19, 1783*

Included

in the evidence collected for the judicial review of the
Viceroy's conduct in office is a group of papers entitled
"Orders, Drafts, Certificates concerning the cost of the
war . " 1

Among these statements is an account of all

lnDecretos, Pianos, Certificaciones sobre la costa
de la guerra," Archivo Historico Nacional, Consejo de
Indias, legajo 20721, cuaderno V, folios 77”109263
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shipments made from the port of Veracruz during Mayorga's
tenure of office.

The detailed analysis of goods which

left the port is invaluable for two reasons:

the period

covered corresponds almost exactly to the duration of the
war in America, and Veracruz was the only port on the
east coast of New Spain through which war materiel moved
to other ports of the eastern seaboard and to the
dependencies of New Spain in the gulf area . 2
The original paper, a long, fold-out ledger sheet,
enumerates types of cargoes shipped to each port,
quantities of each item, and the total value of all money

2In describing the contribution of New Spain to
the war effort the writer has not included remissions to
the Philippine Islands except to illustrate the shortage
of ships and trained personnel on the Pacific Coast of
the viceroyalty. The dissertation concerns the war in
America, and, in any case, the islands did net figure in
the war; neither Manila nor the annual galleon was
attacked. In one respect the Phillippine Islands were
unique among the nominal dependencies of New Spain.
Although they received a situado fixed in 1700 at 140,000
pesos, Jos6 de Vasco y Vargas, Governor during the war
years, established in 1779 a state tobacco monopoly whose
receipts made the captaincy general financially selfsustaining. Schurz, the Manila Galleon, pp. 54-55» 182.
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and goods sent to each port, year by year, from August 16,
1779/ to May 20, 1783*

T^e cost of individual items is

not given, e.g., 1,762 barrels of meat and 1,116 cartons
of gunpowder were sent to Havana in 1780, but what each
cost must remain unknown.

The two commodities cited are

among fifteen categories of aid shipped to different ports,
and evaluated in terms of total cost per year.

The dis

tribution was as follows:

General and comprehensive statement of the funds,
provisions, goods, munitions of war, impressed
seamen, troops of the Infantry Regiment of the
Crown of New Spain which in obedience to the orders
of His Excellency Senor Viceroy have left this port
Veracruz for other places, which is expressed below,
since the sixteenth of August of 1779 when the war
was proclaimed in this city until the twentieth of
May of 1783, when there departed from this port the
warship Santo Domingo, in which the Most Excellent
Senor don Martin de Mayorga embarked, whose values
are expressed in terms of the prices that prevailed
at the time of their shipment, and it is in the
following form.
1779
Havana
Money:

1,100,225 pesos
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Tercios 3 of flour: 1,163
Tercios of dried vegetables:
3»683
Tons of ballast:
480
Quintales of lead: 132
Sheets of copper: 1,000
Tercios of almagre C red. dye]: 100
Impressed seamen: 137
Total value:

1,302,187 pesos

3Where it has been possible, units of weight and
measure used in this statement have been translated
directly into English even when their exact value cannot
be ascertained, e.g., caxas (cartons or boxes)of gunpowder,
planchas (sheets) of copper, barriles (barrels( of meat,
zurrones (skin bags) of cochineal. The arroba is equi
valent to twenty-five pounds; the quintal to one hundred
pounds.
The tercio is difficult to define. It is onehalf a carga. which was originally a mule load. As a
Castilian unit of grain measure, the carga is equivalent
to four bushels. Yet some of the items whose quantities
are expressed in tercios do not lend themselves to measure
ment in bushels, e.g. cloth and rockets. There is great
variation in the measure of a carga as a unit of weight.
Father Francisco Javier Clavigero in his Historia Antigua
de Mexico gave the figure of 500 pounds, surely too heavy
for a mule load. Waddy Thompson, first United States
Minister to Mexico, stated in his Recollections of Mexico
that mules carrying goods between the capital and Veracruz
bore 300 pounds. The Englishman H. G. Ward, who was
apparently a careful observer, defined a carga as 300
pounds in his book, Mexico in 1827. Howard T. Fisher and
Marion Hall Fisher, editors and annotators of a recent edi
tion of Fanny Calderon de la Barca's Life in Mexico, dis
cuss these and other definitions of units of weight used
in Mexico-in their book, Life in Mexico New York: (Double
day and Company, 1966 ), p. 7^7-
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New Orleans

Money: 2,000 pesos
Tercios of flour: 800
Total value:

11,600 pesos

Campeche
Money:

150,250 pesos

Cartons of gunpowder:
Total value:

334

200,350 pesos

Presidio del Carmen
Cartons of gunpowder:
Cartons of nails:
Muskets:

83

various

150

Balls of various calibres:
Total value:

150

21,514 pesos

1780
Spain

Money:
3*287*091 Pesos 0.1.
Sheets of copper: 1,384
Bags of cochineal:
14
Bags of vanilla:
120
Total value:

3*311*608 pesos
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Havana
Money, 6,210,806 pesos 7 . 11.
Tercios of flour: 2,807
Tercios of dried vegetables: 9,208
Quintales of lead: 2,508
Tons of ballast:
192
Arrobas of b^con: 101
Arrobas of lard: 216
Tercios of sheepskins: 20
Tercios of slow-match: 208
Tercios of wool: 50
Tercios of coarse cloth: 20
Cartons of gunpowder: 1,166
Barrels of meat: 1,762
Arrobas of ham: 2,534
Impressed seamen:
Total value:

694

7 ,028,5 6 7 pesos 2. 11.

New Orleans
Money:
Tercios
Tercios
Cartons

14,075 pesos 6 . 2.
of flour: 1,220
of dried vegetables:
of gunpowder: 100

Total value:

430

55,335 pesos 6 . 2.

Campeche

Money: 125,146 pesos J.
Tercios of flour:
150
Tercios of dried vegetables:
Cartons of gunpowder: 200
Barrels of meats 200
Arrobas of ham:
320
Quintale3 of biscuit: 600
Arrobas of oil: 25
Total value:

150

175/139 pesos 3*
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*

Presidio del Carmen
Money: 44,675 pesos 5 . 5 .
Cartons of nails: 8
Arrobas of oil: 6
Arrobas of pitch:
55
Quintales of canvas: 16
Quintales of sheet iron: 12
Total value:

46,777 pesos 6 .

Tabasco
Cartons of gunpowder:
11
Tercios of slow-match: 1
Cakes of wax: various
Muskets: 200
Balls of various calibres:
Total value:

255

6,735 pesos

1781
Havana:
Money: 7/796,644 pesos 4. 6 .
Tercios of flour: 16,325
Tercios of dried vegetables: 5,195
Quintales of lead: 300.94
Sheets of copper: 315
Tercios of sheepskins: 14
Tercios of slow-match:
HO
Tercios of wool: 50
Tercios of coarse cloth: 23
Cartons of gunpowder: 2,200
Barrels of meat: 4,567
Arrobas of ham: 7,271.2
Large bags: 4,000
Arrobas of tallow
Crowbars: 429
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Impressed seamen: 807
Companies of troops: 12 (944 men)
Total value:

8,616,557 pesos 0. 11.

New Orleans
Money:
Tercios
Tercios
Arrobas

127,621 pesos 3 .
of flour: 525
of dried vegetables:
of ham: 369.!

Total value:

300

143,444 pesos 5 .

Campeche
Money: 30,150 pesos
Tercios of flour: 25
Crowbars: 16
Total value:

31/350 pesos

Presidio del Carmen
Money: 90,743 pesos 4. 6.
Tercios of flour: 300
Muskets: 155
Swords and sabers: 83
Total value:

98,194 pesos 4. 6 .

1782
Havana
Money:
Tercios
Tercios
Tercios
Tercios

9/308,548 pesos 6. 7of flour: 14,079
of dried vegetables:
1,578
of rockets: 8
of sleeping mats: 50
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Pieces of bunting: 200
Quintales of lead: 1606.24
Tercios of sheepskins:
33
Tercios of wool: 40
Tercios of coarse cloth: 4
Cartons of gunpowder: 400
Barrels of meat: 1,805
Arrobas of tallow: 1,317-3
Crowbars: 54
Impressed seamen: 477
Companies of troops: 6 (44l men)
Total value:

9/639/888 Pesos 3- 9-

New Orleans

Money: 117/424 pesos 1. 6 .
Tercios of flour:
2,200
Total value:

128,224 pesos 1. 6.

Campeche
Money: 1 6 2 ,6 9 2 pesos 7 . 1.
Tercios of flour: 300
Tercios of slow-match: 4
Cartons of gunpowder:
3^
Muskets: 1,500
Arrobas of pitch: 598
Total value:

181,370 pesos 6 . 9*

Presidio del Carmen
Money: 60,798 pesos 6.
Tercios of slow-match: 2
Sheets of copper: 70
Crowbars: 6
Total values:

62,138 pesos 6.
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_________________________ 1783
Spain
Money;

3 ,914 pesos 3 . 6 .

Havana;
Money;
5/264/527 pesos 1. 3 .
Tercios of flour; 5/460
Tercios of dried vegetables;
1,400
Tercios of coarse cloth;
300
Tercios of sheepskins; 15
Tercios of wool;
23
Cartons of gunpowder;
1,114
Impressed seamen;
359
Total value;

5/554,167 pesos 3 .

Hew Orleans
Money; 1,167 pesos 2.
Cartons of gunpowder; 400
Total value;

59,950 pesos

Campeche
Money;

119, 668 pesos 0. 6 .

Presidio del Carmen
Money:

102,115 pesos 4. 3 .

Guarico Leap Frangois]
Quintales of lead: 9 6 0 .2 5
Cartons of gunpowder:
1,098
Balls of various calibres: 24.277
Bombs: 1,000
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Total value;

314,044 pesos4

Note; to the total sum of this statement have been
added the expenditure for the impressed seamen
embarked for Havana, likewise there have been added
the expenses of the embarkation of the Regiment of
the Crown.
Seamen;

(±779' 918 pesos; (±780/ i ,6 8 8 pesos;
(1781 ) 3/598.4 pesos; (I782 ) 4,202.4 pesos;
(1783) 2,481.3 pesos;
Total; 12,395-1 pesos.

Regiment of the Crown:

Grand Total;

(178l) 9,874 pesos; (1782 )
21,774.4 pesos.
Total; 31,648.4 pesos.

37/254,998 pesos 2.0.

La Contaduria de Veracruz
Veracruz: June 16, 1784

From this account it appears that within a period
of less than four years New Spain disbursed to its West

4T'nis French-controlled port of Santa Domingo had
been designated two years earlier as a rendezvous point
for the combined French and Spanish fleets before their
attack on Jamaica. The movement of this quantity of gun
powder and projectiles to El Guarico, long after Rodney's
defeat of de Grasse, indicates that the Spanish had never
given up hopes for an invasion of the island. One historian
has stated that another attempt was planned, but the project
was abandoned after peace negotiations began. Caughey,
Galvez, p. 144.
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Indian dependencies (and indirectly to France and the
United States) treasure and goods whose total values
were greater than that of all situados paid to the same
colonies between 1764 and 1777/ a period of fourteen
years.

The wartime payments represented approximately

one-half of the total crown income in the viceroyalty.5
After the war ended, the situados sank to their pre-war
level.

In the years 1788-1792 an average of 3/500,000

pesos passed annually from New Spain to other Spanish
colonies.

This figure represented approximately one-

sixth of all money collected from the rentas of the Real
Hacienda.6
Reference has been made in previous chapters to
evidence found in Mayorga's correspondence that he felt

5According to Humboldt, 33/851 pesos were paid
out in situados during the years indicated. It must be
emphasized that it is impossible at this point to prove
the absolute accuracy of these figures. The reasons for
accepting Humboldt's figures have been stated in note 36
of this chapter. Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre la
Nueva Espana. IV, p. 442.
6Ibid.. p. 181.
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the demands made upon the resources of New Spain exorbitant
and that he suspected wastage of money and supplies by the
officials of Cuba.

It is apparent that the treasury

officials of Mexico shared his suspicions.

The following

declaration, which is included in the mass of testimony
taken for Mayorga's residencia, not only states that New
Spain met its obligations promptly and in full; it seems
to suggest irregularities in the use of crown funds.

The

device employed by the wr'ters of this paper is to dis
claim all knowledge of or responsibility for the spending
of funds sent abroad and then to list the uses to which
the money should have been put:

The royal officials of the Real Hacienda and
Treasury of Mexico, for the King Our Lord, may God
protect him:
*

We certify that having previously examined with
the greatest exactitude all the books, papers and
other documents with which we are entrusted, we con
clude from them that during the government of His
Excellency Don Martin de Mayorga. Viceroy, Governor
and Captain General of New Spain there occurred no
captures of pirates of which this office has knowl
edge, and therefore there was neither punishment nor
distribution of their goods and effects: that
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likewise there occurred the swift and efficient
dispatch of mercury ships7 and others: that the
situados were sent with punctuality from these
Treasuries to all military and naval installations
with all else necessary for their maintenance, as
men, munitions, provisions and other goods, without
knowing in these cases if the aids were needed, or
if the Armada and its crews were paid, or if the
ships were properly careened and maintained, that
being properly the duty of the royal officials of
those ports.8

Although the Viceroy and the royal officials of
Mexico suspected incompetence and malversation on the part
of Cuban officials who spent the money which New Spain was
at such pains to produce, they could prove nothing.

There

was, however, incontestable evidence that a substantial
portion of the food collected at Veracruz for shipment to
the West Indies had been wasted through the inability of
Havana to establish and maintain a regular and frequent
schedule of food transport.9

7This must be
azoques in the harbor
carriers did not come
of quicksilver during
Mexican silver.

Further wastage and spoilage

a reference to a swift turn-around of
of Veracruz. Certainly the mercury
regularly from Spain, for a shortage
the war reduced the production of

8"Interrogatorio y certificaciones en cuanto a la
guerra," AHN, Consejo de Indias, legajo 20720, cuaderno II.
90n one occasion in 1782 thousands of pounds of
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occurred in transit, because of carelessness in handling
by royal ships.

On one occasion in 1777# prior to the

outbreak of war, when there was the normal flow of maritime
traffic between Veracruz and Havana, Jose de Galvez went
so far as to recommend to Viceroy Bucarcili that foodstuffs
be shipped exclusively by merchant ships rather than by
ships of the Real Armada.

The loss of food through improper

handling aud stowage was prohibitive, therefore:

"Let it

be done by merchantmen, because it is more profitable to
pay the freight if they [provisions] arrive in gooci condi
tion, than to be forced to buy other provisions to make up
for their lack.10
In addition to money and food, New Spain exported
great quantities of gunpowder during the war, for the
factory at Chapultepec was the sole source of supply for
this essential commodity.

All of Spanish North America

depended upon this establishment in Mexico City for

spoiled flour had to be dumped into the sea at Veracruz
where it had rotted while awaiting shipment.
10Jose de Galvez to Bucareli, April 8, 1777# AGNM,
RC, Vol. 110, expediente 263, fol. 2 9 8 .
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explosives until Mayorga built another factory in I78 O.
The demand for their products sometimes exceeded the
supply, and again Havana was the chief offender.

In 1780

Mayorga warned Jose de Galvez that unless the Cuban offi
cials moderated their demands for gunpowder, the combined
production of the two Mexican powder mills would be insuf
ficient to satisfy the requirements of the island.

The

Viceroy complained that Havana could not possibly consume
so much gunpowder.

He asked:

"What has happened to those

immense quantities?" a question which was never answered.11
Although during the war Viceroy Mayorga endured
almost constant harassment from Jose de Galvez, who found
fault with New Spain's war effort, the verdict of the
juez de residencia, Francisco de Anda,12 and his court
was one of approbation.

While historians have warned that

lxSee pp. 133.
l2The Real Audiencia of Mexico in the eighteenth
century was divided into oidores (judges)^ who had juris
diction over civil cases; alcaldes del crimen (judges of
criminal cases); and fiscales (attorneys for the crown).
Juan Francisco de Anda was one of the five alcaldes del
crimen). Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, p. 120.
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the judgment of a residencia is far from trustworthy,13
in this case it seems apt to quote the conclusion reached
by Anda and his associates.

Comment on New Spain's role

in the war was reserved for the last paragraph of the
statement of the court's findings:

And finally, that he [Mayorga] demonstrated
courage and perseverance in the success of our arms
in the past war with the English: he exerted himself
to the utmost, in the defense of this Kingdom, keep
ing it free of enemies and pirates, giving prompt
orders for the construction of powder mills in Santa
Fe and Chapultepec, where great quantities were pro
duced, and there were sent from them to Havana 400,000
cajones, and the rest, amounting to 740.000 caiones,
to New Orleans, Campeche, Presidio del Carmen, Tabasco
and El Guarico, expediting with equal energy and col
lection, embarkation and shipment from Veracruz of
great sums of money, provisions, goods,war stores,
troops and seamen to support them: to the Army and
Squadron of Operations [Havana] went the sum of
31,941,304 pesos, 3 reales and 2/3 grains: and adding
to this account the value of money spent on account of
the fortifications of Havana: he x3id not fail to aid
promptly and amply the Kingdom of Guatemala, the
Philippine Islands, the Department of San Bias and the
Californias, the forts of the interior, the expeditions
sent from Yucatan and other ports and the other obliga
tions of the treasuries of this Kingdom; for whose

13Haring has stated that witnesses were notoriously
unreliable. He paraphrased Ernesto Shafer's allegation
that judgment of a dead official was likely to be lenient.
Haring, The Spanish Empire in America. pp. 141-142.
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defense he succeeded in removing the sand dunes in
the vicinity of the forts of Yucatan: the coastal
batteries of Alvarado and Mocambo and Coatzacoalcos:
launches armed with cannon were built and galleys for
the coast: picket boats which could go twenty leagues
offshore were equipped with signal flags and explored
the coast to observe the enemy ships: barracks and
hospitals were established for the troops quartered
at Orizaba, Cordoba and Puebla, and officers of the
army were assigned to the instruction of the militia
on the coast and in the several provinces, and
v a c a . / e r e fill ed in in the Infantry Regiments
of A! •
Granada and the Crown, and in the
Dra of Spain and Mexico.14

The force of this statement is lessened by its
poor organization, and the presentation of its factual
material is badly made.

Yet its content is substantially

correct, although how much the response of the viceroyalty
to the challenge of the war owed to the personality of
Mayorga is uncertain.

Bernard E. Bobb, in his study of

the Viceroy Bucareli, confessed that he had been unable
to determine whether the success of his subject as an

14"Representacion que Dn. Juan Francisco de
Anda cdfriisionado para la residencia del Virrey que fue
de Nueva Espana Dn. Martin de Mayorga, haze a V.M. en
relacion de lo actuado en complmto de dicha comision,
conforme a lo que se le previno por Real Cedula de 19
de Septre de 1783 anos," AHN, Consejo de Indias, legajo

20720.
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administrator wai due to his personal ability or to the
general and increasing prosperity of the Spanish empire
under Carlos III.

The same statement may be made in

regard to Martin de Mayorga.

Actually, as far as the

contribution of New Spain to the war for America is con
cerned the measure of Mayorga the man is an interesting
subject but one of secondary importance.

The accident

of his accession to power, the animosity of the Galvez
family, and his dramatic death during his long voyage
*

home just as his ship made a landfall at Cadiz, all tend
to divert attention from consideration of the specific
measures taken by the government of New Spain to meet the
wartime emergency.
The enigma of the personality of Mayorga should
not obscure other and more pertinent questions to which
there are at present no answers.
Did the unprecedented income of the rentas of the
Real Hacienda result from efficient administration by
royal officials and economy in the internal spending by
the government or did it result from the increased taxes
imposed during the viceregency of Mayorga?

The answer to
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questions must await a detailed analysis of all the sources
of crown revenue during the war years, its disbursement,
and a comparison with analyses of equivalent pre-war and
post-war periods.

Such studies have never been made

because of the sheer labor involved . 15
For whatever reason, the total rentas from all
branches of the treasuries increased substantially during
Mayorga's viceregency, a gain which was reflected in the
heavy disbursements made to the dependencies of the king
dom.

The "Representacion" previously cited stated with

unusual clarity and brevity:

"He was vigilant in the con

versation, increase and promotion of the interests of the
Real Hacienda, and he accomplished the considerable increase
of more than four million during his government, this com
pared to previous ones . 16

15Lira Gonzalez, "Aspecto fiscal de la Nueva Espana,"

P. 389.
16The increment of revenue given here agress'with
the sums listed by Humboldt for the years 1779 through
1 7 8 3 : 15,544,574 pesos, 15,010,974 pesos, 18,191,639
pesos, 19,394,490 pesos, 19,579,918 pesos. Humboldt,
Ensayo politico sobre el reino de la Nueva Espana, IV,
p. 442.
"Representacion," AHN, Consejo de Indias, legajo

20720.
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Should the Viceroy and the port officials of
Veracruz he held responsible for the frequent congestion
of storage facilities on the coast and the consequent
spoilage of perishable material?

Could the officials of

Havana have moved cargoes from Mexico to points where they
were needed more efficiently and swiftly?

In order to

answer these questions an investigator would have to
determine the number and types of vessels available for
the royal service in the area during the war years and
whether they were wisely employed.

It is highly unlikely

that even painstaking research could produce definitive
statements of the number of ships available at the time,
their routing and their cargoes . 17
Finally, were the funds and the supplies sent from
New Spain sufficient to meet the needs of the military and

l7Many Spanish vessels had the same name, and many
of these ships were often in operation in American waters
at the same time. Furthermore, there was no rigid classi
fication of ship types, and the same craft might be
described in different terms in different records. Richado
Cappa, Estudios criticos acerca de la dominaclon espanola
en America, 26 Volumes (Madrid; Libreria Catolica de
Gregorio del Amo, l880-l894, Vol. XI, Industria Naval, p. 3*
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naval establishments which were dependent upon the
resources of Mexico, or did maladministration in Cuba and
elsewhere cause temporary shortages of money, gunpowder
and food?

Here again is a question likely to defeat the

most assiduous investigator.

Even if it were possible to

trace every shipment of money, food and materiel of war
from New Spain to its ultimate destination, more questions
would immediately arise:

were these aids properly used:

were ships and shore establishments properly maintained
and their personnel paid, fed and clothed?

Conclusions

drawn from examination of the records of military and
naval units could be grossly inaccurate and misleading.
Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa demonstrated with a wealth
of evidence that the records kept by the armed forces
were more often false than not? that paymasters and supply
officers, both ashore and afloat, habitually defrauded
service personnel of their rations and money and withheld
weapons and gear for sale to private individuals or to the
crown itself. 18

18Jorge Juan de *Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa,
Noticias secretas de America (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Mar
Oceano, 1953)» PP. 65 -7 0 .
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Because of these questions it is at present
impossible to assess exactly the efficacy of New Spain's
aid in the war against England, and consequently this
study must be called provocative rather than definitive.
Yet even with the lacunae in the available data it is
clear that during the war New Spain was virtually the
sole support of Spanish arms in America and that the
kingdom made for the mother country and. her allies a
contribution unmatched in the history of colonial Spanish
America.
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript Materials

Tnis study is largely based on unpublished
manuscript material contained in two repositories:
Archivo General de

the

Naci6 n in Mexico City and the

Archivo Hist6 rico Nacional in Madrid.

The bulk of the

material from the Archivo General de la Nacion consists
of correspondence between the office of the Viceroy in
Mexico City and the Ministry of the Indies in Spain.
Missives from Spain to the viceregal establishment are
found in the ramo entitled Reales C6 dulas, a series of
180 volumes which covers the years I6 9 O-I8 2 I.

The com

munications directed by the viceroys to Spain are col
lected. in the ramo Correspondencia de Virreves . 3^-6
volumes spanning the years 1755“ 1821.

The ramo Historia.

565 volumes of miscellaneous documents dating from the

287
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sixteenth to the nineteenth century, contains much
interesting information of such diversity that it does
not readily lend itself to inclusion in the 162 other
branches into which the manuscript material of the Archivo
General de la Naci6 n is divided . 1
It is difficult to categorize for bibliographic
purposes the documents described above, for each document
is complete within itself.

Therefore, precise identifica

tion of such material can be made only in the footnotes,
where the exact location of each manuscript is given.

In

this bibliography it has seemed sufficient merely to
specify the general sources within the archives from which
the cited documents have been drawn.

1The two ramos Correspondencia de Virreves and
Historia are of interest to investigators because they
represent the earliest attempt to classify the official
papers deposited in Mexico City. Their collection was
ordered in 1790 by Viceroy Count Revillagigedo.
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I . Documents from the following ramos and volumes
located in the Archivo General de la Naoion,
Mexico Citys
Reales Cedulas. Volumanes 80(1760) ; 8l(176l);
8 2 (1762 ) ; 8 3 (1763 ) ;84(1764)
8 6 (1765 ) ; 8 7 (1765 ) ;
8 8 (1766 ); 8 9 (1766 ); 9 0 (1767 ); 9 1 (1767 ); 9 2 (1768 );
94(1769); 95(1769); 97(1770); 98(1771); 101(1772);
106(1775); 107(1776); 108(1776); 109(1776);
111(1777); 113(1778); 115(1778); 116(1779);
117 (1779 ) ; 118 (17-8 0 ) ; 119 (1780 ) ; 120 (1780 ) ;
121(1781); 122(1782); 1 2 3 (1782 ); 124(1783).
Correspondencia de Virreyes. Mayorga. Volumenes
122(1779); 123(1779); 124(1779); 1 2 5 (1780 );
1 2 6 (1780 ); 1 2 7 (1780 ); 128(1781); 129(1781);
130(1782) ; I3 K I T 82 -I783 ) .
Historia.

II „

Tomos, 44, 168, 168, 186, 425/ 426.

Documents from the following legajos located in the
Archivo Hist6rico Nacional, Madrid:
Consejo de Indias. Legajo 20720:
"Expediente de
la Residencia tomada a D. Martin de Mayorga, 1 7 8 7 #"
"Representacion que dn Franco de Anda comisionado por
la Residencia del Virrey que fue de N. E. don Martin
de Mayorga, haze a V„M. en relacion de lo actuado en
cumplimto de dicha Comision, conforme a lo que se le
previno por R_1 Cedula de 19 de Sepre de 1783 anos ,"
"Interrogatorio y certificaciones en cuanto a la
guerra."
Legajo 20721s
"Decretos, pianos, certificaciones
sobre la costa de la guerra."
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